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the Nationalised .Industries, with Particular Reference to .the Gas Industry. 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis presents a real rate of return on capital which it is 
believed provides a better indicator of performance in the nationalised 
industries than methods used hitherto. British Gas is used as an example 
of how this indicator may be used in practice. 
In part one, alternative performance measures are discussed. The 
conclusion reached is that a real rate of return on capital provides the 
most suitable measure. 
Income is defined as gains arising during the year which may be 
distributed whilst maintaining the purchasing power of balance sheet 
assets. Capital is regarded as the equivalent in terms of purchasing 
power at the end of the year of the balance sheet assets at the beginning. 
The question of accounting for inflation and how this affects 
performance yardsticks is also considered. 
In part two, inflation accounting in the nationalised industries 
and certain private industries is surveyed and appraised. 
Part three presents estimates of the real rates of return on capital 
obtained by British Gas for the period 1960/61 to 1977/78, using the definition 
developed in part one. 
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.. INTRODUCTION 
' ' 
This thesis begins from a basic conern that the performance of the 
nationalised industries should be measured in the optimum way. If not, 
the_·wrong conclusions may be drawn by commentators and policy makers, and 
the resulting decisions may also be wrong. Thus, our concern is that the 
nationalised industries should provide decision makers with the correct 
information on which to make their decisions. Similarly, decision makers 
should understand what are the correct yardsticks by which they should 
measure nationalised industry performance. 
The first step in determining the correct yardstick is to consider 
the guidelines made by the government for measuring.:· nationalised industry 
performance. These criteria, which increasingly have stressed that the 
nationalised industries Should be run on commercial lines are outlined in 
part J appendix 1. Two of these criteria are marginal cost pricing and 
investment appraisal techniques. A detailed examination of these ex ante 
criteria is outside the scope of this thesis. However, the main problems 
concerning their use are presented in part 1 appendix II in the form of an 
annotated bibliography. These criteria are rejected because of their 
basic inapplicability, in general, to the problems of the real wor.ld - events 
often turn out differently than expected. The question then remaining to 
be answered is whether or not the government•s ex·post financial guidelines 
are the correct ones. 
Accordingly, the possible·ex·post criteria are surveyed and appraised 
. . 
in part 1 chapter 1. From this it is possible to determine which-method 
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is the most suitable for our purposes. Basically, a rate of return on capital 
. . 
employed i9 used~ However, minor adjustments are made to the definitions 
. . 
used in the governmental White Papers on the Nationalised Industries (G2, 
G3, and G7). For example bank overdrafts are added back to the assets base. 
We also take an entity view of the f.i·rm, and the view that income should 
be define~ as the gains which may be distributed whilst maintaining the 
.. purchasing power11 of the entity•s assets. Capital is defined as the equivalent 
. . . 
in tenns of the purchasing pm-1er at the end of the year of balance sheet 
assets at the beginning. Thus concern is with maintaining the firm as a 
productive entity in terms of maintaining the real value of the income 
streams from the capital of the firm, rather than the physical assets of 
the firm. 
This gives us the basic yardstick for measuring performance. However, 
it has been recognised for many years (see for example G2,p.5, para.8) 
that the existence of general inflation means that if the firm accepts the 
concepts of income and capital used here, account must be taken of the 
effects of the increased costs of replacing the physical assets and stocks 
of the firm. Similarly, inflation will affect the real value of the monetary 
assets or liabilities of the business. Any adjustments made for inflation 
will affect the component parts of our performance yardstick and the inter-
pretation that we place on its results. 
So, in part 1, chapter 2 the inflation accounting debate is surveyed 
and appraised. From this it is possible to develop the adjustments necessary 
to the basic·rate of return criteria outlined above. This provides us with 
a model that can be used to measure performance in a meaningful way. 
. . 
Before it is possible to use this model it is necessary to analyse the 
. . 
methods of inflation accounting which have been implemented in the accounts 
. . 
of the nationalised industries, since·we·wish to know what efforts have been 
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made already to provide more meaningful data for performance measurement. 
. . . . 
The results of this survey are presented· in part 2 , chapter J • The 
second chapter io part 2 presents a survey of inflation accounting in 
selected comparable private firms and industries. This is necessary since 
if significant differences are observed in the methods of inflation accounting 
employed by the public and private industries,comparisons of performance 
will be distorted. It 's seen from part 2· that a great diversity of methods 
of accounting for inflation have been introduced in both sectors~ But, most 
importantly, the methods employed have often been half-hearted, piecemeal, 
confusing, and, it could be argued with some justification, designed for 
other purposes than·assisting the measurement of performance. The evidence 
in part 2 strongly reinforces the argument that the correct information is 
not being provided to decision makers. 
Given the above, the ground is now clear to use the model developed 
in part 1. Owing to the constraint of time and space it was decided that 
one nationalised industry should be used as a case study. The gas industry 
was chosen for three main reasons: 
(i) It is an industry which has undergone a vast transformation over the 
last twenty years with the advent, initially, of new gasification processes 
(see for example 149 Ch.3 for a description), and, latterly, North Sea gas. 
Hence the effects of these changes on performance are of great interest. 
(ii) As the evidence in part 2 demonstrates, it is the industry which 
has progressed the farthest in implementing inflation accounting. 
(iii) In implementing inflation accounting it has encountered much criticism, 
especially with respect to its motives. Questions have also been raised 
concerni_ng the revalued asset base on which supplementary depreciation has 
. . . . 
been calculated, and the extent to which.the corporation has distorted comparisons 
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with its own·past and with other industries. 
Hence.the task in part 3 was to produce·comparable series of historic 
cost and replacement cost rates of return for the gas industry. 
In order that the rates could be compared in any meaningful way it was 
necessary to choose a period of more than one year. In the event it was 
decided to choose the period 1960/61 to 1977/78. This provides a sufficiently 
long period of time to show the effects of various institutional changes 
on BGC. One of these changes has already been mentioned - the change to 
different sources of gas. But other factors must be recognised, for 
example: (i) the 1965 Gas Act which instigated the move to ~:entralisation 
of c:ontrol, which was formalised in 1973 with the formation of the British 
Gas Corporation. (ii) The effects of Government anti-inflation legislation 
in 1973/74 and 1974/75 which led to severe restrictions on pricing. 
The calculation of a replacement cost rate of return also provides an 
independent check on the method used by B.G.C. Moreover, the data presented 
here provided information where none is available from BGC themselves, in 
particular replacement cost asset values and cost of sales adjustments. 
Initially it was hoped that access could be gained to unpublished 
raw data on the numbers of and costsNalues of land and buildings, cars, etc. 
so that the most accurate estimate of the replacement cost of assets, and 
hence replacement cost depreciation could be obtained. Whilst BGC were very 
helpful in explaining their methodology they declined to provide any unpublished 
material. So recourse was made to data published in the accounts of BGC 
and, prior to 1972/73, the Gas Council. Apart from the usual problems with 
accounting data, (see partl, chapter 1 for a discussion of these problems), 
. . 
we were faced with the task of estimating _age profiles from the published 
annual investment data. Ther.e were certain problems here since for assets 
with l~ng age profiles (e.g. mains, services) data on annual investments 
1 
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had to be estimated prior to 1949/SO.since·no data are.available pre-
vesti.nQ day. A second problem was that because of .the re~rganisation 
consequent upon the introduction of natliual. gas, many asset lives fluctuated 
over the period under study, since.older plant was being made obsolete before 
its estimated depreciation life had expired. Hence published data on the 
estimated average length of depreciation lives could not be used. 
Notwithstanding these problems it was possible to make estimates of 
the replacement cost rate of return for the period under study. But it 
is well to bear th~se problems in mind when analysing the results presented 
in part 3 chapter 2 that the estimates produced here prove to be reasonably 
close to the estimates made by BGC. Comparison of the replacement cost and 
historic cost series using our model are presented in part 3 chapter 
2. 
It is also appropriate to compare the replacement cost series for BGC obtain 
obtained by our method with replacement cost series for industry in general, 
since it is important to know the position of BGC relative to industry in 
general, on the grounds that if resources in the public sector do not earn 
a comparable rate of return to that earned by resources employed in the 
private secto~ this may be indicative of a misallocation of resources. As 
the replacement cost data for industry in general is not calculated on the 
same basis as the model used here it was necessary t.o produce a further 
replacement cost series for BGC on a basis comparable to that for general 
industry. Adjustments could not be made to the general industry series as 
the raw data could not be obtained. The adjusted BGC and general industry 
series are presented in part 3, chapter 2. These series show the relative 
performances of BGC and industry in general, in real terms. The limitations 
of adjustments for inflation based solely on depreciation and stock appreciation 
. . 
should be borne in mind when studying these series. 
Finally, the conclusions of the study are presented in part 4. 
PART 1 THEORY 
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· · Patt ·1 ~ ' · Ch ~ 1: · ·A· Review· of· Measutes· ·of· Petfotmance ·and· Effi ti ency 
· ·Inttoduction 
The choi'ce of the best measure of performance is not easy. To a 
. . 
. great extent the choice will depend on the purpose at hand. Furthemore, 
it is unlikely that one measure alone will tell us all we need to know 
about a firm's performance. This chapter reviews the various measures 
available and attempts to suggest which one might be most useful for the 
measurement of performance in the nationalised industries. 
That discussion is necessary of the kind presented here is evidenced 
by the difficulties encountered by the government in achieving a consensus 
of opinion on the best measure of performance and efficiency criteria for 
the nationalised industries. As Appendix I to this chapter makes clear it 
has taken almost thirty years to develop comprehensive, useable and relevant 
guidelines. It is against this background that the following discussion 
should be seen . 
. To discuss in detail the arguments of whether or not the nationalised 
industries should be run according to criteria of commercial efficiency 
would be outside the central theme of this thesis. It is evident from 
Appendix I that governmental guidelines have increasingly been moving towards 
a recognition that the nationalised industries should indeed be bound by 
criteria of commercial efficiency. Further,as Papps (130) among others, 
has argued, if the nationalised industries are to undertake "socially desirable" 
activities they should receive direct grants from the government and be 
left free to run themselves as efficiently as possible. Thus we take as 
our starting point the assumption that the nationalised industries 
should strive to achieve maximum efficiency. The subject of this chapter is, 
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then, to investigate which·measure or measures are most suitable for 
measuri_ng this. 
W~flst pricing and investment techniques are not central to a 
discussion of performance measurement and efficiency criteria they are 
discussed here (Appendix II) because the government White Papers have laid 
great emphasis on·ex·ante criteria. The main argument in this area is that 
. . 
if pricing and investment policies are correct then the financial oQjectives 
will be satisfied.~ But, as the discussion in Appendix II makes clear, 
. . 
although these methods have been developed to a high degree of sophistication, 
in an imperfect world with uncertainty, their use must be limited. Under 
such conditions it may be impossible to get pricing and investment correct. 
Accordingly ex post criteria need to be considered in preference to ex ante. 
Ratio Analyses as Measures of Performance and Efficiency·criteria 
The u~e of ratios to asses performance relies almost entirely on 
published balance sheet and profit and loss acount data. Before proceeding 
to discuss the various measures that may be used it is necessary to consider 
some of the problems associated with accounting data, which must qualify 
the use of accounting ratios in assessing performance. Morgenstern (112, 
Ch.4), for example, provides a good discussion of the problems. In particular 
are the following points: 
(i) the problem of measuring capital and profit which depends on the 
theories, opinions, conventions and traditions adopted by the particular 
firm in question. 
(ii) the completeness of measurement in the balance sheet and profit 
and loss account. E.g. the firm may not possess a complete asset register 
thus assets and depreciation will contain a measure of estimation. 
(iii) accounts contain information relating to different time periods 
and different money values and so non-comparabilities arise. In this context 
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a firm with. a newer asset structure than another fi·rm in the same industry 
may, even if the same profits are bei.'ng earned, appear less efficient using 
rate of return criteria. Different revaluation conventions between sectors 
will also introduce elements of non-comparability. 
(iv) similar firms may contain differing amounts of goodwill in their 
balance sheets. This makes comparisons difficult. Goodwill itself may 
introduce inaccuracies as it is likely to be a pure estimate of the excess 
. . . . 
of value of the assets of the firm over that shown in the accounts. 
(v) the stated value of an asset in a balance sheet, if based on market 
price, depends on the non-disturbance of the market by the sale of that 
-
asset. Hence industry aggregates will be unreliable. 
(vi) the writing-off of long-term expenditure, e.g. BGc•s writing-off 
of North Sea debts and early scrapping of gas holders, may be achieved by 
creating temporary assets, to which book values of displaced plant are transferred 
then charged against revenue. It may also lead to excessive depreciation 
provisions for a number of years. Hence care is needed in interpretati9n 
of performance over time. 
(vii) the revaluation of the ass~ts of one firm in'an industry, but not 
of another, will reduce the rate of return on capital and increase asset 
growth rates in the former. This may be overcome by a phased introduction 
of asset revaluation. 
In addition to the accounting problems the interpreb.bo,,of ratios is 
not without difficulties. Howe (62) has poi.nted to a number of difficulties. 
An excessive rate of return may be due to short run demand factors rather 
than to long run conditions of market power. Or it may arise through 
allowance made for risk, or because of supernormal efficiency. The possible 
existence of X-inefficiency in monopolistic conditions may mean that the rate 
1-obt!. 
of returnu.(t·/.o..~!; .• ,!it~excessive. Care must also be· taken in using accounting data 
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to test economic.theories of resource-allocation, because, as Stigler (173, 
pp.58-6l). has noted~ in the·case of corporate income tax a different concept 
of income is being used. Distinction must also be made between what is 
salary and what is return on capital to owners of small firms. 
. . 
A problem with ratios that is often ignored is pointed out by Whittington 
(201). This is that ratio analysis assumes the existence of a proportionate 
relationship between the two variables whose ratio is calculated. This 
assumption is invalid (i) if, say, a portion of a firm's profit is unrelated 
to the sales element or (ii) if the firm experiences decreasing returns or 
faces a saturated market, in which case the relationship is non-linear. 
These caveats apply more in the case of establishing a relationship 
for the purposes of prediction. But they may also apply. in the case of 
performance assessment against a standard. If, say, in the case of the 
return on sales ratio higher sales can be obtained only by a lower profit 
margin a non-linear relationship exists. In view of these caveats Whittington 
(op.cit) argues for the use of regression analysis. However, it can be argued 
,,,,&;,!' 
that it matters little for measurement against a standard if a no~~relationship 
exists - as one is comparing one ratio with another. Secondly, linear 
bivariate regression will not overcome the problem of linearity in ratios. 
It means simply an increase in the error term in the equation to be estimated, 
whi.ch provides evidence of non-linearity but not a means of solving it. 
There are other criticisms of regression techniques. Just as movements 
in ratios over time may be affected by variables-other than those included 
in the ratio, regression analysis may be affected by serial correlation in 
the error term. Regression analysis may also require the use of ratios as 
a deflator of the effects of size variations to overcome the problem of 
. . 
heteroscedasticity in cross-section regression analysis which produces 
unbiased but inefficient estimators2. Bias may be introduced in the use of 
- 11 -
ratios if a spurious relation ·exists between· ratios (Whitti_ngton ·E.P.· tit p.ll ).. 
This may ari·se if two·uncorrelated vartables are divided-by a conunon denominator. 
. . . . 
Whilst the solution is to ensure that the time relationship is in ratio form 
it must also be borne in mind that spurious correlations can affect regression 
analyses. 
Despite these fairly severe general criticisms of ratios (more specific 
points will be discussed subsequently) ratio analysis is to be preferred. 
As Whittington. (op.cit pp.l2-13) makes clear, the empirical justifications 
of this argument are still fairly tentative and whilst conceptually regression 
analysis may be better for prediction, for performance measurement, the 
argument is less strong. Moreover, whilst we have seen the deficiencies 
of ~ post accounting it may be best to use them because the conceptual problems 
of using discounted future income streams may be insuperable. Morgenstern 
(op.cit p.76) has suggested the use of probabilities of r·ealisation as a 
way of correcting errors in asset valuation. But the difficulties of 
calculating such probabilities, since data is not available, would cast doubt 
on the ~sefulness of this. However, as one recent fairly rigorous study, 
using Australian data, has shown (14) there is some evidence that financial 
ratios have some value in the industry context. Although, the authors 
express reservations regarding the link between ratios and policies, they 
do point to the extremely important problem that policy makers or leading 
institutions may place too much emphasis on strict adherence to performance 
·standards when data deficiencies would suggest that the standards should be 
seen only as providing a guidepost. 
Before turning to consider individual ratio measures of performance it 
is worth reiterating that whilst it may be considered that one ratio in 
particular gives the best overall view of performance for specific decisions 
other ratios may be useful. In other words reference may need to be made 
to what is called the .. pyramid of ratios ... 
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The foll owi.ng sections wi 11 consider measures of performance under 
the following headings: 
(i) Productivity.measures 
(ii) Value added measures. 
(iii) Profitability measures. 
(iv) Other - including internal financing, stock-market indicators and 
efficiency in the production function. 
Productivity Measures 
Probably the most well known use of labour productivity as a measure 
of performance in the nationalised industries is in the work of Pryke 
(142, 143). In justifying his use of output per man hour3 Pryke claims 
that profit figures disguise the use of inefficient technology, which he 
defines as technology which results in lower productivity than is possible. 
But the Polanyi•s (139, p.28), in criticising Pryke•s claim that the nationalised 
industries were becoming more efficient,argue that changes in productivity 
are imperfect as indicators of efficiency. Labour productivity ignores 
technical efficiency in plant operation, in distribution of the firm's 
product and it ignores levels of costs. It must also be pointed out that 
rates of growth of productivity which Pryke was comparing, say nothing 
about the relative degrees of efficiency existing. If nationalised industries 
were very inefficient prior to nationalisation, then rapid increase in prod-
uctivity may be merely a 11 Catching-up11 effect. 
It has also been argued (Papps, 130) that Pryke's measurement ignores 
relative scarcities and thus relative prices. If capital is relatively 
scarce and expensive surely it is a more efficient use of resources to 
use labour. Pryke (142,p.67) has recognised that labour productivity, 
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by itself, is not a good indicator because there is no mention of what 
input of capital is combined with the input of labour to achieve a 
particular output per man hour figure. Pryke has attempted to combine 
inputs of capital and labour. By dividing the increase in output by the 
increase in combined input of capital and labour he attempts to arrive 
at a more meaningful measure of productivity. But this refinement still 
does not attempt to solve the capital measurement problem; the figures 
for capital in the accounts are taken as given, which simply entails 
accepting an accounting (historic cost) basis for capital valuation. In 
addition there are theoretical doubts about the validity of any method used 
for the apportionment of labour and capital inputs. For example, 
i) the use of earnings of labour as the proportionate weight for the labour 
input relies on the doubtful assertion that people in each industry are 
paid according to the value of their output contribution; (ii) there are 
practical difficulties in distinguishing the changes in factor inputs, which 
may be due to substitutions because of factor price changes or because of shifts 
in the production function; (iii) changes in factor prices e.g. higher wages 
may not be due to changes in quality. Further, as the Polanyis observe 
(op.cit: p.37) even if the above caveats are ignored, the meaning of any 
changes observed is unclear. An increase in output per unit of labour and 
capital input may reflect the realisation of inherent economies of scale with 
growth of output. Moreover it could be argued that there are more than two 
factors of production, so that a measure using only two factors ignores important 
components affecting performance of the firm. 
The Polanyis carry out the same analysis of nationalised industry 
performance by using the measure of output increase achieved per unit of extra 
capital invested (op.cit p.40). This avoids the problem of assessing the 
value of the capital stock and changes in the value and in the capital stock. 
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But, again, like Pryke they accept the accountancy valuation of changes in 
it. 
The Pola·.nyis made allowance for changes in the labour force during the 
period under study, thus separating out the part of extra output that is 
associated with the capital input alone. The problem with this measure is 
that it tends to depress the apparent labour productivity growth in capital 
intensive industries because it relates extra output directly to the extra 
capital used. Hence the nationalised industries would be at a disadvantage 
vis-a-vis manufacturing. But this in itself is interesting from a resource 
allocation point of view. However, the use of this incremental capital output 
ratio may be no better than other productivity measures. Denison (33,pp.l21 
-122} alludes to some of the problems with this measure. Firstly an increase 
in physical capital is only one of many sources of growth so that its eff~cts 
could be either increased or reduced by positive or negative correlation 
between it and other growth sources. Secondly, the direction of causality 
between investment and growth is by no means clear. 
Later research by Pryke (145} has attempted to improve the use of the 
measure of combined labour and capital productivity, instead of using actual 
profits earned by the nationalised industries, which tend to be low, as a 
weight for capital ,an opportunity cost approach was used. Pryke•s method was 
to estimate the profits that would have had to have been earned to have 
provided for replacement cost depreciation and to have earned a ten per cent 
return on net assets at replacement cost. The wage salary bill was used as 
the labour weight. Comparisons of total factorproductivity are then made 
for the nationalised industries and manufacturing for the two periods 
1963-1968 and 1968-1973. 
This approach appears still to fail to overcome the problems discussed 
above. The.use of a ten per cent return on net assets at replacement cost 
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seems reasonable if the effects of stock appreciation are _ignored. 
However, if stock appreciation is deducted in assessing replacement cost 
rate of return, the evidence (41, p.37 Table A) suggests that the real rates 
of return range from ten per cent in 1968 to about six and a half per cent 
in 1973. 
From an empirical viewpoint evidence for the unreliability of 
productivity measures is provided by Harlow . ~57) and Lorenz (99,100). 
Investigating changes in productivity under nationalisation, Harlow found that 
there were no grounds for the belief that increasing capital inputs relative 
to labour inputs is the optimum way to improve performance. Nor does factor 
substitution in general cause productivity gains. The most important factors 
influencing productivity changes were found to be scale increases and 
technical progress. In the case of the gas industry, for example, fuel 
productivity increases resulting from technical change and the existence of 
capital expenditure constraints may be most important (57,p.236). Also there 
may be no consistent relationship between capital and labour productivity. 
For instance it was found in the air transport industry that labour productivity 
increased rapidly but capital costs hardly changed. 
Lorenz has pointed to the difficulties in using productivity measures in 
the context of international comparisons of performance of post offices. 
Comparisons are distorted by different initial levels of efficiency, differing 
times at which labour saving techniques were implemented (i.e. different 
plant mix), initial levels of automation of telecommunications equipment, 
penetration levels of telephone usage, changes in the length of the working 
week in one country but not another, and installing new technology ahead of 
demand in one country but not another will depress labour productivity in 
the installing country. Total productivity comparisons will be distorted· by 
conflicting financing and accounting practices. There is also the fundamental 
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problem of what is 11 0Utput 11 in the labour productivity ratio. Differing 
. . 
results are produced depending on whether telephones per employee, calls 
per employee or connections per employee are used. The evidence, says 
Lorenz, (99) suggests that the latter provides a more reliable comparison. 
The conclusions to be drawn from the above discussion of productivity 
measures appear to be firstly, that they are unreliable and secondly, and 
most important,·- that, c:m th~Jr Olt{n they do not impart sufficient information 
about efficiency. Productivity measures may be so misleading, as Farrell 
(38,p.263) observes, as to·indicate high performance because of increased 
productivity in every industry and yet result in a lower standard of living 
in the country. 
Added Value Ratios 
Added Value is the difference between the value of goods produced and 
the cost of materials consumed in manufacturing these goods. It thus 
discounts the effect of variations in material costs and represents the sum 
available to cover all wages, salaries, expenses and profit. Protagonists 
of the added value concept, such as Wood (e.g. 213) and Gilchrist (e.g. 45) 
have pointed out that unlike profit added value is not affected by depreciation 
policy, interest charges, development costs, wages etc. because all along 
with profit are contained within the added value. 
It is also argued that added value can provide a better measure of 
productivity because it is a better measure of output than sales turnover 
(e.g. Gilchrist op.cit, p.44). This is because sales turnover provides no 
information about the amount of labour input necessary to achieve it, and 
becau·se it contains the value of items bought from outside. But by defini·tion 
it appears that added value do·es not provide thi·s in.forniati:on .-either. If is 
contained within the added value figure but· niust.··be 'sep·arated ···out to· be~ 
meaningful. The same.applies to sa·les turnover)lhere· .. the1·cost·of the·"labOI:ir 
-
input is one of the costsdedticted to arrive at profit. Gilchri-st ·also '~_rgues 
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that sales may represent more or less than the value of goods produced· 
in the period. The use of adjustments for changes in the stock levels 
of finished goods is only useful if the stock changes were planned. 
Otherwise, as Wood (213) has pointed out, stock changes result from 
mistakendecisions i.e. the firm has been producing inefficiently. Whilst this 
is conceded it must be true that to measure performance effectively it is 
relevant to know what materials the firm has purchased f~om outside because 
it is necessary to consider all the resources of the firm. 
Moreover, if we are measuring productivity the denominator is the 
same as in the previous section with the attendant caveats alluded to 
there. Thus it seems that added value does not overcome the problem of 
measuring productivity especially since it only tackles the numerator in 
any productivity ratio. 
Another aspect, as Beattie (13,p.26) has argued is that variations in 
added value per employee may be the result of differing proportions of skilled 
and unskilled workers employed in different firms. Perhaps, mo.re usefully 
the use of the ratio of value added per £1 of labour cost provides an indication 
of the use made by a firm of its employees, if the firm insists on the use 
of productivity measures. 
Howe (62,pl3) has pointed out that if the ratio of added value to sales 
is obtained on a disaggregated basis, the degree of vertical integration by 
market may be measured. This may be useful for analysing the degree of 
concentration in an industry. In the firm context it may also be an indicator 
of profitability. Gilchrist (op.cit:.p.48) would argue that maximising this 
ratio maximises profit. However, movements in the ratio may be merely 
indicative of a sales mix comprising orders of changes in skills mix rather 
than being due to real changes in profitability. 
Much is made of the use of added value ratios in the short-run control 
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of the firm (see Gilchrist·~~cit for an example) by the use of such ratios 
as added value per employee, added value to sales, added value per £1 of capital 
. . 
·and so on. But Beattie argues·(op~cit p.25) that if we wish to analyse perform-
ance by functions or departments it is necessary to use ratios of profit to 
capital and cost to sales·as·well as added value. This is because a firm's 
value added results from the functioning of the firm as a whole. It is 
impossible to show the output of the production department separately from 
that of the sales department. In the example used by Gilchrist ~p.cit) 
where six different products are produced for separate discrete identifiable 
markets it is, of course, better to use added value. But this seems to be a 
special case. 
By definition added value circumvents the effects of inflation. But 
this may be misleading because although the amount of added value may not 
change over time when there is inflation it may conceal the fact that wages 
and overheads have increased in relation to profits. It thus seems necessary 
to. analyse the.components of it.· If indeed it is found that wages and salaries 
are high it still does not indicate where the inefficiency lies. We are 
.forced back to the analysis of the different functions of the firm discussed 
in the previous paragraph. 
It thus seems that since added value is defined to ignore materials 
purchased from outside and that since it emphasises labour and capital 
productivity it provides only a partial analysis. If certain internal functions 
are to be analysed then added value ratios may be useful, such as in the 
cases outlines above. However, for overall efficiency it may be more useful 
to use a pyrami~-of-ratios approach with return. on capital the focal 
point. As the advocates of added value are quick to point out return on 
capital is not without its conceptual problems. These will be considered 
in the next section. 
I 
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Before leavi_ng this section it is necessary to mention two 
further points. It is argued by some that the ratio of added value 
. . 
to capital employed may be a better measure of performance than the 
rate of return on capital employed (e.g. Wood, 210). However, it 
has been argued above that added value is deficient for measuring 
overall performance. It should also be obvious that to criticise 
return on capital employed because of problems of valuation of capital, 
and then to suggest the use of the same denominator with added value 
• 
as the numerator as a b~tter performance measure, as Wood has done (op.cit}, 
is inconsistent to say the least. Hence the use of added value to 
capital employed ratio daes not appear to solve the problem. Secondly, 
Ball (6,p.7) and others have made the usual point that profits or high 
rates of return on capital may not be indicative of efficiency of resource 
use alone, because they may contain elements of monopoly. It would seem 
that added value which contains profit must involve the same problem. 
Therefore, the conclusions to be drawn with respect to added value 
are that it has the same drawbacks with respect to the denominator as 
labour productivity and return on capital ratios; the exclusion of factors 
purchased outside the firm make it useful only for internal-comparisons of 
particular areas of performance; and as it includes a number of interdependent 
factors it is not possible to determine what is happening in the firm without 
breaking this down . We are then back with the problems of defining profit. 
From the foregoing it also appears that added value would be more suited 
to short run comparisons of performance, such as the comparison of forecast 
added value with actual, than to comparisons over time when factor proportions 
are changing. Lastly, on a practical note, the use of added value is 
limited because of a lack of available data. 
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Rate·ot·Return:an:capital · 
At the outset it must be clear that the rate of return on capital 
employed whilst being regarded by many as the primary ratio with respect 
to measuring performance by itself cannot reveal everything about the 
performance of the firm. For example an increase in the rate of return may 
result from an increase in the margin between costs and prices or it may 
result from using capital more efficiently relative to sales. The latter 
case is one of -~mproved efficiency; the former may result from increased 
market power4. To analyse these it is necessary to consider the constituent 
parts of return on capital i.e. 
Profit = Profit X Sales 
Assets Sales Asset 
From here it is possible to calculate a number of ratios relating to 
particular areas of performance. Hence a pyramid-of-ratios such as Fig.l. 
may be built up. From this, for example, we may examine the ratios of 
turnover to stocks. If these are low it could be an indication that the firm 
is carrying .more stocks than are necessary to keep at full production 
without running out of raw materials. If this is the case the company has 
money tie·d up which is not earning a return when there is probably a 
positive opportunity cost. Note that these are partial measures, which 
on their own do not provide an overall measure of performance. However, as 
a starting point for measuring overall efficiency we may take the rate of 
return on capital as this provides the closest approximation to the use 
made of all the resources of the firm. 
Rate of Return on capital has long been used by the Monopolies 
Commission as the primary yardstick for the investigation of the effects 
of monopolies on resource allocation, since it is an approximation for the 
overall rate of return. That the definition of return on capital is not 
· ·Profit 
Sales 
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M~asure of Business Success. Manchester Statistical Society 
Mar. 1961 p.27. 
inimitable and una~biguo~s is clear from Rowley's discussion of the 
.. guideposts .. used by the Monopolies Commission (154), and from Sutherland's 
critjque of Rowley (175). 
Discussion of the definition of the rate of return on capital for use 
in monopoly investigation was raised as long ago as 1952 by Silbertson and 
Solomons (164). 
These authors point to two fundamental issues at the heart of defining 
rate of return on capital: 
(i) what should be included in capital and profit 
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(ii) given (i) on what bases should capital be vnlued and i"ncome 
determined. 
It is proposed to discuss each of these in turn. It should be borne 
in mind that in assessing performance in the nationalised industries essentially 
the same approach is being used as for the assessment of monopoly returns. 
That is, interest focuses on the economic use of the resources of the firm 
as an er.ti .. ty rather than on the proprietorship of the firm. We shall return 
to this point in chapter two where more practical problems are discussed. 
(i) (a) Capital 
1. If comparisons are to be made of return on capital in an industry then 
it seems reasonable to use only the capital employed in that industry. This 
usually means that investments in associated companies, marketable securities 
and so on are excluded. It is a moot point as to whether or not the ·firm 
is using investments in the business. On balance it seems that investments 
should be included as their existence will affect the average rate of return 
earned by the firm. Moreover they may be sold to augment the liquidity of 
the business. This might apply, for example, if the firm experiences seasonal 
fluctuations. 
2. Excess or idle assets should be included e.g. vacant land because it 
is necessary to see if the firm is using all resources efficiently, and 
this included the degree of utilisation. The more idle or excess assets 
a firm has thenceteris paribus the lower will be the rate of return. It 
could also be argued that what may appear to be an idle asset, for example 
a building plot, may be being held as the firm expects to use it in future 
expansion. 
3. Arne~ (2) argues for the exclusion of goodwill because it represents 
the addition to book values necessary to al.ign the assets of the firm with 
the fi rm• s own valuation of its efficiency. Howe( op ~cit. p, 11) .agrees because 
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goodwill reflects the asset's ability to earn supernormal profits. Thus 
a rate o.f return calculated with the inclusion of goodwill would reduce 
the return on capital to:a •normal" level. The problem of goodwill usually 
arises· after a merger, where ,usually the acquirer pays a premium above 
the net book value of the assets of the acq~ired. Whilst this does not 
present a problem in the nationalised industries because the nationalisation 
statutes forbid merger activity it is important in the private sector. As 
Meeks demonstrates (106, Appendix A) to include goodwill biases the 
profitab~lity measure downwards, and may thus disguise the gains from the 
merger, which may be negligible anyway (for example see Meeks op.cit and 
Utton, 189). Meeks thus excluded goodwill in his study5• However, as 
Aaronovitch and Sawyer (1) demonstrate, there has been a dramatic change 
in the ratio of book value of the victim to price paid by the acquirer over 
the last fifteen years, i.e. a dramatic increase in goodwill. Surely 
this is closely related to the increase in inflation in this period? Goodwill 
could thus be seen as an adjustment for the undervaluation of assets due 
to inflation. But it does not constitute a coherent system of inflation 
accounting. Such an adjustment, if included, would also lead to distortions 
in comparisons with other firms who had not been taken over. 
On these grounds it appears logical to exclude all intangibles because 
the value placed on them wi"ll be subjective and bear no relation to future 
earning power. Moreover, if goodwill correctly measured, is included all firms 
will earn the same, normal, rate of return. 
4. The inclusion of assets at depreciated cost may be objected to on the 
grounds of arbitrary accounting conventions with respect to depreciation 
provisions e.g. Straight line, fixed percentage etc. Hence two equal firms 
may appear to have differing asset bases simply because of differing deprec-
' iation policies. Moreover, the deduction· of accumulated depreciation 
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. . 
provisions, it is argued, preju_dges the declini_ng efficiency of fixed 
. . 
assets which rate of return on capital seeks to measure. The use of 
undepreciated historic cost certainly overcomes the above problems of 
arbitrary allocation, and, it could be argued, it may compensate for the 
effects of inflation. But it is unsatisfactory because if-provides no 
information on the decline in value to the business of the asset, nor is 
it in any way a reflection of the real effects of inflation on asset values. 
As will be seen in the section on valuation it seems that depreciated replacement 
cost is the best measure of assets. 
5. Problems in inter-firm comparisons arise when firms have different 
proportions of hired assets. For the purposes of measuring 
economic efficiency, interest focuses on all the resources used to produce 
output, thus Arne~_- (op.cit, p.62)suggests that some imputed value of hired 
assets may be used, if it is not possible to obtain the actual capital value 
of hired assets. But for leasehold land and buildings it is a matter of 
entering the gross value. of the lease and depreciating this over time, as it 
is this which produces the income stream. Thus applying the same logic it 
would seem reasonable to use the gross lease value of the other hired assets. 
It could be said that if the firm is effectively burdening someone else 
to hold some of its resources, for example suppliers with stocks, then if 
the imputed adjustments are not made, the rate of return will be higher than 
it rea·lly is when all resources are counted. But, surely it is a reflection 
of efficient management if it can achieve this. Thus the rate of return will 
be correct. 
6. The question of investment charged to revenue may be pertinent to the 
nationalised industries. An example is the charging, by British Gas, of 
replacement of certain mains to revenue. The same points also apply to 
R & D expenditure. That is both have effects over more than one accounting 
period so that they should be included as capital, rather than as adjustments 
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to revenue. Th.e same applies to other non ... r ecurri_ng expenses. 
. . . . 
7. Given the above the question now arises whether gross or net assets 
should be used. In the case of British Gas the target rate of return set is 
the earning of a stated rate of return defined as net profit (pre interest 
but net of depreciation) on average net assets. Net assets are defined as 
fixed assets plus investments, displaced plant and deferred charges, plus current. 
assets minus current liabilities. Average net assets are used to take account 
of the assets used throughout the period rather than just those in use at the 
end. 
Now in essence the argument centres on the purposes for which the rate 
of return is being measured. As we are measuring performance then rate of · 
return should be measured in respect of all sources of capital. This would 
imply a total asset base. On the liabilities side of the balance sheet this 
means the inclusion of long term loans, equity (in the case of the private 
sector),bank overdrafts, minority interests and curren-t liabilities. An 
explanation of each of these is in order. If loans are excluded from 
liabilities, that is in the private sector we would be interested in a 
return on equity capital, then misleading information is conveyed because 
if it was not for the existence of the loan the entity could not have earned 
the rate of return on the rest of the assets that it did. 
As Silbertson and Solomons (op.cit'p.792) point out, this is especially 
crucial where the pre-interest rate of return differs from the rate of 
interest on loan capital and where loan capital accounts for a significant 
proportion of capital employed. Clearly, this is true in the case of the 
nationalised industries. 
In the private sector it could be argued that the rate of return on 
equity provides the best measure of management performance. However as 
Arney·. (op.cit p.64) argues it is by no means obvious that differing gearing 
{the ratio of loans to equity) reflects managerial efficiency or whether 
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it is simply the result of market arbitrage. Financi_ng differences 
. . 
should only affect the rate of return on assets to the extent that they affect 
the·asset structure, not the.finantial structure of the firm. Moreover, 
interfirm comparisons should not be obscured 'by differing financial 
policies. Neither should the stock market valuation of equity be used 
. . 
because there is only a long run tendency for the market value of a company•s 
shares to correspond to the value of assets they represent. This arises 
because of lags between increases in the assets earning power and increases 
in stock market valuation; stock market prices relate only to transfer of 
small parcels of snares i.e. they represent only incremental not total 
valuations; and stock market prices may be deflated below a true reflection 
of the earning power of assets because they depen~ on dividends which have 
tended to fall in recent years. This is due, to a large extent, to the 
increased cost to the firm of paying dividends arising from the tax changes 
introduced in the 1965 Finance Act. However, perhaps the strongest 
argument against equity is that if the stock market is operating efficiently 
rates of return on equity are equalised, since the price of shares include 
an element of goodwill. Th11s return on equity says nothing about different 
levels of efficiency. 
If a net assets view is taken then usually ~ank overdrafts are deducted 
from assets. But clearly bank overdrafts are essential to the overall 
performance of the firm. The exclusion of bank overdrafts has the same 
effect ·as excluding loans. Whilst minority interests are essentiilally no 
di"fferent from other classes of shareholders. British Gas makes a distinction 
between 11 Bank loans and overdrafts .. and 11 Bank overdrafts ... The former is 
treated as a capital liability, the latter as a current liability. It is 
unclear from the accounts what the precise difference is. It is assumed 
that it is a matter of the length of the loan/overdraft. This being · 
·;,. 
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so for the purposes of this thesis all are treated as capital liabilities. 
This leaves the question of current liabilities to be resolved. These 
include creditors, provisi1ons, and temporary deposits. It has been argued 
by some that the creditors element of current liabilities is in effect a 
permanent loan which in a continuing business is never reduced to nil 
{Taylor Harrington, 17.~). H.ence, it should be included as a source of 
capital. But if this is true, then by definition the debtors of the business 
must be a resour~ for another firm. Therefore, it is the· net position of 
debtors and creditors that represents the correct position. 
On the foregoing arguments we would conclude that the asset base to be 
used for measuring performance should be Fixed Assets, plus investments, 
displaced plant and deferred charges plus current assets minus current 
liabilities plus bank overdrafts. In other words we use a net-asset definition 
amended because of the inclusion of bank overdrafts. 
( i ) (b) Profi t 
Profit may be defined simply as sales revenue minus costs. If we are 
calculating a rate of return on capital then it seems reasonable that,for 
consistency in the arithmetic,net income should derive from the same 
activities i·n which capital. is.employed. Hence it should be subject to 
the same inclusions and exclusions discussed above. 
Of particular interest are the cases of depreciation and interest. 
It is argued here that depreciation should be charged as a cost against profit 
as it represents provision for replacement of assets which is essential if 
the entity is to satisfy the going concern assumption. Depreciation is 
discussed more fully subsequently. In the.case of interest payable to 
loan capital holders it was argued above that loan capital should be 
included in the capital base {if the asset base is viewed from the 
liabilities side of the Balance Sheet). Interest payments must be regarded 
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as payments to the suppliers of capital, not a cost. This payment should 
thus be seen as a distribution of the surpluses earned by a bus.iness on 
its operations. If we are comparing performance between two firms with 
differing proportions of loan capital, then if the two earn the same 
profit pre interest, post interest the firm with a greater proportion of 
equity will appear more profitable. This problem especially arises in comparisons, 
~etween the nationalised industries and private firms. 
When comparisons between small private firms and public companies are 
made, it is necessary to assess the profits of small firms before the deduction 
of those parts of the owner•s salaries which represent entrepreneurial profit 
rather than a fixed overhead. However, it may prove difficult to make the 
distinction between that part which is salary and that which is profit. 
The issue of taxation is ignored here since in the period under study 
I 
the tax liability of BGC was zero. 
' Notwithstanding the above, care must still be taken when ·making 
comparisons between differences in the length of depreciation lives of 
. 
similar assets in d1fferent firms, and differing stock valuation conventions 
which may produce different assessments of performance between two otherwise 
identical firms. 
A case peculiar to the special circumstances enjoyed by British Gas, but 
which is worth mentioning as an example of some of the less obvious. factors 
which may distnrt comparisons, has been alluded to by Targett (178). This 
is also of crucial importance in the setting of financial targets by the 
government. Targett demonstrates how, in the ca·se of BGC, differing 
depletion policies of natural gas affect the rate of return. Higher 
depletion rates produce a high rate of return. ceteris paribus because it 
means capacity utilisation is increased. Differing depletion rates also 
alter the attainable rate of return, so that targets must be set in relation 
to it. 
Now we turn to a discussion of the bases for capital valuation and 
income determination. 
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(i i) · ·capita 1 · va 1 uati on ·and· Income· Detemi nation 
Traditionally capital has been valued at historic cost, ostensibly on 
the grounds of objectivity. However, under conditions of rising prices 
and changes in relative prices, it may result in a firm seeming less 
profitable than another simply because it has a younger age profile of 
assets. Further, whilst the gross value of the asset-may be objective, 
subjectivity is introduced in the method of depreciation used. 
There appears to be a wide consensus of_opinion that the value of 
capital should be taken as the value of the asset to the business or 
"deprival" value (e.g. Baxter (12), Whittington (199) and Perrin (134). If 
relative prices change then historic cost is not a good proxy for deprival 
value. If historic cost is rejected then the choice is between three 
measures of current economic value, viz. net realisable value (NRV), · 
present value (PV) and replacement cost (RC). It is proposed that each 
will be discussed in turn. 
Net Realisable Value 
The main arguments for NRV are as follows 
(i) it provides proprietors with information on how much the 
firm would be worth if they were to dispose of it {-e.g. _Gray 
and Wells, 52); 
(ii) it produces the minimum value of any alternative use i.e. the 
best estimate of opportunity cost (e.g. Gray and Wells op.cit) 
(iii) it is the only relevant monetary equivalent which reflects a 
company•s financial ability to ad:apt (e.g. MacDonald, 102) 
Now, the three immediate points to note from this are firstly whether 
it is-useful to assume that the firm will be sold within the current period 
and from this, secondly, should the firm be seen as a fund of purchasing 
power or as a fund of productive potential? Lastly, does the alternative 
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use value, or exit value, represent the best proxy for opportunity cost? 
In most cases it is unlikely that the firm will be sold in the current 
period. The view that the -firm should be considered as a fund of 
purchasing power is, based on a proprietary view of the firm. It has 
been argued above that for purposes of measurement of performance all 
resources of the firm should be included in capital. In other words that 
the correct view of the firm for performance measurement, using an entity 
view, is that it is a fund of productive potential. 
Now opportunity cost is usually assumed to be equal to the value 
of the highest-valued alternative use. But it only follows that this must 
lie outside the business if liquidation is imminent or if the firm or industry 
is declining. Except in these circumstances, argues Arne~: (op.cit,p.72 
et.seq.) the true opportunity cost value of an asset not held for resale 
is its capital value not its NRV. Further opportunity cost may only be 
relevant with respect to the decision whether to acquire or retain, once 
. ' 
the decision is embodied in capital. Therefore, NRV as a proxy for 
opportunity cost is only useful as the condition for closing down or the 
lower limit of the profitable retention of the asset in the business. But 
the fact that the management keeps an asset is evidence, under rational 
profit-maximising assumptions, that management consider it to be worth 
more than NRV. 
Another argument must also be considered. If the assets of the 
industry are specialised, as in an entity like the gas industry. they are 
likely to be, then NRV may approach zero as there is no alternative market, 
except scrap. In the short run opportunity cost will be zero and any 
return after full allowance for replacement will be quasi-rent. But as we 
have argued above, production will continue in the longer run, and, if the 
firm is not declining, opportunity cost will exceed zero. In other words 
as Stigler has pointed out in a critique of Jev;9"s (17l,Ch.2)it is wrong 
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to assume that capital once completed is consumed. It will remain 
invested produci_ng a flow· of income and services unti 1 it can be depreciated 
through use and salvage value, and it will continue in that use regardless 
of its return. If we assume, as implicitly we have, that production levels 
are maintained, then in the long run opportunity cost is not zero. Fixed 
costs must then be covered or capital will leave the industry. 
Present·value 
It has been argued by some (e.g. Kay 70~ that if the objective is to 
provide information on the earning power of the assets then present value (PV) 
should be used. The use of present value takes into account the timing of 
receipts and estimates about the future. 
However, whilst present value is useful in a world of perfect foresight 
and certainty so that all expectations are exactly fulfilled, in practice in 
an uncertain world its use is diminished. 
Further, as Whittington (199) and Warrell (191) have observed, the true 
discounted value of the assets of the firm in toto is not equal to the sum of 
the separate asset values because the value of the assets computed on this 
basis is in part derived from the value of the business as a whole. The 
attempt to value individual assets at present value confuses the value ·to the 
enterprise of the mere possession of the asset ·with the value to the enterprise 
of the efficiency with which the asset is expected to be used. If the firm 
is considering whether or not to acquire the asset the present value ~s not 
the value of the physical asset but of the expected cash flows which will be 
influenced by and include the efficiency with which the firm uses the good. 
Thus it is not possible to assess the efficiency of the asset in isolation. 
Once the firm has the asset the maximum cost to the enterprise of losing the 
asset is not its present value. The removal of the asset, if it.is a 
replaceable asset, will not affect the valuation of associated intangible 
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assets, ~rganisati"onal effici(mcy.etc.~ since.the increase in the value of 
. . . . 
these, which.results from purchasing the asset or having the opportunity 
to purchase it and which is embodied in the present value, is transferable 
to a replacement asset. Hence present value appears to be an unsuitable 
estimate of the current economic value of the asset. Also, if we measure 
performance using the ratio Profits:Assets and the valuation of these is 
based on discounted future receipts then changes in the value of the denominator 
will also cause changes, automatically, in the value of the numerator. Thus 
we have a problem of lack of independence. 
Moreover, it is clear that the use of PV,if calculated correctly, will 
reduce the rate of return to a 11 normal 11 level because PV includes the economic 
rent earned by the asset. 
Replacement·cost 
The valuation of assets at replacement cost may be difficult because: 
( i) 
( i i) 
the cost of replacement is a function of the time available 
(Silbertson and Solomons,·op~cit); 
the firm may not replace like with like, i.e. net investment may 
be made in replacement. (Silbertson and Solomons, op.cit); 
(iii) current replacement cost may reflect market imperfections i.e. 
(iv) 
(v) 
it may include an element of consumer•s surplus (Arne~/; op.cit); 
a 11 owance must be made for ex pi red service (Arne~ .' , op. cit) ; 
the maximum price a prospective purchaser would be prepared to 
pay for the firm is not necessarily equal to the sum of the 
individual replacement costs of the assets. 
However, these factors may merely mean that the replacement cost 
produced is only an approximation to the ideal value, the problems are 
not insurmountable. It may be assumed that the cost of replacement does not 
vary significantly with the amount of time available, if in most cases the 
firm has time to consider all alternatives. The second problem may be 
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overcome largely by using price· indices and the fourth may be solved by 
adjusting the depreciation provision. 
Returning to our three concepts of deprival value it can be seen 
that there are six possible rankings: 
·Tab 1 e ., : · ·Ranking· of· Valuation ·Concepts 
maximum loss on deprival 
and correct basis of 
valuation: 
1. NRV > PV > RC RC 
2. NRV > RC > PV RC 
3. PV > RC > NRV RC 
4. PV > NRV > RC RC 
5. RC > PV > NRV PV 
6. RC > NRV > PV NRV 
Source: Sandilands, G4 para.218 Table 4 p.59 
·As Kay (70,p.301) points out instances where NRV is greater than 
either PV or RC are unlikely to persist. Thus for practical purposes the 
six options reduce to two, numbers three and five. In case five, the maximum 
loss on deprival is less than RC, so that the firm cannot gain as much by 
either using the asset or disposing of it. Examples of this case are 
highly specialised assets specific to one industry, and/or assets with 
extremely low productivity or utilisation. Thus whereas it does not pay 
the company to dispose of the asset since PV > NRV, it does mean that the 
company will not replace the asset when it wears out as RC> PV. Apart 
from the specific reasons given above for not using present value as the 
value of the asset to the firm we have also argued that as the firm is to 
continue in business it will replace the asset. 
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Thus we are left w.ith. three where the firm is better off usi_ng the 
asset and will replace· it.· Here also i"t can Be seen that the maximum 
. . 
loss on dep~ival will be replacement cost. Therefore, the basis_for 
valuation should be replacement cost. It represents the closest 
approximation to capital value. 
There is one further point that needs to be tackled. Myddelton (119) 
has argued that exchanges occur precisely because the buyer prefers what 
he buys to what he pays for it. Thus the cost price is not equivalent 
to the value to the buyer, and hence a hypothetical RC is not even an 
approximate measure of value to the business. But equivalence is not 
necessary. All that i.s required is a satisfaction of the inequality 
condition, that replacement cost is less than (or equal to) the value 
to the business. 
In considering income valuation we must be clear about our definition 
of income. There seems to be widespread agreement on ~he use of a Hicksian 
definition of income. Following Hicks (59) we may measure income as that 
amount which may be consumed or distributed during an accounting period 
and leave the business as well off at the end of the period as it was at 
the beginning. In other words it is the amount necessary to maintain the 
substance of the firm. However, from this at least five concepts of 
income (or profit) may be isolated (see Table 2). 
It has been argued above that for purposes of performance measurement 
it is essential to measure income before the deduction of interest 
payable on loans. In other words an entity view should be taken. On an 
entity view, interest payments which are a transfer from shareholders 
to creditors should not be brought into the account at all. To deduct 
them as well as the adjustment to depreciation and cost of sales amounts 
to double counting. If a proprietary view is taken then interest payments 
must be deducted from profit. But in times of changes in prices, as will 
.·· 
·' 
Table 2: Concepts of Incom~ 
Concept of 
Income 
1. Gains arising during 
year which may be distrib-
uted whilst maintaining 
monetary ~mount of share-
holders interest at 
beginning of year. 
2. Gains arising during 
year which may be distrib-
uted whilst maintaining 
'purchasing power' of 
shareholders interest at 
beginning of year. 
3. Gains arising during 
year which may be distrib-
uted whilst maintaining 
oronu~tive capacity of 
assets~ 
4. Gains ar1s1ng during 
year which may be distrib·· 
uted whilst maintaining 
'purchasing power' of 
amounts on balance sheet 
representing assets at 
beginning of year. 
5. Gains arising during 
·--·year-which may be distri-b-
- uted after charging for 
'value' of assets consumed 
during the year. 
Capital 
Regarded as: 
Monetary amount 
of shareholders 
interest at 
beginning of year 
Amount at end of 
year equivalent 
in purchasing 
power to monetary 
amount of share-
holders interest 
at beginning of 
year. 
Productive 
capacity of 
company at beginn-
-ing of year. 
Equivalent in 
terms of 
'purchasing power' 
at end of year of 
balance sheet 
assets at beginn-
ing. 
Note Concept 
of Firm 
Basis of Proprietarship 
Historic 
Cost 
Accounting 
CPP Method Proprietorship 
Replacement Entity 
cost 
accounting. 
Used by Philips 
in Holland. 
-, 
Similar to Entity 
concept 3, 
except 3 
based upon 
maintenance of 
physical assets 
'Value to the Sandilands/ 
Business of the ,;!~D/18 basis 
Comp~ny's Assets. 
Entity 
Source: F. Sandilands Inflation Accounting Cmnd 6225 (1975) pp.32-38 
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be discussed in more detail below, adjustments should be made to 
proprietary profit for the real gain on monetary liabilities because 
. . 
this is a gain to shareholders at the expense of creditors. It seems 
. . 
to the present author that failure to distinguish these two concepts of 
the firm leads to confusion in assessing the performance of the firm and 
how this is affected under inflationary conditions. 
It has been argued that for performance measurement using the rate 
of return on capital an entity viewpoint should be used. This immediately 
rules out the first two concepts outlines in Table 2. 
Now under the assumption that the·:firm will conti.nue in business the 
aim must be to maintain the capital of the business intact. The question 
arises as to what is meant by this. Concept 3 (in Table 2) would contend 
that it involves the maintenance of the physical assets of the entity. 
Hence gains would not be regarded as profit until sufficient funds have 
been provided to replace the assets consumed during the year. The problem 
is that the company may not wish to replace its assets by exactly the 
same kind of assets even though it wishes to maintain its productive capacity. 
As Kay (op.cit p.302) has pointed out the Sandilands definition (Concept 5) 
uses a definition of capital as being value to the business but as Sandilands 
itself defines this, in most cases, to the current replacement cost 
(Sandilands G4,p.56) it seems that logically there is no difference between 
the two concepts. 
Now if Concept No. 4 is examined it is seen that we are still concerned 
with the maintenance of the firm as a fund of productive potential. But 
in maintaining this we are concenred with maintaining·the real value of 
the income streams from the capital of the firm, rather than the physical 
assets of the firm. From an economic point of view, this concept would 
appear to be the correct oneto use. 
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On this bas·is we·may still use a measurement of capital based on 
replacement cost, a:s outlined above. That is if relative prices are not 
constant, and with a given constant· general price leve 1, his tori c·,cost is 
unsuitable. 
' The adjustments necessary to income will be as follows. To maintain 
the purchasing power of fixed assets and stocks of goods and materials 
a deduction should be made from income. Changes in purchasing power should· 
be measured by the movements in prices of the fixed assets and stocks. 
This assumes that the company will continue to invest money in the same 
types of fixed assets and stocks in the future as at present. In most 
cases this will be a reasonable assumption. In the case of British Gas, 
of cou~se, it could be argued that with the change from town gas to North 
Sea gas, the Corporation is investing in different assets. 
It will also be necessary to make adjustments for the gain/loss of 
purchasing power due to the effect of relative price changes on net monetary 
liabilities/assets. Whereas for fixed assets and stocks a specific index 
would be used, for adjusting monetary assets in the absence of any information 
on what the monetary assets would be used to purchase a general index such 
as the-Retail Price Index should be used. 
At the same time as the extra depreciation allowances should be deducted 
from income,it is also necessary to record the gain to the firm from holding 
its existing assets compared with the position it would have been in if 
it did not own the assets. 
Traditional accounting income distinguishes two types of gain - the 
realised operating gain and the realised holding gain. As the traditional 
model is based on historic costs it only recognises gains when they are 
realised. If we use a concept of income which bases its measurements on 
replacement costs, current period income will be recognised in both its 
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realised and unrealised forms. Th.e latter is represented by the change 
in a resources replacement cost prior to realisation. The question of 
. . 
whether holding gains represent income centres on what capital is required 
to maintain. All holding gains will represent income if we are simply 
interested in maintaining the money value aggregate of replacement cost 
capital. If we are interested in maintaining the physical resources and 
productive capacity of the entity then unrealised holding gains do not 
represent any change in this, and realised holding gains may not do so either 
if the realised cash has to be used to replace the realised resource at 
a cost different from the original. But as we define capital maintenance 
as maintaining the earnings stream then it should be classed as income. 
McElroy (103) writing in the context of national income accounting, 
argued that in the real, changing, world, if capital gains or losses are 
excluded the income stream is distorted as we arbitrarily mix current and 
part relative prices. Capital gains indicate that expected future 
consumption flows have increased, i.e. capital had earlier been misvalued. 
If we exclude holding gains and depreciate at replacement cost we understate 
total income since the .increase in net worth is not recorded in the period 
when it is perceived, but it is depreciated out when the increase in consumption 
-
which the increase in net worth anticipated actually occurs. We would thus 
be adopting an arbitrary periodisation rule of income. 
The problems of adjusting income and capital will be returned to in 
the next chapter where the effects of inflation are discussed in detail. 
The discussion here has sought to outline valuation concepts. 
A few minor, but surmountable, problems remain. Firstly, adequate 
historic cost records are required to be able to adjust assets to current 
cost. Secondly, intangibles may be excluded because historically they 
are not recorded. Thirdly, should assets be revalued at 11 Used 11 value or 
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"new minus depreciation"? Fourthly, should replacement value be that of 
an identical asset or that of one producing the equivalent output? Lastly, 
. . 
on what basis should stocks -and debtors and bank balances be valued? 
In practice most firms appear to keep adequate historic records. 
However, in the case of the gas industry, where there were historic problems 
due to nationalisation, a comprehensive asset register did not exist as 
recently as 1977·. We have argued above that intangibles should be excluded 
for purposes of assessing performance. In principle it does not make any 
difference whether assets are valued at "used" or at "new minus depreciation .. , 
although there is some evidence (nee Arnold and Huefner (3) that the use of 
indices, which are based on prices of new goods, are more reliable ·than 
suppliers list or secondhand price lists. As interest focuses on retaining 
operating capacity it is necessary to use the replacement value of an equivalent 
asset. As debtors and bank balances are in monetary terms NRV = RC. Since 
stocks are likely to be sold within the period then ideally NRV should be 
used. However, for practical purposes NRV of stocks is not likely to 
differ significantly from RC 
Other Measures of Performance 
(i) Some ratios wid~ly used in analysing performance of the private sector, 
such as Dividend Yield, P/E ratio, Earnings per Share etc. are quite obviously 
irrelevant to the public sector and can be rapidly dispensed with. 
(ii) Until recently the nationalised industries ~tere encouraged to finance 
as much new investment from internal funds as possible. The view held was 
that the more a firm/industry can finance investment internally the less 
it has to rely on borrowings, and thus the lower will be any interest payments 
that the firm has to make. Thus one suggested measure of performance was 
the self-financing ratio. However, as pointed out in Cmnd 7131, and elsewhere 
(68) self-financing ratios-reflect changes in the level of investment as 
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much as ch~nges in the level of profitability. They also completely overlook 
. . . 
the opportunity costs of t~ese funds. 
(iii). ·Asset·Growth If a firm opts for growth maximisation then it is 
assumed, at least by the models in the literature, that it will not 
simultaneously maximise profits.A trade-off takes place between growth and 
profitability as the marginal investments become less and less profitable 
beyond the optimal point. Growth maximisation may lead to a greater than 
prcrportionate increase in the managerial system of control with the 
accompanying growth of X-inefficiency and other managerial diseconomies of 
scale. These diseconomies may be overcome, argues Williamson (204), by 
the move from a U-structure (unitary) of management to an M-structure (divisional) 
of management. 
However, growth maximisation will be constrained to the extent that 
the growth of assets must be financed. The supply of finance at one point 
in time will be limited. If the firm grows by the use of internal or 
external finance the amount by which it can grow will be closely related 
to its profitability. In the former case last year's profit and this year's 
retention ratio control next year's investment. In the latter case, unless 
the firm is reasonably profitable it may be difficult to raise finance via 
new issues and borrowing. The empirical evidence, however, suggests no 
clear relationship between growth and profitability (see for instance the 
survey by Eatwell (35)). 
Asset growth may be obtained in two ways: 
(i) internal growth 
(ii) external growth 
The evidence available would suggest t~tfor firms in general these 
two factors are complementary (see for example, Aaronovitch and Sawyer, 1). 
Further, in attempting to determine which of these contributes more 
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t~ growth it may be· impossible to isolate thei'r separate effects. But 
there is some evidence.to suggest t~at firms partaking in mergers did not 
find them successful. The work of Meeks is one for example. A study of 
Utton·(op~cit) of merger intensive firms in the UK suggested that companies 
heavily dependent on mergers had lower efficiency and lower profitability 
than companies whose long run growth is slower but whose internal efficiency 
can be sustained. 
The calculation of asset growth by mergers is complicated by the problem 
of what value is to be put on the assets of the firm acquired. UK standard 
accounting practice offers no clear-cut guide with the result that it is 
fairly arbitrary whether book value or purchase price is used. If the acquirer 
pays a price exceeding book value of the firm•s assets then the problem: 
of accounting for goodwill arises. A full discussion of this problem is 
beyond the scope of this thesis6, but it seems that the main alternatives 
are to (i) enter goodwill in full with no revaluation of the acquired firm•s 
assets or (ii) revalue the acquired firm•s assets and enter as goodwill 
only the excess of purchase price over this revaluation. It could be argued 
that because of inflation the historic book value of a company•s assets 
is understated, thus goodwill should be included as an estimate for this. 
But as Howe (op.cit. p.ll) argues in the context of monopoly and restrictive 
practices investigation, goodwill should be excluded because it reflects 
the assets• ability to earn· super normal profits and a rate of return calculated 
with the inclusion of goodwill would reduce the ratio to a 11 normal .. level. 
If either goodwill is included or assets are revalued on merging, then 
assets will be seen to increase, whereas if goodwill is excluded or assets 
are not revalued the asset growth will not be so great. 
However, in the case of the nationalised industries the nationalisation 
statutes forbid merger activity so that this aspect of asset growth does 
not apply. 
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The use of internal growth as a measure ~f performance may be 
. . 
unreliable where apparent growth results from the firm revaluing its 
. . 
assets. In any case the use of asset growth tells us nothing about 
how those assets are being used and hence says little about resource 
allocation. 
(iv) Sales·GrQwth 
As· with asset growth sales growth competes with the object of profit 
maximisation. Hence, as was seen with asset growth it tell us nothing 
about the level of efficiency of resource allocation. 
(v) Other forms of technical efficience are based on the specification 
of the production function of the industry in the most efficient way· from 
an engineering viewpoint (for example see the path-breaking article by 
Farrell, 38 and the review of the literature in this area by Todd, 181). 
These methods by their nature tend to be partial and restricted to firms 
with a fairly homogeneous structure. Otherwise problems arise of different 
capital vintages, and of the availability of sufficiently detailed information 
relating to different plants and products. 
Problems may arise because of the difficulty in measuring particular 
inputs. In measuring technical efficiency interest focuses upon the optimum 
combinations of physical inputs. But data may not be available in a suitable 
form, for example if the numbers of labour employed are taken as the labour 
input then bias may arise as differential skill levels are ignored. The 
existence of inflationary elements in accounting data may obscure the 
real resources being used. 
Measures of technical efficiency also face problems of accounting 
for changes in relative prices. After the decision to invest has been 
taken changes in relative prices cannot be taken into account as the 
possibility of substitutuion of input factors is practically impossible. 
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Lastly, to take technical efficiency·in isolation from the environment 
. . 
in whicfi"the firm exists is to·ignore important factors which·may affect 
the overall efficiency of the firm. 
·Part·l Ch~l: Summary·and·conclusions 
A number of criteria for performance measurement and efficiency 
assessment have been examined in this chapter. That there is much inter-
dependence between these various criteria should be abundantly clear. 
The two main ex ante measures outlined in Part 1 Appendix II have 
been shown to have developed to a high degree of sophistication and it 
has been indicated in which cirsumstances it is possible to use them. 
But, in an imperfect world with uncertainty, their use must be limited -
actual events often turn out in a way different from that predicted. 
Accordingly ex post criteria are required. 
The discussion of these criteria alluded to the problems of using 
accounting data, but concluded that it was better to use this data because 
of the insuperable problems of using discounted future income streams. 
Otherwise, if we get bogged down in such semantics little progress. would 
be made in measuring performance. 
It was clear that the ratios themselves suffer to a great extent from 
problems of definition and that many of them only related to particular 
parts of the entity, i.e. they were partial measures. The point was made 
that, to measure performance completely, a number of ratios would have to 
be used, and an example of a pyramid of ratios was given. But it was argued 
that, as a starting point for analysis, one ratio should be used as a 
guidepost. It was concluded that this should be the rate of return on 
capital employed. From the ratio discussed the rate of return on capital 
employed provides the broadest overall view. However, its definition and 
use are not without problems. 
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The conceptual problems of capital and income valuation have been 
. . 
examined in some detail. The argument concerning what to include centred 
. . . . . . 
on the objective at band. As the objective here is the measurement of 
the overall performance of the firm all resources available to the firm 
should be taken into account. Thus for example, loans should be included 
Table 3: Comparison of B~G~C~ ·consolidated Income and Capital on Different 
... . . . . . 
INCOME 
1. Profit Pre-interest 
post depreciation inc. 
INCOME AND CAPITAL 
As in BGC On Basis of 
Accounts Defi ni ti ons 
Used Here (1975/76) (1975/76) 
£m % £m 
other income 201.9 
2. After adding back 
capital items 
charged to revenue 
(48.lm). 250.0 
CAPITAL 
1. F.A. + C.A. - C.L. 
2. F.A. + C.A.- C.L. + 
Bank overdrafts 
3. Add capital items 
previously charged 
to revenue 
Pre-interest rate 
of return 
2280.6 
2298.6 
48.1 2346.7 
.8. 9 
% 
10.7 
Note: that in BGC accounts Bank overdrafts are subtracted from capital 
but included· in pre-interest profit. 
Source: BGC. Annual ·Report and Accounts 1975/76 pp.36,37,44,45. 
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in capital, and income should be calculated before deduction of loan 
. . 
interest because it is the existence of the loan which enabled the firm 
to perform in the way that it did. Interest payments must be regarded 
as payments to the suppliers of capital, not as a cost. In other words, 
an entity view of the firm was taken. 
Comparisons, over time, of performance would be distorted, it was 
argued, if firms charged what may be better seen as capital items {for 
examples, R + D expenditure, and replacement of fixed assets) against profit. 
It is interesting to compare the rate of return on capital of BGC 
on the basis as defined in their accounts and on the basis adduced here 
(see Table 3). Assets are increased by adding back bank overdrafts and 
items previously charged to revenue and income is similarly increased by 
adding back this capital item previously charged as a cost. The rate of 
return on capital increases significantly7. 
The bases for capital valuation and income determination were discussed. 
Three possible methods of capital valuation were considered- NRV, PV and 
RC. It was argued that, as the firm is assumed to continue in production 
in the long run and is not declining, the opportunity cost of the assets 
was best measured by capital value not NRV. It was further argued that 
replacement cost provides the best approximation to capital value. In 
the case of income measurement it was contended, using a Hicksian definition 
of income, that the maintenance of capital should be interpreted as meaning 
the maintenance of the real level of income streams to the firm. 
The discussion placed emphasis on the fact that it was an examination 
of the valuation process of income and capital. Before it is possible 
to state the model to be used to appraise the performance of the British 
Gas Corporation it is necessary to consider the effects of changes in the 
general price level on capital and income calculation. Therefore, we turn 
in the next chapter to consider the inflation accounting debate. 
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Part 1: Ch. 2 :·· ·The· Measurement· of· Income· and· capital · \~i th ·a· c·hanging 
Introduction 
The concepts of capital valuation and capital maintenance to be 
used were discussed in the previous chapter. 
In this chapter the effects of inflation on the arguments in chapter 
one will be tackled. It will be necessary to refer to some of the other 
concepts outlined in Table 2 of chapter one. Principally the relevant 
concepts are two and five. These formed the basis for the inflation account-
ing proposals put forward in provisional SSAP 7 and in the Sandilands 
Report and subsequently ED18 respectively. These proposals are outlined 
and discussed in Part 1: Appendix III. 
From Ch.l Table 2 it is seen that the SSAP7 income is concerned with 
the gain in the purchasing power of shareholders interest and that capital 
maintenance here seeks to maintain the monetary purchasing powe~ of the 
shareholders interest. It thus uses a proprietary view. Sandilands/ED18 
recognises income as gains after charging for the value of assets consumed 
during the year and capital as the value to the business of the company•s 
assets. It is interesting to note that SSAP7 recognised the validity of 
using a replacement cost accounting approach for management, (i.e. entity 
purposes (6l,Appendixl)) but rejected it on the grounds of subjectivity. 
But SSAP7 did recognise the effect of relative price changes on replacement 
cost. However, this raises wider issues. If accounting is to measure 
economic performance and income and capital are to be defined in Hicksian 
terms then relative prices must be accounted for, in addition to general 
price changes. As argued in the previous chapter, if the price of the 
assets of the firm increases relative to things in general then there has 
been a real increase in its income stream. This condition holds both in 
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times of stable and risin~ general prices. Thus it seems essential that 
an inflation accounting system must contain two parts, an adjustment for 
. . 
the change in general prices (pure inflation accounting) and an adjust-
ment for the change in relative prices (a valuation adjustment). The 
system proposed in SSAP7 merely adjusted for the change in general prices. 
The Sandilands system adjusted only for the gross change in relative 
prices. But both of these approaches stemmed directly, of course, from 
the concepts of capital and income used. 
We now examine, in the light of the above, the warious sides of the 
inflation accounting debate. 
Capital ·valuation and Income·Measurement 
Consider for a moment the conflicting arguments of SSAP7 and Sandilands 
/ED18. 
The protagonists for SSAP7 contend that a general price index should 
be used to adjust asset values and that the purpose of replacement 
depreciation is to maintain the real purchasing power of shareholder•s 
interest intact, rather than maintaining the physical capital of the 
business as in Sandilands/ED18. Further, it is argued by proponents of 
this view that the assets of the firm are unlikely to be replaced by new 
assets which are exactly the same, because of changing technology. In 
addition the maintenance intact of physical assets provides little info.rmation 
about the income streams deriving from those assets. 
These views have been criticised on a number of counts. Firstly, 
it is argued by Howe (61) that a general approach contravenes the going 
concern concept of financial accounting. By not taking account of the 
changes in the purchasing power of money which directly affects it the 
firm is failing to maintain itself as a going concern in the long run. 
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Secondly, the use of a broad based index produces a smoothi_ng effect 
. . 
which-suppresses informati"on showing the randomness of actual price 
changes relating to the portfolio of net assets held by the firm. Thus 
this view is adduced by Standish (168) who says that it is only by the 
use of specific indices that a firm specific definition of the current 
value of net assets can be achieved. 
Thirdly, there is no guarantee that the assets of the particular 
firm in question will have moved in the same direction and by the same 
amount as general prices, as a result of inflation. 
Lastly, if shareholders or other interested parties wish to know 
the general effects of inflation then they would be better off consulting 
other, publicly available, statistical information because the information 
in a company's accounts is a lagged indicator of the effects of inflation 
because the shareholder has to wait until well after the end of the 
financial year before the information is available. 
These considerations would suggest that a more specific range of 
indices should be used in asset valuations. But there are certain reservations 
to be considered. It has been argued (118,119) that the use of specific 
indices departs from the objectivity concept of historic cost accounting. 
The force of this argument is reduced, however, when it considered that 
subjectivity enters historic cost accounts, for example with respect to 
apportioning of overheads, obsolescence, the calculation of depreciation 
and the capitalisation of some assets but not others. 
Inaccuracies may arise because the available specific indices do not 
fit the asset categories of firms precisely. This is a well known problem 
but whilst in some cases an arbitrary decision is made as to the industry 
class to which a firm belongs, approximations of this nature will, it is 
said, produce better estimates than an index based on a theoretical and 
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abstract. 11 basket of goods 11 such·as the retail price index. Evidence that 
the retail price index does not provide a reasonable approximation to 
specific industry indices is adduced by Bourn, Stoney and Wynn (16,17) 
and Peasnall and Skerratt (133). The remaining argument here now centres 
on the use of asset specific rather than industry specific indices. Whilst 
Bourn·et al (17) and Peasnell and Skerratt·(op.cit) produce evidence that 
asset specific indices produce 11 better11 results they do recognise the 
usefulness of the industry specific indices that are published (in G6 for 
example). But they say it is possible to produce asset specific indices 
from the existing data base, so the advent of these should simply be a 
matter of time. 
One final point concerning industry indices. Price controls in times 
of high inflation may distort the indices. This may occur if a price is 
kept artificially low so that it would be expected that excess demand 
existed. It is difficult to see how an index can take account of this. 
The problem, though, only arises if all industries are not affected equally 
by price controls. This inequality may arise where a firm has a high 
proportion of imported raw materials. It is assumed, however, that in 
such cases the specific index will be no worse than the general index. 
Some authors would wish to depat·t from the use of indices on either 
the general or specific bases. 
Arney {2,p.91) puts forward the case for using fire insurance valuations 
on the grounds that these are comprehensive, a definite value is required, 
the firm usually insures at reinstatement value, replacement values are 
determined by applying some rate of depreciation to replacement cost as 
new, and revaluations are made regularly. However, in times of rapid 
inflation these revaluations may lag behind the inflation rate. In any 
case the use of insurance valuations may be possible for internal use, 
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but th.e information is.not available to the external researcher. 
A method used by.Shashua and Goldschmidt (158) attempts to value 
assets in aggregate by the assumption of a uniform age distribution and 
an average rate of growth of assets, so that an average rate of inflation 
may be used in the revaluation. The supposed advantage of this method 
. . 
is that it overcomes the problem that use of indices means a restatement 
of historic cost in current prices and not a revaluation. But the 
assumption of a uniform age distribution assumes the problem away. 
Differing age distributions make a significant difference to the overall 
assets value so that disaggregation must be used. Consider the effects 
of assuming that gas mains have the same age distribution as gas board 
vans. How the length of the age profile is to be decided upon is not made 
clear. If a relatively short age profile is used then assets such as land 
and buildings will be underestimated. If a relatively long age profile 
is used then assets such as motor vehicles will be overestimated. It 
seems that if sufficient information is available then a more accurate 
approach is to calculate the age distribution for each asset by adding 
back each annual investment until the balance sheet gross book value 
less disposals at the end of the current year is obtained. 
The method of continuously contemporary accounting, developed by 
Chambers (22) and used by Gray (51) has three main features: (i) it 
retains the conventional historical recording system (ii) it periodically 
makes adjustments to assets ad and when reports are required so as to 
record changes in their current cash equivalents, and (iii) it periodically 
records the adjustments necessary to profits and losses which will maintain 
shareholders equity in terms of purchasing power. Thus it is hoped to 
account for both changes in the relative prices of assets and for the 
effects of genera 1 purchasing power ga.i ns or 1 osses to equity capita 1 . 
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However this method bases its valuation of assets on current selli_ng price 
. . . 
or net realisable value.· But we have laid down the argument against the 
use of NRV in the previous chapter. If the firm is to continue in business 
then it is required to renew the assets of the firm as they wear out. 
Thus for most purposes replacement cost is the relevant valuation concept. 
. . 
· ·sandilands considered but rejected the notion of valuing assets on 
a CCA (Current Cost Accounting} i.e. specific, basis and then adjusting 
them in subsequent years for changes in the purchasing powerof money, 
the CPP (Current Purchasing Power) approach. This approach was considered 
to be too complex (G4, para. 546). Sandilands was also scepttcal about 
the validity of any measure of general inflation and thus left it to the 
interested party to make his own adjustments for the decline in _value of 
the monetary unit (paras. 45-47}. But this seems a curious argument to 
adduce. Whilst the deficiences of the retail price index are recognised 
it has hitherto been satisfactorily used as a basis for measuring general 
inflation. For·sandilands to argue otherwise seems a weak case for the use 
of specific indices. It seems perfectly reasonab.le to use specific (CCA} 
indices to take account of relative price changes since the date of purchase 
of the asset, but as under conditions of inflation the monetary unit 
declines in value then a general (CPP} adjustment would present the figures 
in the accounts in real terms. 
Again the distinction is related to the view taken of the firm. The 
pure CPP method does not maintain the purchasing power of the income stream 
from the assets in the balance sheet of the firm, but taking a proprietary 
approach it seeks to maintain the purchasing power of the shareholders 
interests. The CCA method seeks to maintain the physical assets of the 
firm rather than the real value of the income stream to the firm as an 
entity. 
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Operating·Prafit·and·Holding·Gain 
The historic cost system of accounting introduces an element of holding 
gain into the profit calculation because depreciation and consumption of 
stocks are charged at the prices historically paid not the cost of replacing 
them. The holding gain in historic cost accounting is recognised at 
the point of·realisation as a form of cost reduction. When accounts are 
adjusted for inflation the income in the value of assets representing the 
holding gain is recognised as it occurs, that is it is an unrealised 
holding gain. 
Now Sandilands recommended that distinction be made between operating 
gains, defined as turnover minus .. value to the business .. of inputs, and 
holding gains, defined as 11 Value to the business .. of inputs minus their 
original cost. Defined as such it was argued that operating gain would 
approximate closest to the Hicksian definition of income. Further, by 
separating out holding gains from operating gains, and placing them in 
an appropriation account outside the profit and loss account it was intended 
that the interested party would see what gain was due to skill of the 
management and what was due to the forces of chance. 
But Kay (op.cit) has pointed out that operating gains are equivalent 
to repeatable profit only if everything which is classified as a holding 
gain is an unexpected gain (a 11Windfall 11 in the Hicksian sense). Thus the 
analysis made by the Sandilands Committee is only valid if all past price 
changes were unanticipated and prices are expected to remain stable in 
the future. It is doubtful whether either of these two conditions have 
much empi rica 1 support. Moreover, as Arne~ .. · ( op. cit. p. 114) observes it 
is a function of management to anticipate relative price changes. Thus 
holding gains should be an element to be included in measuring performance. 
Moreover it is not necessarily true that holding gains and operating gains 
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are the result of different decisions as Sandilands implies. In practice 
the two' are inextrica~ly ·linked. 
It has also been argued by Kay· (op~tit)and Baxter (12) that operating 
profit gives an unclear picture to interested parties because operating 
profit is on the one hand reduced by the increased cost of sales and 
depreciation, but·it is not compensated for by the increase in asset 
values. Thus it is-contended that operating gain is not equal to Hicksian 
income or distributable profit. 
Before proceeding further with the distinction between operating _gain 
and holding gain it is necessary to consider in detail cost of sales and 
depreciation adjustment. 
Cost·of·sales·and·oepreciation·Adjustments 
One suggested ~ethod of adjusting for changes in the cost of sales 
has been that stocks should be valued on a LIFO (last in first out) basis, 
so that the most expensive stock is charged in the profit and loss account, 
and the cheapest appears in the balance sheet, rather than the opposite 
happening as with FIFO (first in- first out). 
But it has been pointed out (e.g. Howe, op cit) that this is not a 
replacement valuation policy. It is suggested that a more realistic method 
may be to retain the FIFO basis, carrying forward in the balance sheet the 
.,.. 
most recently acquired stock at cost or market value, but charging stock 
deemed to have been used in production in the p.rofi t and 1 oss account at 
replacement valuation, with the amount of stock revaluation being taken to 
a reserve. 
Baxter·(op~cit) suggests that the cost of -stocks should be raised 
with the general index. This is because of the time lag between purchasing 
of stocks and rate of goods which means the cost in pounds of one date are 
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subtracted from the cost tn pm:mds of another. To be consistent it is 
necessary that the outlay on stocks means as much this year as it did last 
year. The use of a general index gives recogni-tion to the maintenance of 
. . 
real rather than physical wealth. But it also assumes that there has been 
no change in relative prices during the time l~g. As Morley (113) has 
pointed out stock appreciation can derive from a change in relative prices, 
which produces an increase in profitability, and from a change in the general 
level of prices. In the former case if a firm purchases raw materials 
before prices rise, it holds stocks which are appreciating without incurring 
additional costs. Operating profit remains constant, but because of stock 
appreciation a real gain to the firm results. If stocks are purchased after 
the price rise then operating profit falls because of the increased cost, 
but the stock appreciation remains. Thus the overall result, in this instance, 
is no fa 11 i n,rprofi tabi 1 i ty. In the case of a genera 1 rise in prices, then 
there will be nominal stock appreciation. If inflation is 10 percent, the 
stock appreciatipn will be 10 percent of the value of the volume of stocks 
at the beginning of the year. Morley concludes. that it is only in the 
case of the change in relative prices that the accrual. is real. 
A similar point is made by Gibbs (43) who argues that Sandilands errs 
because it does ·not take account of the timing of price increases. Under 
the present price control system a company is usually prevented from putting 
up prices to reflect the higher cost of stocks until all the old stocks 
have been sold. But if it is to maintain the same quantity of stock without 
having to. borrow,it must be allowed to put upprices as soon as the cost of 
its purchasing star~ to. rise. This will produce a stock profit, but it is 
not to be confused with stock appreciation, which Gibbs defines as the 
increase in the cost of holding a given volume of stock. Gibbs contends 
that the Sandilands Committee make an error when they describe the two as 
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synonymous. Thi.s also implies that taxation on ·stock appreciation should 
be restricted to tfiat amount of ap!Jreciation over and above the. general rise 
in prices. 
Another deficiency in the Sandilands method of stock a~justment has-
been alluded to ~Y Kay·(op~tit). Kay contends that because the stock 
adjustment is arrived at by an averaging method, which is approximated by 
multiplying the average of opening and closing stocks by the average price 
increases in the year, then stock appreciation can be exceptionally high 
or low. As. the starting point is the original cost of stocks,then if the 
original cost is exceptionally high or low, the adJusted cost will be. 
Therefore, gains which are due to luck or skill in the timing of purcha~es 
will be embodied in Sandilands operating profit not in holding gain. Thus 
we should include real holding gains as part of income. 
In the case of depreciation, it was seen earlier that Sandilands 
and subsequent proposals (see Appendix III) suggested that depreciation 
should be calculated on the replacement cost of assets. 
Using a specific index it is suggested that the appropriate method is 
to inflate the historical depreciation charge in respect of a fixed asset 
each year using the specific index relating to the fixed asset concerned. 
But as Howe·(op~cit) points out this method will not guarantee sufficient 
funds to replace the original fixed asset if the final replacement cost 
is calculated as the original cost times the final replacement cost index. 
It has been suggested that back-log depreciation should be charged. 
That ~s depreciation provisions should be adjusted for subsequent changes 
in the.price level to ensure that depreciation provisions made at the life 
of the asset equal the replacement cost of the asset at the end of the 
period. However, as Howe·(op~tit),.Baxter (op~cit) and Kennedy (76) have 
observed, this may not be necessa~v. As long as the accumulated provisions 
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are of such a kind that their value ts likely to move more- or less in 
line ~lith the asset" in question they provide a perfectly good"hedge" 
against unforeseen movements in the price level. Also if the matching 
principle is adhered to then any change in the price level of the fixed asset 
concerned which takes place after current depreciation has been provided 
for- i~ not relevant. Thus a* current revenue is being matched with current 
cost the appropriate value of the pound in which to express depreciation 
expense is the value of the pound in which the current period•s revenue 
is expressed. This hinges on the assumption that in providing for 
depreciation we are trying to adjust for the use of the asset rather than 
trying to spread the replacement cost. The provision of backlog depreciation 
would thus change the whole concept of depreciation. Moreover, if 
depreciation is thus· considered to provide for the replacement cost of 
the asset then the depreciation charged annually in the proft and loss 
account for the year will exceed the value to the business of the asset 
consumed during the year. Sandilands (paras. 474 - 483) has recognised 
this problem. Sandilands (para. 606) also points out that whilst it is 
not necessary to charge backlog depreciation an adjustment must be made 
in the balance sheet so that the cumulative depreciation provision matches 
the difference between the gross and net book value to the business of the 
depreciated assets. 
So returning to the discussion of operating profit and holding gain 
it has been seen that Sandilands operating profit is reduced because it 
attempts to maintain capital in terms of physical assets rather than 
striving to maintain the real income stream from the assets. This is the 
reasoning behind Sandilands showing holding gain-separately from operating 
gain. 
Leading on from this Sandilands contends that holding gains cannot 
be shown as profit, and therefore cannot be distributed to shareholders, 
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because they have not. led to an increase in the c·ash flow of the business. 
This has led Kay·(op~Cit) to accuse Sandilands of producing a measure of 
profit which is not a measure of profit but of liquidity. 
That liquidity is important to firms was emphasised by the liquidity 
crisis in much of British industry in 1973/4. Evidence provided by Lawson 
(e.g. 87) suggests that because of inadequate information on cash flows 
companies have been distributing to equity holders an excessive amount of 
earnings. 
Exponents of cash flow accounting criticise conventional accounting 
because of the difficulties of measuring profits and capital.· Traditional 
historic cost profits do not represent the cash flow of the company. But 
if the primary objective of the company is to survive then in the last 
res·ort· this means the company must have the ability to meet costs, repay 
loans etc. The accounts should show how well this has been achieved. Cash 
flow is objective, it automatically deals with changing costs and prices 
as all entries are at current value, and by entering receipts and expenditures 
when they fall due cash flow accounting avoids the problems of gains/losses 
on net monetary liabilities. Some would argue that instead of devising an 
elaborate structureof inflation accounting it is preferable to use a cash 
flow accounting system. (Lawson, e.g.(86) and Sumner, 174). However, the 
main problems with cash flow accounting are in defining profits for the 
year when the accounting system it requires does not match revenues and 
costs; to be of most use it requires the incorporation of cash forecasts; 
and whilst a positive cash flow tells us the firm has no liquidity problems 
it provides no information as to whether or not the firm is allocating 
resources efficiently. But despite these shortcomings it is useful to have 
information on cash flow positions as supplementary information as a guide 
to whether the company is in danger of imminent collapse, as Sandilands 
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recognised (para.518}. 
The problem of profitability versus liquidity has led to disagreement 
. . 
over whether holding gains may be distributed to shareholders. A number 
of writers have argued that profitability has not increased as a result 
of holding gains and that to distribute such gains would lead to disaster 
(84,108) as Pilkington (136) argues if a firm followed the above advice 
its asset values would fall and its borrowing base would probably have 
been eroded because it would have passed part of the gain, that eventually 
becomes evaporated due to plant obsolescence, through into distributable 
earnings. 
Merrett and Sykes (lOG) argue that it is incorrect to say that 
profitability has increased on the basis of a gain from an option that the 
company has no intention of pursuing, that is se 11 i_ng the fixed asset to 
realise a holding gain. Further, in times of inflation, this gain if used 
for capital expenditure is not 11 Voluntary 11 in the sense that it will enhance 
the future position of the company. Rather, it is necessary in order for 
the firm to keep going at the same level of activity. They further argue 
(110) that a company said to be more profitable because of holding gains may 
have no resources with which to pay dividends, taxes, wages etc. 
Merrett and Sykes have been criticised by Kennedy (74) who claims that 
they confuse liquidity as being synonymous with profitability which is a 
characteristic of inflation, especially when the real rate of interest is 
negative. A number of methods have been suggested which reveals this 
possibi 1 i ty. 
One commentator (Gibbs 43) has favoured a combination of CPP and 
CCA methods in providing a better indication of profitability. The 
method suggested has four main features: 
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(i) operating gains are calculated after allowi_ng for maintenance of assets 
employed, as in CCA; (ii) all items of income and expenditure are adjusted 
. . 
to £s at the beginning of the year and are thus based on a standard 
measurement unit, as in CPP (iii) holding gains/losses on fixed assets 
and stocks are shown as real gain/losses because the general inflation 
element of the rise in prices is removed, and (iv) the gains on holding 
net monetary liabilities are included as in the CPP system. It is contended 
that this producesa better view of the profitability of the company than 
a CCA system which understates operating profit but overstates total gains 
because holding gains shown reflect general inflation rather than real 
holding gains/loans. 
A development of Gibb's method has sought to produce a more appropriate 
definition of money profit, that of a distributable surplus having maintained 
fixed and working capital intact, while also retaining the inital ratio of 
debt to shareholders funds (i.e. the same gearing ratio) which is conven-
tionally used as a measure of financial strength. This method, developed 
by Godley and Cripps (47) assumes that the firm invests the required amount 
to maintain its capital intact, in terms of the Sandilands' definition 
of capital maintenance. Further, as a result of operating gains resulting from 
real gains in fixed assets, stocks and monetary liabilities the basis is 
pro_~ded for raising further debt which produces cash available for 
distribution to shareholders. This arises because in times of inflation 
interest should reflect an amount of compensation to the lender for loss 
on the real value of his money, in addition to the nominal rate of interest. 
This amount over and above the nominal rate of interest is thus really a 
capital transfer and should not be included in the profit and loss account 
which is conceived by Sandilands to be a strictly current account balance. 
If it is treated as a charge against profit then this makes a 
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provision for reconstituting the real value of the assets due to a company•s 
creditors and thus less than the whole of the appreciation in the company•s 
assets is needed to reconstitute the assets due to the company•s shareholders 
to their original real value. The proportion of such asset appreciation 
which, if full interest is allowed against profit, should be allowed to be 
outside the profit.balance is given by the ratio of Shareholders Equity to 
Total Assets. 
Alternatively, still excluding from profit that part of interest 
payment which represents the difference between the nominal a~d the real 
rate of interest on the grounds that it is a capital transfer, it has been 
suggested (Jay, 66) that the disallowed interest could be shown as a debit 
in the holding gains section of the accounts below the line at which profit 
is shown. Thus this would, it is argued, avoid the problem of double-
counting which the inclusion of working capital and interest payments in the 
profit and lossaccount produces. Some {e.g. Lawson, 84) would disagree 
with this, arguing that S~ndilands does not fully account for working 
capital. Two ways in which the situation may be rectified are suggested by 
Lawson:-
{i) charge annual interest in the profit and loss account at a company•s 
weighted average cost of capital, on total working and fixed capital invested 
so that total interest and depreciation equal depreciation calculated at 
the cost of equity capital on an .annuity basis plus interest on total invested 
working capital calculated at the cost of equity capital plus loan and 
overdraft interest paid minus deot interest recalculated at the equity 
interest rate. 
or {ii) the Total Corrective equals total capital expenditure plus/minus 
the periodic increase/decrease in total working capital plus loan and 
overdraft interest paid minus/plus long, medium and short term debt raised/ 
redeemed. 
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As Sandilands uses parts of (i) and (ii) the total corrective falls 
short thus depreciation is likely to be inadequate. In part (ii) the 
last two parts represent the benefit derived by substituting debt capital 
for equity. But, Lawson argues that if this is done the substitution will 
be offset by the higher cost of equity capital in the first parts of the 
calculation. Thus it seems to Lawson that adjustments ~ la Gibbs, Godley-
Cripps, and Jay compoundthe overstatement of shareholders• earnings. 
Lawson goes on to argue that whilst a company•s debt raising capacity 
may increase in times of inflation because of a monetary increase in the 
asset and interest cover, this will not affect shareholders•profit. If 
the company, as a result of gains due to inflation, adjusts its capital 
gearing ratio upwards by raising debt and simultaneously distributing the 
cash to shareholders then this debt-for-equity substitution alters the 
allocation of a given income between debt and equity providers, but it a~so 
increases the risk class of each remaining equity share althougb 
equity holders are compensated by receiving a higher (geared) income per 
share. The net effect is that the market value of new debt is equal to the 
market value of displaced equity - equity prices do .not rise because the 
higher equity income is capitalised at a higher discount rate reflecting 
higher risk, and although debt gets lower income per unit it has a higher 
preference on income. There has been simply a transfer of an equal amount 
from equity to debt. In other words Lawson appears to be saying that to 
distribute income by debt financing is to trade-off future dividends for 
higher current dividends if the real expected earnings stream i-s unchanged. 
But as Gibbs and Godley-Cripps have shown it is legitimate to include 
as income that amount of holding gain over and above the holding gain 
due to increases in the general price level. This produces the· basis, in 
terms of a real increase in profitability, to borrow to increase distributable 
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profit. In other words the real expected·earnings stream has increased 
. . 
even though the company cannot realise the asset to increase its actual 
cash flow as Lawson would like, as this would contravene the going concern 
assumption, the owner of the asset has increased his·potential command 
over all other goods and services and is thus better-off vis-a-vis non-
owners. Further, as Kennedy (72) points out,by wishing to keep in business 
the owner of the asset is implicitly saying that the economic value of the 
asset is greater than its market value, and subjectively the owners assessment 
of the gain he will make is greater than the profit he would realise. Thus, 
in order to take his profit he can borrow more on the strength of the rise 
in its market value, and since the owner estimates economic value to be 
greater than market value he must expect that future cash flows· will be 
sufficient to service the interest on the loan. In other words the owner of 
the asset is able to preempt part of the late:nt cash flow from the disposal 
of the asset. 
It does seem that lawson is ~reoccupied with cash flows and liquidity 
rather than profitability. Kenned~ whilst agreeing that the raising of the 
new debt is part of the cash flow of the company (76), disagrees with lawson 
(85) that it is related to operating cash flow. The gearing adjustment which 
is generally agreed to be a capital adjustment enters the profit and loss 
on loans 
account after the deduction of interest payable/and so does not affect the 
provisions needed to maintain productive capital. The general adjustment 
is necessary because, contrary to the view adopted by lawson (82) the 
actual amount of interest represents a discount on costs below the current 
market rate sufficient to account for the gain due to inflation, the actual 
figure shown does not represent the real cost only the money cost. Watson 
(192) puts the point clearly by considering the problem from the viewpoint 
of a monetary asset. If the firm had a monetary asset yielding x of money 
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income and the whole of x were spent each year then in successive years the 
company could produce.fewer and fewer quantities of physical goods. But if 
the interest received is corrected for its reduction in purchasing power by 
deducting from the interest received an amount equal to the rate of inflation 
. . 
times the value of the asset this would produce a figure for real income, and 
if all this were spent each year the firm would still be able to purchase 
the same amount of physical goods each year. 
Thus, the real gain on monetary liabilities, the other side of the coin, 
must be considered as income. This depends on the assumption that the firm, 
in maintaining capital,aims to maintain the purchasing power of that capital. 
Now it is essential, as has been argued, that for assessing performance 
an entity view of the firm should be taken. In other words income should 
be measured before the deduction of interest payable on debt, because interest 
charges represent a transfer from equity to debt. For purposes of assessing 
shareholders• income it is necessary to deduct interest payments. Now if geared 
holding gains are not added back then an ungeared company will appear more 
profitable than an otherwise exactly similar geared company, simply because 
of a negative real rate of interest. 
The special position of the nationalised industries, which in general 
has attracted comment · 
have no equity worth consideringi It has been assumed so far by the industries 
that loans could be regarded as being akin to equity and thus no adjustment 
is required 
along the lines suggested by the Hyde Committee (63)i Now, the Hyde guidelines 
(op.cit. para.S) state: 
"If the total liabilities of the business •.. exceed total 
monetary assets, so that part of its operating capacity is effectively 
financed by net monetary liabilities, an adjustment should be 
made to reflect the extent to which depreciation and cost of sales 
do not need to be provided in full from the current revenues of the 
business in showing the profit attributable to the shareholders." 
Strict adherence to the Hyde guidelines would mean that the gearing 
adjustment would add back practically all of the increased cost of depreciation 
.,. 64 .,. 
and sales previously deducted. This would seem reasonable. given the gain 
. ' 
due to the reduced burden of servicing debt. But note that this applies 
' . ' 
to the position after interest has been deducted. We have argued above that 
' ' 
it is the pre-interest position which provides the relevant information for 
assessing .performance. 
Thus if we regard interest on debt as an appropriation of profit 
rather than a charge, that is we take an entity view, then the correct profit 
is arrived at before all ·financing costs, including interest. 
Inflation·Ac:counting·and·Taxation 
In the context of the nationalised industries the issue of taxation is of 
little more than academic interest. Thus it is not proposed to pay more than 
cursory attention to the issues involved in inflation accounting and taxation. 
Essentially the argument centres on the fact that unless adjustments are 
made to the taxation system, then corporations will bear an excessive tax 
burden under inflationary conditions. This is because some sales proceeds 
will be used to purchase replacement stock at current cost, which will usually 
be higher than in the previous period. Under the historic cost system tax 
is chargeable upon the difference between sales proceeds and historic .cost. 
The government went some way towards recognising the problem of the 
increased cost of stocks by the introduction of tax relief and 100 per cent 
first year tax depreciation allowances on new investment in 1974. This was 
merely a deferral of tax liability. It may have resulted in some companies 
building up large tax liabilities which affects their financial position and 
borrowing capacities. One observer (Stanley,l69) has pointed out that because 
the relief takes no account of changed stock values those companies wit~ 
inefficiently high stock levels get tax relief on them. Sandilands and Gibbs 
(op.cit) endorsed this system as a useful 11 rough and ready11 form of inflation 
accounting for tax purposes. Other, for example,lawson (84), argues that it 
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is at least a necessary condition for operationalising the principle of 
tax neutrality, that is where the imposition of a tax produces a neutral 
effect on the allocation of resources in the economy (see Musgrave R.A. and 
Musgrave P.B (117) p.417 for a discussion of the conditions for neutral 
corporation tax). In other words it is argued that the tax system should 
be reformed to achieve neutrality, but that the proposals put forward by 
Sandilands and subsequent proposals give inadequate tr.eatment to the problem, 
and hence the business decision remains distorted. This is because the 
present system taxes distributed profits at a different rate from retained 
earnings, hence the cost of equity finance is raised relative to that of 
debt finance. Interest payments are allowable as a charge against profit, 
whereas dividend-s · to equity holders must be paid out of post-tax profits. 
However, the point is that for purposes of performance measurement 
interest focuses on pre-interest pre tax profits. 
Summary·and Conclusions·on Inflation Accounting and Performance Measurement 
A number of often contradictory views have been put forward as suggestions 
for the way in which the firm may account for inflation. In summarising 
these suggestions we concentrate on those pertinent to the task of performance 
measurement 
As a starting point we take the conclusions from chapter one, that in 
measuring performance an entity view of the firm must be used. Included in 
capital are fixed assets, plus investments, plus current assets mi:nus current 
liabilities. Income is valued before the payment of interest, and after 
maintenance 
provisions have been made for the ~·1 of capital, which is defined as 
maintaining the purchasing power of the assets in the balance sheet. 
Given this background the methods of adjusting asset and income valuation 
in times of inflation could be obtained. 
Basically, assets, as defined above, are to be adjusted by applying 
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specific indices to the historic cost of fixed assets. This provides an 
estimate of replacement cost. 
Income valuation proves to oe more complicated. Three of the adjustments 
that are necessary are fairly straightforward and uncontroversial. Turnover 
and operating costs are adjusted to take account of the fact that they accrue 
throughout the year. Following the methodology of SSAP7 this adjustment is 
carried out by multiplying the relevant data by the ratio of the end of year 
general price index to the average general index for the year. (Note that 
the current thinking of the accounting profession omits this adjustment). 
If the replacement cost of the assets and stocks of the business increase 
then the extra cost of replacement must be charged against revenue. The extra 
cost~ it was argued, should be calculated using specific indices rather than 
general indices, since whilst interest does not focus on replacing the same 
physical assets it does focus on replacing the same type of assets. Thus 
from an entity viewpoint general indices are not the correct indices. (The 
mechanics of calculating stock and depreciation adjustment are outlined in 
Part I Appendix IV sections I and II). In times of inflation the real value 
of the monetary assets of the business will be eroded, thus an adjustment 
must also be made for their maintenance. Following Kennedy (77,p.63) it 
is argued that trade monetary liabilities should be included here to give a 
figure for net monetary assets (trade liabilities are seen as negative 
monetary assets). Using a general index the figure for net monetary assets 
is adjusted to provide an estimate of the amount by which net monetary 
assets would have to rise to be maintained in real terms. The amount so 
calculated is deducted from profit as the adjustment necessary to maintain 
the real value of net monetary assets (see Appendix IV, section IV). 
By far the greatest controversy surrounds the treatment of holding gains 
resulting from a rise in the general price level, from that resulting from 
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a change in the.specific price level. The dtfference between the specific 
. . 
and the general holding gain is the real holding gain on the asset. 
As Kennedy (77, p.60) point out, following Godley-Cripps, the general 
index holding gain on an asset financed by borrowing is equivalent to the 
monetary holding gain on the assets, since equal but opposite adjustments 
will be made to the sum borrowed and to the historic cost of the asset! 
The net result is the holding gain on the asset itself. Thus the gain on 
financing assets by borrowing, the gearing gain, should be added back to 
entity profit to produce proprietary profit. 
On the grounds of prudence (Kennedy, op.cit p.61), viz. that no 
unrealised revaluation surpluses should enter the profit and loss account 
the Hyde Guidelines apply the gearing adjustment only to those holding 
gains· represented by the adjustments to depreciation and cost of sales. 
Strictly, the gearing adjustment should be applied to all holding gains, as 
Gibbs and Godley-Cripps have argued. 
As we have already pointed out, in the nationalised industries, which 
are financed totally by borrowing, the calculation of proprietary profit 
by adding back the gearing gain _g__J,g, Hyde, would virtually offset the 
deductions made.for increased depreciation and cost of sales provisions. 
But, as interest, in this instance, focuses on the firm as an entity, this 
problem need not concern us. 
However, the ungeared real holding gains is of importance. Thl.1s, the 
difference between the holding gain calculated using a specific index and 
that calculated using a general index, should be regarded as income, as the 
consensus of the arguments in this chapter suggests. As such it is available 
for loans to be raised so that the cash can be distributed to shareholders. 
But, recall the definition of income. employed in this thesis, that is the 
gains arising during the year which may be distributed whilst maintaining 
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the purchasing power (i.e. the real income stream) of the amounts on the 
balance sheet representing assetsat the beginning of the year, and the 
arguments concerning capital gains outlined in chapter one. These two 
points suggest strongly that·entity income will be understated if capital 
gains are excluded. With capital gains excluded replacement cost depreciation 
and the cost of sales adjustment overprovide for the maintenance of the real 
income stream. Note that if there is general inflation with no changes in 
relative prices then the real income stream from the assets of the entity has not 
changed. But the purchasing power of shareholders will increase to the extent 
that assets are financed by debt; the real cost of debt falls. Thus from a 
performance measurement view the real holding gain must be used to offset 
replacement cost depreciation. (See Appendix IV section III for the mechanics 
of calculating the real holding gain on non-monetary assets). 
Thus we may summarise the necessary adjustment to the accounting data 
to arrive at an entity replacement cost rate of return as: 
(.i} assets revalued at replacement cost using specific indices; 
(ii) turnover and operating costs adjusted in recognition of their 
accrual throughout the year; 
(iii) adjusted depreciation allowances using specific indices; 
(iv} an adjustment to the cost of sales; 
(v) an estimate of the real gain on holding assets; 
(vi) an adjustment to maintain the real value of net monetary (trading) 
assets. 
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Partl. Footnotes 
1. G.J. Stigler (173), p.62), however, found no evidence that risk premiums 
were demanded.qnStigler also found little difference in the level of the 
rate of returntcapital between concentrated and unconcentrated industries. 
However in the former the rate of return tended to be more stable. 
2. For a discussion of this problem and a possible solution see G. Maddala, 
Econometrics McGraw-Hill 1977. 
3. Turnover per employee or profits per employee are alternative measures 
of productivity. The problem is that a labour intensive industry will 
have lower sales or profits per employee than an industry that is more 
capital intensive. 
4. The use of profit as a measure of market or monopoly power is an 
sales 
approximation to the Lerner Index (see Lerner, 90) which in strict 
theoretical terms says the ratio Price·~·Marginal ·cost measures the 
Price 
diversification from optirn1al resource allocation. 
5. It should be noted that, whereas Meeks did exclude goodwill for purposes 
of comparing post-merger profitability, it did not alter the principal 
conclusion that post-merger profitability declined. 
6. See G.A. Lee Modern-Financial ·Accounting 2nd Edn Nelson 1975 pp. 131-135 
and pp. 420-425 for a discussion of the valuation and treatment of goodwill 
in the balance sheet. 
7. Note that for purposes of illustration depreciation has not been deducted 
on capital items charged to revenue. It is this adjustment rather than 
the bank overdraft adjustment which makes the greatest difference. 
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INFLATION ACCOUNTING IN-PRACTICE --THE NATIONALISED 
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As long ago as 1961 the problem of accounting for inflation, 
particularly with respect to depreciation provisions, was recognised 
in the nationalised industries: 
11 Most of the Boards recognise in their reports that, ..•. 
it would be prudent to make some additional provision 
out of revenue to meet the difference, which emerges when 
prices rise, between depreciation at historic cost and 
at replacement cost 11 • 
(G2, p.S para. 8) 
In an often ignored recommendation the White Paper went on to 
suggest that adjustmt::nts should be made to take account of this: 
.. Provisions should be made from revenae for: .. (i) such 
an amount as may be necessary to cover the excess of 
depreciation calculated on replacement cost basis over 
depreciation calculated on historic cost ..... 
(G2, p.7 para 19[b)) 
This part examines the extent to which the nationalised industries have 
made progress towards the implementation of the above, to examine this in the 
light of the theoretical discussions of Part 1 and to compare the practice 
of the nationalised industries with some selected comparable private firms 
and industries. 
The nationalised industries differ greatly in character and structure 
so it seems reasonable to suppose that they have been affected in different 
ways by inflation. The piecemeal methods of inflation accounting adopted 
as discussed below, by the nationalised industries will only necessarily 
distort comparisons more than if no attempt is made if all the nationalised 
industries have been affected more or less equally by inflation. But, it is 
not necessarily true that each nationalised industry in making some move 
towards inflation accounting has moved consistently in the right direction 
or by the correct amount. Indeed, the very·ad~hoc nature of their attempts 
suggests that they have achieved neither. 
~": .:-} 
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Part 2~ ·ch~l~ · ·Inflation·Actoonting·in-th~·Nationalised Indostries 
The evidence as presented in the annual reports and accounts of 
the industries stud-ied indicates that a \'lide range of methods have been 
employed, thus each industry is considered in detail. For purposes of 
the study the nationalised industries are taken as British Airways, 
British Gas, British Rail, British Steel, Electricity, National Bus Co., 
National Coal Board, National Freight Corporation, and the Post Office. 
1. British Airways 
Until the formation of British Airways1, any inflation accounting 
provisions related to BOAC only. The introduction of inflation account-
ing in BOAC can be traced to the 1969/70 financial year, (01) when 
provisions to a fleet reserve were introduced. The purpose of this 
reserve was to provide funds to cover the excess of replacement cost 
over the historic cost of aircraft in service.· By the end of the 1977/78 
financial year this reserve, which by then included former BEA aircraft, 
stood at £64.4m (D6, p.55, note 14). 
The Corporation, realising that aircraft are seldom replaced by 
others of similar type and size, calculated the additional cost over 
historic cost for purposes of allocating provisions to the fleet reserve, 
on the basis of replacement of equivalent productive capacity (02, p.9}. 
In 1974/5 British Airways was awaiting the publication of the 
Sandilands Report (G4). Internal exercises had been carried out and the 
conclusion reached was that net worth would be seen to increase 
with some form of inflation accounting (03, p.6}. As it could 
fail to be increased by inflation accounting only in the case of 
losses from holding net money assets, the conclusion seems trite. 
In the same Report, whilst declining at that stage to publish the full 
!·~ .-, 
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results of the exercise, it was estimated that the aggregate value of 
land and buildings exceeded net book value of £88.6m by £20m. However, 
the qualification was added that in view of the specialised nature of 
their long leasehold land and property, it was impractical to arrive 
at an open market valuation. 
By the end of the 1975/6 financial year, the Corporation had 
taken account of the Sandilands recommend.ations and had published estimated 
comparable Current Cost Accounting (CCA) accounts, but was still insisting 
that changes would not be made from the historic cost presentation 
until a statement of standard accounting practice was published. The 
main differences to emerge in the figures presented were an increase in 
the value of net assets from f480m at historic cost to £620m on a CCA 
basis; and a deficit before interest and tax of £30m on CCA basis, compared 
with an historic cost profit of £10m. 
A more detailed comparison of balance sheet information on historic 
and current cost bases was first presented in the 1976/7 accounts. The 
exercise was repeated for the 1977/8 financial year. The data for both 
years are reproduced over (Table 1). 
The 1976/7 accounts emphasised that under CCA shareholders funds 
increased by 27.2 per cent (05) 2, compared with an increase in the 
Retail Price Index of 17 per cent between the end of 1975/6 and 
the end of 1976/7. From this some indication is obtained on how the 
11 Shareholders 11 investment has fared in real as opposed to physical terms. 
Although Sandilands did not attach much weight to this recent discussion 
gf the CCA proposals has recently drawn attention to the need for this 
information (See Ch.2). But care must be taken in this area as .. adjustments .. 
in the 1977/8 accounts (see above) mean that between 1975/6 and 1976/7 share-
holders funds fell by 14 per cent. This raises a general problem in that 
!'!: .. 
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TABtE·l: "BRITISH.AIRWAYS.BALANCE~SflEET 
·1976/7·a~d-1977/8 
ASSETS 
Fixed Assets 
Investments 
Net Current Assets 
FINANCED BY 
Public Dividend Capital 
Reserves (Inc. Revaluation) 
Shareholder's Funds 
Capital Borrowing 
Minority Interest 
Deferred Tax 
HISTORIC COST 
1976/7 1977/8 
£m 
695 
13 
(5) 
703 
290 
85 
375 
237 
1 
90 
703 
£m 
819 
14 
(4) 
829 
300 
136 
436 
297 
1 
95 
829 
Source: B.A. Annual Report and Accounts 1977/78 p.l3 
CCA 
1976/7 1977/8 
£m 
960 
20 
(5) 
975 
290 
219 
509 
237 
1 
228 
£m 
995 
23 
(4) 
1014 
300 
229 
529 
297 
1 
187 
975 1014 
year on year it may not be clear which changes are due to inflationary 
adjustments and which are the result of changes of definitions made by- the 
Corporation accountants. Of course, this problem existed before the question 
of adjusting for inflation arose as a random perusal of nationalised 
industry accounts readily shows {e.g. compare the closing and opening figures 
for Land Buildings in DB and D9, Schedule 3, respectively). 
Part 1 
The guidelines of the Hyde Committee {see/Ch.2 Appendix I) with respect 
to adjustments to the profit and loss account have also been incorporated as 
·~· -· 
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a supplementary·statement. The comparisons of this with historic cost 
data are shown below: 
TABLE 2: · ·COMPARISON . OF· PROFIT AND. LOSS . ACCOUNT. OF. B ~A~ ~ ·1977 /8 
Profit before interest 
Less additional depreciation 
Deduct interest 
Currency losses 
Ge.~ring adjustment 
Pre-tax profit 
HISTORIC 
COST 
£m 
65 
65 
23 
42 
2 
40 
40 
CURRENT COST 
(HYDE) 
£m 
65 
47 
18 
23 
(5) 
(5) 
14 
9 
Source: B.A. Annual Report and Accounts 1977/8 pp.l2,13 
It is worth noting that additional depreciation of £47m is almost sixty 
per cent of historic cost depreciation. The gearing adjustment of £14m reflects 
the particular capital structure of B.A. which unlike most of the nationalised 
industries has a significant element of equity (public dividend capital). In 
other nationalised industries where this is absent the gearing adjustment 
would almost completely offset the additional depreciation charge, which 
partly explains why it has not been included in the data that B.A. provide; 
although no reason is given presumably this is because in relative terms 
the amount would be insignificant. 
Following on from the building up of a Fleet Reserve, B.A. has said 
(04, p.6,11} that it is setting itself a minimum financial objective of 
generating sufficient cash flow to meet the replacement cost of aircraft and 
equipment and other obligations3. This would have been achieved had it 
not been for losses incurred because of Concorde. 
One crude way of accounting for inflation is to shorten the 
depreciation life of an asset, thus increasing the charge against 
current profit. However, B.A. has increased the depreciation lives of 
some of their aircraft. For example in 1975/6, the depreciation life 
of the Sl-11 was increased to 12-14 years compared with the 10-14 years 
of other aircraft4 (03, p.30}; and in 1976/7 the Boeing 707-336 fleet 
amortisation life was increased to 14 years (04, p.34,40). This latter 
change reduced the amortisation charge for the year by £2.2m. The normal 
justification for this might be that technical progress was expected to 
reduce the cost of replacement, or that after an initial introductory period 
the assets were thought likely to be useful for a longer period than was orig-
inally thought. In the context of British Airways it seems that this is not the 
case, both aircraft having been in service for some time, but that the reduced 
amortisation charge is a device to make stated profits appear greater. 
2. British Gas 
Until the 1975/6 financial year BGC followed conventional historic cost 
accounting principles. Indeed it showed little concern for the effects of 
inflation, except to note that the 7 per cent pre interest rate of return 
~: r~~ 
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on assets target laid down by the government was inadequate to meet the cost 
of replacing assets owing to the rise in interest rates {and-therefore, 
implicitly, because of inflation)(DlO, p.l3). 
However in 1975/6 the Corporation began to charge the cost of replacing 
certain categories of existing fixed assets to revenue and only that 
expenditure which represented an extension, increase in capacity or 
improvement to fixed assets was to be charged to capital account (010, p.42). 
This' resulted in £48.lm being charged to revenue in 1975/6 which would 
previously have been capitalised. The reasons advanced for this action were, 
firstly, inflationary costs, secondly, changing technology, and thirdly, 
the need to build up reserves to £500m by the end of the decade6, to maintain 
the industry•s relative position. 
The charging of capital items to revenue may seem a highly objectionable 
practice because the assets in question last more than one year. According 
to one commentator: 11 British Gas has developed rare and unrealistic 
accounting techniques .. {39). However, B.G.c.•s action may be seen as a 
crude way of accounting for inflation, in the absence of a consensus of 
opinion on a more formal method of inflation accounting. However, because 
the cost of the particular asset is written off in the year of acquisition, 
care is needed in interpreting the resultant rate of return on net assets. 
Since the deflation in the rate of return on net assets resulting from an 
increase in capital stock with profits held constant is biased by the action 
taken. 
7 
The numerator in the formula r = ~/k is reduced as explained above, 
but in the denominator the capital charge does not appear as an addition 
to the value of the capital stock. Technically this is not incorrect, 
since all expenditure is accounted for. The problem is the lack of 
uniformity it creates with the other nationalised industries, thus making 
direct comparisons difficult. '·~···Moreover, adjusting the numerator only takes 
account of maintaining, at current prices, an old value of the asset stock, 
rather than the current value. 
However, B.G.C. have subsequently gone further than this. In the 1976/7 
accounts they adopted the recommendations of the Accounting Standards 
Committee (ED18) (Dll, p.l5) relating to proper financial provision in 
the annual accounts for the replacement of physical assets at current 
cost in order to maintain the corporation•s business in its existing state. 
To this end a supplementary charge to revenue, in addition to normal 
historic cost depreciation and replacement costs charged to revenue has 
been made. For 1976/7 this resulted in a supplementary depreciation charge 
against revenue of £102.6m, compared with a historic cost depreciation 
charge for the same period of £176.4m (011, p.36). The comparable historic 
cost and CCA positions for both 1976/7 and 1977/8 are shown below: 
TABLE 3: COMPARISON OF-HISTORIC COST.AND"CURRENT COST PROFIT AND LOSS 
ACCOUNTS OF B.G.C. 1976/7 and 1977/8 
Turnover 
Less Operating Costs 
Less Replacement Expenditure 
Historic depreciation 
Supplementary depreciation 
Displaced and deferred charges 
Pre-interest profit 
HISTORIC COST 
1976/7 1977/8 
£m 
1976.2 
1194.5 
763.0 
176.4 
228.9 
376.4 
£m 
2568.1 
1585.1 
. 983.0 
196.0 
238.9 
548.1 
CURRENT COST 
1976/7 1977/8 
£m 
1976.2 
1194.5 
763.0 
55.6 
176.4 
102.6 
228.9 
218.2 
£m 
2568.1 
1585.1 
983.0 
89.0 
196.0 
145.4 
238.9 
313.7 
Source: B.G.C. Annual Report and Accounts 1976/7 1977/8, profit and loss 
account, Schedule 1 and Note 3. 
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It is to be noted that the historic cost profits shown are before deduction 
of replacement expenditure. It would be interesting to compare the rate of 
return on capital using the two methods, but B.G.C. do not provide data on 
the replacement cost valuation of assets. 
Backlog depreciation has not been included in the supplementary charge 
{012, p.43 note 16 (iii)). However, as discussed at length in Pt.l.Ch.2, 
this is only necessary if the intention of providing depreciation is to 
provide funds for replacing the asset. As emphasised there, this is a 
fundamental departure from the notion that depreciation provisions reflect 
the value to the business of the asset that has been used up. 
According to the information in the annual reports, the supplementary 
charge has been based upon an internal revaluation of assets or upon the 
application of 11 appropriate indices .. , although the basis for the latter 
is not revealed in the accounts. Despite this, it is not too difficult 
to show the problems faced by industries in implementing fully and 
accurately methods of accounting for inflation. 
Consider the case of B.G.C. Pre-vesting day8, a very high percentage 
of authorised gas undertakings was municipally owned, according to one 
study, (23) 43 per cent of the 718 statutory undertakings in 193.5. On 
many of these sites, there would be electricity and water undertakings. 
It was considered·too complex a task to delineate precisely which part of 
a site belonged to which concern, and the problem was solved by estimating 
a lump sum to represent each concern's assets for each region. With the 
formation of BGC in 1973, those pre-vesting assets not already depreciated 
were written off completely. As some of these assets still have a substantial 
value, any calculations of supplementary depreciation will be imprecise to 
the extent of the problems arising from separation. 
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The supplementary charge is credited to an 11 Asset Maintenance Account .. 
with no change shown in the balance sheet asset values. This has been 
criticised as a 11 Cover-up operation .. (3:-.q, necessary to prevent pressure 
to remove excess profits9. However, in order to engage the triggering 
mechanism, (that is for reserves to be in exces~ of 10 per cent of net assets) 
the corporation~s reserves would have to rise from £116m in 1976/7 to about 
£195m. In fact in 1977/8 accumulated reserves amount to £313.0m compared with 
average net assets of £2,210m, that is reserves are now 14.2 per cent of net 
assets. But the condition for ministerial intervention is not unambiguous. 
It would appear that the provisions of Section 16 of the 1972 Gas Act relate 
only to that excess revenue deriving from the searching for and boring for 
gas. The normal trading activities of B.G.C. are excluded from Section 16. 
The action of B.G.C. is not however incorrect. As has been pointed out 
(61) (pp. 29~30) it is perfectly reasonable to either inflate the historic 
value of the fixed assets by the chosen price index, or, as B.G.C. have 
done, subtract from the historic value of the fixed assets in the Balance 
Sheet only part of the replacement depreciation provision, and carry the 
remainder to a special reserve. Only if the first course is adopted 
is it necessary to credit the increase in the value of the assets to a 
capital reserve. In either case, the problem is avoided of subtracting 
replacement cost depreciation from historic cost asset values which would 
otherwise inflate the return on capital employed ratio. However, the 
first course may be preferred since it places a more realistic value on 
the asset in the Balance Sheet. The actions of B.G.C., as will be seen, 
are in contrast to those of British Airways, British Steel, National. 
Bus and the Pos·t Office, all of whom have attempted to calculated replacement 
cost depreciation and have published the revalued asset figures. However, 
it should be noted that in all cases except the Post Office, the revalued 
t,.;· J. 
asset figures are published for comparison onl~ 
A further distorting effect is created by the reduced period over 
which displaced plant and deferred charges are being written off (Dll p.43). 
These charges relate mainly to the unamortised residue of costs of coal-
based plant made obsolete as a result of the development of Natural Gas 
from the North Sea, to the unamortised ,balance of oil-based plant taken 
out of commission because of natural gas, and to the cost of converting 
appliances to North Sea gas. Initially, amounts were being written off 
in five equal annual instalments which would have been completed by the 
end of the 1978/9 financial year. However, the writing off has been 
brought forward one year and the displaced plant and deferred charges 
have been increased from £135.7m (in 1975/6) to £228.9m (in 1976/7) 
(Dll, p.36), with a final amount of £238.9m in 1977/8 (012, p.38). This 
is explained in the accounts as being in line with the Corporation•s 
practice of continually reviewing accounting policies, (Dll, p.l5) but it 
must also be seen as another crude method of accounting for inflation, 
as shortening the period of writing off displaced plant means a greater 
c·ost in real terms in the period to the end of the financial year 1977/8 
than if the period was extended to 1979/80. 
As regards one of the other main adjustment for inflation deemed 
necessary in the.Hyde Guidelines, that of adjustments to the cost of sales 
and stocks, B.G.C. have decided that these would be immaterially affected by 
adjustments for inflation (Dll, p.l5). At first this seems a reasonable 
attitude, as the quantity of gas in store is a fraction of that in store 
when all gas supplied was town gas. But despite the fact that in relation 
to the supplementary charge fo.r depreciation, a charge for stock appreciation 
would be very small, in relative terms, it would still be significant in 
absolute terms as becomes clear when it is realised that stocks and 
work-in-progress amounted to £113.6m at the end of 1977/8 (012, p.48). 
Furthermore, it could be argued that had B.G.C. included this in their 
accounts it would make the seriousness of their intentions with respect 
to inflation accounting more convincing. 
The gearing adjustment recommended by·Hyde is considered to be 
inappropriate because 11 the supplementary depreciation charge is required 
in full to maintain the assets at current cost and this need is not affected 
by the form of financing or capital structure ... (012, p.l4). This is a reasonaiHe 
attitude given the capital structure of the industry (unlike that of British 
Part 1 
Airways). But it does mean, as pointed out in/Ch.2, that income for performance 
measurement must be measured before the disbursement of interest. If the 
Corporation, wishes to take a proprietary rather·. than an entity view, which 
taking pre-interest income implies, then the gearing adjustment would need 
to be included. In declaring income as post-interest but pre-tax (012,p.l4) 
but at the same time saying a gearing adjustment -is not needed the 
Corporation is not taking a consistent entity or proprietary view. 
The misgivings alluded to above give rise to concern about any enhanced 
ability to appraise the performance of B.G.C. since it is impossible 
to verify the~r actions and impossible to ~nterpret correctly their-results. 
3. British Rail 
The initial response by British Rail to the introduction of inflation 
adjusted accounts was to show concern with the trade-off between the benefits 
to be derived from such a system and the increased administration costs involved 
(013). Even so at the time, 1976, it did estimate that by using inflation 
accounting, the charge for depreciation would increase by about £11Sm12 . 
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Despite the above misgivings the 1975 Accounts indicate a rough-and-
ready attempt at inflation accounting. Additions to, and replacements of, 
fixed assets are normally charged to capital account. However, from 1975 
onwards expenditure on replacements and alterations to certain kinds 
of way and structural assets, certain track works (that is other than that 
concerned with major additions}, and signal and telecommunications equipment 
have been charged to revenue account as incurred. As seen above a similar 
approach has been used by British Gas, and as shown there such action leads 
to a disto-rtion in the reported rate of return on capital. That is, by 
adjusting only the numerator and not the denominator in the rate of return 
expression the rate of return on capital will be understated. 
As another crude method of accounting for inflation in 1975, the 
depreciation lives of certain assets were shortened. 
By 1977 the British Railways Board had welcomed 11 the flexible approach 
to accounting .. (014, p.l3} of the Hyde Guidelines and was considering the 
implications of implementing them. In fact the approximate effects were 
published in a supplementary note (014, p.l3}. Whereas the published information 
takes the post-interest, post-tax and extraordinary items as its starting 
point, the following presents the effects of the adjustments using pre-interest 
results. (Table 4}. 
Clearly the adjustments for inflation produce a worse financial outturn 
than the straightforward use of historic cost figures. 
However, what is interesting here is that a gearing adjustment has been 
introduced. Whilst it seems reasonable for British Airways and British Steel 
to introduce a gearing adjustment, because of the element of pi.!blic dividend 
capital in their liabilities, for British Rail this is a little curious as 
public dividend capital is absent. If it was used then a priori it would 
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be expected to approximately offset the supplementary depreciation and 
stock adjustment (if it is introduced along the lines suggested by the 
Hyde Committee). However, because of relatively large reserves the gearing 
gain on capital liabilities is reduced. 
It does seem surprising that British Rail should only have provided 
data on current costs in the 1977 accounts. Perhaps it was discouraged from 
doing so earlier, and is still reluctant to enter current costs in the 
profit and los·s account proper, by the realisation that any sort of replacement 
cost accounting would make it show an even worse profitability record than 
the one it already has. For, despite the disposal of meny ·old assets as a 
result of the Beeching closures, the industry must still possess a very 
high proportion of track and structural assets which have bee~written off 
long ago, but which would require a great deal of resources to replace. 
4. British·steel ·cotpotation 
Since being renationalised in 1968, British Steel has undergone 
extensive reorganisation. However, it has not been slow to pursue the 
effects of inflation on its accounts. 
The Corporation•s initial efforts in this direction were the 
publication of comparable profit and loss accounts and balance sheets 
on Historic Cost and Current Purchasing Power {CPP) bases, along the 
lines of the proposals in provisional SSAP7 {Dl5, pp. 44-45). These data 
{first published in 1976) were to be regarded solely as supplementary 
information. 
The main points to emerge were: 
1. The estimated gain in purchasing power owing to the effects of 
inflation on net long term monetary liabilities was £166.6m. 
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. TABLE. 4: . CURRENT. COST. STATE~·1ENT ·FOR. BRITISH· RAIL~ ·1977 
£m £m 
Total operating surplus after 
historic cost depreciation 62.8 
Plus other income 
Less Corporate expenses 
Profit before interest 
Less supplementary depreciation 
amortisation 
stock usage 
Adjusted loss before interest 
Less interest 
Plus gearing adjustment 
Loss (pre-tax) after adjustments 
125 
50 
20 
9.7 
72.5 
4.1 
68.4 
205.0 
(136.6) 
43.0 
(179.6) 
50.0 
(129.6) 
Source: B.R. Annual ·Report and Accounts 1977 pp.l3, 39 
Note: Total operating surplus includes passe~ger support 
grant of £363.7m and compensation for maintaining level crossings 
of £10.5m (Dl4, p.39 note 1). 
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2. Additional CPP depreciation of fixed assets was £104.5m. 
3. An additional CPP stock charge amounted to £171.4m. 
4. CPP valuation of Fixed Assets 13amounted to £2642.6m compared 
with £1707.9m on a historic cost basis. 
For the 1976/7 financial year B.S.C. discontinued the provision of CPP 
data following the publication of ED18. Instead, preliminary estimates of 
the CCA depreciation charge and the increased book value of assets were 
shown (Dl7, p.9). In general these estimates were seen to be slightly above 
the CPP charges. 
Despite the reluctance of B.S.C. to go further than this in 1976/7, 
by the end of 1977/8 a current cost statement was produced: (table 5). 
As expected, the inflationary adjustments result in B.S.C. reporting 
considerably worse profits than under the historic cost system. Like British 
Airways a gearing adjustment is included in the current cost statement. This 
is reasonable as about half of the capital employed by B.S.C. is Public 
Dividend Capital. 
B.S.C. have also increased the depreciation lives of certain of their 
fixed assets (Dl8, p.42 note X) because assets fully depreciated were still 
in use. Accordingly this has led to an increase in the net book value of 
assets brought forward with a corresponding increase in depreciation charges. 
Thus both income and the.rate of return on capital are depressed. 
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'TABLE·s:. 'PROFIT.AND'LOSS.ACCOUNT.OF'B~S~C~ 'FOR.l977/8·~·INCORPORATING 
-- ---· -· 
. ·cuRRENT'COST'STATEMENT 
Trading loss before interest, but 
after deducting historic cost 
depreciation and adding interest 
receivable, etc. 
Less depreciation adjustment 
-- cost of sales 
Loss pre-interest 
Less interest 
Loss after interest 
Add gearing adjustment 
Loss before taxation 
Less taxation and minority interests 
Post tax loss 
fm fm 
(244.3) 
171.7 
52.8 224.5 
(468.8) 
197.4 
(666.2) 
77.7 
(588.5) 
1.7 
(590.2) 
Source: B.S.C. Annual Report and Accounts '1977/78 pp.38, 57 
5. Electricity Council 
The Electricity Council was one of the earliest of the Qationalised 
industries explicitly to recognise the problem of inflation accounting. 
In 1972/3 the Council stated that it was "closely considering various 
aspects of this problem" (018, p.20) and that these included the implications 
of presenting accounts on a CPP basis. However, it was felt that a more 
detailed study was necessary before the Council would be prepared to 
change its policy. 
In 1973/4 the E.C, stated that it was not prepared to do anything 
until a consensus of opinion was arrived at, but, by the time of the 
publication of the 1974/5 results, internal exercises had been undertaken 
and the not too surprising conclusion reached that replacement cost 
depreciation would be greater than historic cost depreciation. It was 
thought premature to present a set of accounts relating to current price 
levels, "as some other organisations have done", (0.19, p.32) since the 
problem of inflation arose not merely in relation to depreciation but 
also because the nationalised industries were specifically affected in 
view of their particular capital structure and overall financial framework. 
In its 1975/6 report, the Council was still awaiting a consensus of opinion 
(021, p.22). It was also concerned at the effect that replacement cost 
accounting would have on performance figures. But this is a curious attitude. 
It is quite well recognised in the inflation accounting debate that 
performance figures will appear to be deflated. However, and in fact, in 
a period of inflation, historic cost profits are overstated and historic 
cost asset values are understated. Replacement cost accounting attempts to 
present the real picture. 
Whilst the Electricity Council welcomed the proposals of the Hyde 
Committee {023, p.3) it has not as yet produced a supplementary statement 
of current costs. 
However, the Council has made use of a rought and ready method of 
accounting for inflation as allowed in the 1976 Price Code (GS). This 
allows all firms to add 40 per cent to depreciation charges. The Council, 
clearly does not see this innovation as a system of accounting for inflation 
as it believes that a review of its overall financial framework is an 
essen~ial prerequisite to the introduction of accounting for inflation {023, p.3) 
Although this supplementary depreciation is permitted under the 1976 
Price Code, evidence has been presented that the higher depreciation provisions 
have been passed on in the form of higher consumer prices in at least one 
regional Electricity Board {G7). In investigating this problem the Price 
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Commission has suggested that, since the Board bases pricing policy on 
total costs, the extra depreciation should be offset by a gearing adjustment 
to prevent consumers paying excessive charges (G7, paras 11-15). Without 
a gearing adjustment the total costs include both the interest on the 
capital borrowed to finance the purchase of existing assets and replacement 
cost depreciation in full. 
But we have argued for an entity view of the firm. If this is accepted, 
then prices are not expected to cover total costs. Principally, as Kennedy 
(77, p.63 fn.lO) point out, on an entity view prices are not expected to 
cover interest costs. On the same grounds no gearing adjustment is ~~equired. 
Thus from the entity viewpoint prices should not take account of interest 
costs but they should take account of replacement depreciation. 
However, it appears that, as pricing in the Board concerned (the South 
of Scotland Electricity Board) is based on total costs, a proprietary view 
is being taken. If this be true then the Price Commission are correct in 
their view - recognition must be made of the fall in the real value of 
monetary liabilities. If the adjustment is not made then, when nominal interest 
rates rise with accelerating inflation, nationalised industry prices have to 
rise disproportionately to· other prices. The link between depreciation and 
gearing gains, as Godley-Cripps point out (47) and which Kennedy (op.cit p.60) 
endorses, arises from the fact that the real gain on an asset financed by 
borrowing will always equal the monetary holding gain on the asset, since 
equal but opposite adjustments are made to the sum borrowed and to the 
historic cost of the asset financed by the loan. Note that this assumes 
the uses of the general index. If specific indices are used, there may 
be some extra real holding gain on the asset. 
Strictly, the gearing adjustment should be appl~ed to all holding gains. 
(l (Pt.3. Ch.2 uses this assumption). However, on the grounds of prudence, I 
that no·unrealised.revaluation surpluses should enter the profit and loss 
. . .. . . 
account, the Hyde Guidelines apply the gearing adjustment only to those 
holding gains represented by the adjustments to depreciation and sales 
(-Kennedy, op :cit p .61). 
It is surprising that the Electricity Council had not adopted at least 
some form of inflation accounting prior to this year, as some other comparable 
industries had done; the charging of replacement cost of some capital to 
revenue.account is an obvious example. This appraoch has been used by B.G.C. 
and British Rail, both of which like the Electricity Council have large 
distribution networks. The significant size of these networks would suggest 
that, if the methods used to account for the increase in replacement cost 
differ between industries, comparisons could be distorted. 
6. National Bus Company 
Although set up in 1969, to amalgamate the multiplicity of road passenger 
transport services, it was not until 1974 that National Bus made any attempts 
at inflation accounting. In this year all properties of NBC operating sub-
sidiaries were revalued at current use value 11 in accordance with joint 
recommendations of the Institute of Chartered Surveyors .. (024, p.21, para.37). 
As a result of this revaluation NBV of these assets rose from £32.2m 
at 31.12.73 to £87.3m at 31.12.74 (024, p.33, note 12). Further, the 
accumulated depreciation of properties which were revalued was written 
back and taken to a surplus arising on revaluation reserve, so that a 
total of £56.8m was credited to such reserves in 1974. 
Following this, and as a result of the Sandilands recommendations, 
the 1976 Accounts included a note that an additional £24m would be required 
for replacement depreciation on a current cost basis (025, p.22). Supplementary 
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statements showing the effects of inflation are not due to be included 
until the 1978 accritints (026, p.26 para.61). 
Although NBC has made some progress in the right direction it would 
. . 
be expected from an economist's viewpoint that comprehensive replacement 
cost data should be provided. For if, by using inflation accounting, we 
are seeking a better measure of efficiency, and hence, by implication, 
opportunity cost, then as NBC is one of the few nationalised industries having 
an alternative in the private sector an approximation to an opportunity 
cost rate of return, which a replacement cost rate of return would give, is 
required. In the case of NBC it should also be clear that·Aet realisable 
value {NRV} of assets approximates more closely to replacement cost than in 
some other nationalised industries. The discussion in part I, however makes 
it clear that for a going concern replacement cost is the most useful 
I 
measure of capital. 
7. National Coal Board 
The NCB has been very reluctant to pursue any attempts at inflation 
accounting. It has stated that a revaluation would probably show the market 
value of land and buildings to be in excess of book value {027, p.34}. But 
it considers that this valuation would have no significance in the context 
of normal trading operations. Furthermore it is also concerned {0.27, p.l8} 
about the complexity of revaluing assets on a CCA basis, especially with 
respect to shafts and underground railways of a Victorian vintage. 
However, whilst it is true that Victorian assets will not be replaced 
by exactly the same assets it is surely clear that provision over and above 
that provided by historic cost depreciation provisions is required especially 
as assets of this age will have been written out long ago. The precise 
method of providing for replacement is, however, not obvious. It was 
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mentioned'above14 that British Airways calculated the additional cost 
above historic cost required by referring to the replacement cost of 
equivalent productive capacity. This may not be helpful here because 
the capacity of a Victorian pit is likely to be well below the capacity which 
would be regarded as suitable for the efficient use of modern coal extracting 
'• 
machinery. However, if the capacity equivalent of all very old pits 
together could be calculated and provision made on this basis then it would 
seem that this would yield a useful approximation. 
More recently the NCB have recognised the importance of making adjustments 
for inflation, in the light of the publication of Cmnd.7131 (G5). But as 
the Hyde Committee proposals are only an interim guide the Board have further 
postponed the publication of current cost statements (028, p.35). 
8. National Freight Corporation 
As seen in section 6 the most comparable nationalised industry to NF.C 
(NBC) has gone some way towards accounting for inflation. However, NFC 
has not specifically mentioned the problem of replacement cost accounting 
in its reports. 
Nevertheless, two very minor innovations have been made. Firstly, 
depreciation on freehold buildings was discontinued in 1972 in order to 
reflect the increase in value (029, p.54). Secondly, in that year the 
depreciation lives of certain vehicles were shortened. The net effect of 
this was im ·improvement in the financial results for 1971 of £0.3m. At the 
same time however the Corporation refused to revalue fixed assets because 
of their specialised nature. 
The evidence from the accounts suggests that NFC is too preoccupied with 
reconstruction and reorganisation to concern itself with inflation accounting. 
.~ .-, 
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But it does·explicitly show concern for the.need to provide for the 
replacement of assets, estimating that replacement cost depreciation would 
be £29.4m compared wi"th historic cost depreciation of £11.9m (031, p.9). 
Present pre-interest profit of £2.8m is clearly insufficient to cover a 
supplementary depreciation provision of this magnitude • 
. ' 
The a~gument applied above to the NBC is relevant here. For in 
opportunity cost terms there is an alternative market for the assets of NFC. 
Thus there is a strong case for the introduction of comprehensive inflation-
adjusted accounts which would include data showing a better estimate of the 
opportunity cost of the assets of NFC than the present historic cost accounts. 
9. Post Office 
AlthoJgh the 1975/6 Accounts state that the Post Office were examining 
the implications of Sandilands recommendations, inflation accounting had 
already been introduced, even before it ceased to be a government department 
in 1969. 
The introduction of accounting for inflation took the form of a special 
provision for depreciation and was introduced in the 1946/7 year15 . 
The reason for the introduction of this special provision for 
depreciation was explained thus: 
" In consequence of the general rise in prices since 1939, the 
cost of renewing plant has considerably exceeded the accumulated 
provision for depreciation of the plant renewed. From 1 April 
1939 to 31 t~arch 1947 telephone plant renewals cost some £28m 
compared with depreciation provision of about £21.5m. The Post 
Office estimate the excess on renewals in 1947/48 at £3m and expect 
larger excesses in future years. They consider that it would cost 
about £500m if all the telephone plant in situ at 31 March 1947 
had to be renewed at current prices: the original cost of.this 
plant (adjusted to 1935 prices for older items bought at higher 
prices) was about £300m". 
(032, pp.40-41, para.lO). 
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This .meth.od of providing additional depreciation with a conse_quent 
. . . 
reduction oy: the same amount of the revenue surplus had the backing of the 
Treasury (032, pp. 40-41 para 10), and is carried out up to the present day. 
The supplementary depreciation charge is calculated on plant, furniture, 
vehicles, garage plant and office machinery so as to bring the total 
provision for the year into line withfue current value of the assets. Buildings 
remain to be depreciated on an historic cost basis. 
The supplementary charge is arrived at by applying current price indices 
to the historic cost of the above mentioned asset groups and by then 
computing depreciation at "appropriate" _rates on the added values. It must 
be noted that no supplementary charge is made on those assets where it is 
considered that technical advances mean that replacement cost is less than 
or equal to historic cost (this applies to main circuits) or to assets on 
which substantial sale proceeds can be expected on their disposal, as for 
example, buildings. 
According to the accounts these provisions have not been.rojusted for 
subsequent changes in price levels but, as has been shown (61), this may 
not be necessary. There may be no need, in subsequent years to add to the 
provisions made now, despite increases in the future cost of replacement. 
The reasoning behind this is that as long as the accumulated depreciation 
provisions are embodied in assets such that their value is likely to move 
more or less in line with the asset whose replacement is being provided for, 
they provide a perfectly good "hedge" against unforeseen movements in the 
price level. In addition, balance sheet matching requires that current 
revenue should be matched with the appropriate current cost in order to 
yield the correct measure of current income. In this case the theoretically 
appropriate value of the pound in which to express depreciation expense 
is the value of the pound in which the current period•s revenue is expressed. 
, .. -· 
Thus any price ch~nge in the fixed asset concerned which takes place 
after·current depre~iation has been calculated is not a relevant 
considerati'on. 
The following table demons·trates the magnitude of the supplementary 
charge for depreciation in relation to historic cos·t depreciation. 
TABLE'6: ·posT·OFFICE.DEPRECIATION'PROVISIONS.AND'PROFITABILITY (1977/78) 
Historic Cost depreciation 
Supplementary depreciation 
Pre-interest, post all depreciation 
profit 
Less interest (net) 
Profit post-interest 
Average Net.Assets 
Pre-interest return.on capital 
Pre-interest return on capital net of 
Historic depreciation 
£m 
390.5 
350.6 
697.1 
329.4 
367.7 
653.1 
% 
10.7 
16.0 
Source: Post QWice Annual Report and Accounts 1977/78 p.43. 
The supplementary depreciation charge aqainst profit s1gnificantly 
reduces the pre-interest rate of return on capital from 16 per cent to 
10.7 per cent. But if replacement cost accounting was introduced, the rate 
of return is unlikely to be depressed further to any significant degree. 
Not surprisingly, then, the Post Office appears to consider the 
supplementary depreciation provtston to be an adequate adjustment for 
.. 
inflati"on. It states explicitly (D34, p.7) that"acost of sales adjustment 
would be immaterial. Relatively speaking, stocks at £23.2m in 1977/8 are 
insignificant (0.4 per cent of average net assets). But in absolute terms 
this is quite a significant amount. The other proposal made by the Hyde 
Committee, a gearing adjustment, is considered inappropriate because all 
external finance is from the government. This is a reasonable attitude, 
. . 
as has been argued in the similar case of British Gas. On the above grounds 
the Post Office declines to publish a supplementary statement showing the 
effects of inflation. 
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Part· 2 ~ · Ch ~ · 2: ·INFLATION. ACCOUNTIN~ IN THE PRIVATE. SECTOR 
In deciding upon which private industries to examine, the prime 
.. 
objective was to obtain information for those industries operating under 
market conditions similar to those of the nationalised industries. 
· The main characteristics of the nationalised industries, for this 
purpose, were taken to be: 
(1) all, apart from BSC, are non-manufacturing; 
(2) although some of the products/services of the nationalised industries 
may be regarded as substitutes e.g. gas for electricity and coal, and 
road freight and road passenger transport17 for British Rail, the 
industries operate under a limited degree of competition, and in most 
cases have an almost complete monopoly for their product. 
(3) some are involved in primary extracting industries e.g. coal, and gas. 
The main industries/firms seeming to fit some, if not all, of these 
categories, and which although not an exhaustive sample, are likely to be 
representative, were taken to be: 
(1) Cement industry 
(2) I.C.I. 
(3) Shell 
(4) B.P. 
These will be considered in turn. 
Finally, the results of two cross-section studies are discussed. 
(1) Cement Industry 
Practically the whole of the cement produced in the UK is concentrated 
in five firms, viz. Aberthaw and Bristol Channel Portland Cement Co. Ltd., 
Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd., Rugby Portland Cement Co. Ltd., 
18 
Tunnel Holdings Ltd., and Ketton Portland Cement Co. Ltd. 
, .. . -. 
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The pricing .agreement of the cement cartel was one of those upheld by 
. . 
the Rest~ictive Trade Practice~ Court, wfticn·was set up unde~ the provisions 
of the 1956 Restrictive Trade Practices Act. It is beyond the scope of this 
chapter to consider in detail the cement manufacturers& agreement and, in 
any case this has been documented elsewhere, (176, p.l82) suffice to say 
here that the upholding of the agreement perpetuated a situation of market 
power such that no significant rivalry has emerged and a pricing system where 
prices diverged so greatly from costsms to lead to significant resource 
misallocation. (see 177 for a detailed discussion). 
It is interesting, then, to consider whether in view of the prevailing 
market conditions of lack of competition, the cement industry has used 
inflation accounting to any significant extent more than might be expected 
and which might be construed as trying to conceal monopoly profits. 
The information for this section was obtained from the annual report and 
accounts of the companies and from the relevant data provided by 11 Moodies 
Services ... 19 
We may consider the behaviour of each firm in turn: 
(i) Aberthaw and Bristol Channel Portland Cement Co. Ltd. 
The 1976 Annual Report and Accounts of 11 Aberthaw and Bristol .. present 
a fully detailed set of CCA accounts, based on the recommendations made in 
Exposure Draft (ED) 18. 
The main proposals outlined in ED18 provided for adjustments to the 
accounts to be made in the following areas. 
(1) additional depreciation to reflect the increased replacement cost of assets, 
as a consequence of inflation. 
(2) an adjustment to the cost of sales to take into account the increased 
cost of stocks because of inflation. 
(3) an adjustment to reflect the gain on holding monetary liabilities, and 
:·· ,-, 
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a loss from holdi.ng monetary.assets. This latter proposal has been the 
most controversial issue concerning the E018 proposals, nevertheless Aberthaw 
and Britsol include a calculation of the gain on net monetary liabilities, 
which amounts to £0,7m. The gain is attributed to the fact that much of 
the expansion of the firm up until 1976 had been financed largely by 
borrowings. 
The fixed assets of the company were recalculated on a replacement cost 
basis by using the following indices: 
(i) plant, machinery, spares and deferred grants ~:· .. capital expenditure 
in other manufacturing industries index 11 . This index includes building 
materials, timber furniture and pottery and glass. 
(ii) bu-ilders merchant stocks - used the wholesale distributi-"QI'_l,builders 
merchant index. 
(iii} offices, land being quarried and the calculation of the effect on 
shareholders interest - used the Retail Price Index. 
Whilst agreeing with the indices used in (i) and (ii), it is argued 
here that the Retail Price Index is not an accurate enough estimate of the 
inflation in office and land prices, being too general~ This is especially 
true if we wish to assess replacement cost in earlier years notably in the 
1972-1974 property boom years when the relative price of land increased 
dramatically. It is suggested here that a more appropriate index to use 
would be the 11 Building Society Loans on new dwellings - mortgages approved1120 
index. The adjustment to the valuation of fixed assets resulted in a CCA 
net book valuation of fixed assets in 1976 at £20.8m (035, p.21) compared 
with a Historic Cost valuation in the same year of £10.0m (039, p.ll) and 
an additional depreciation charge of £0.6m (035, p.20). This calculation 
may be regarded as something of an underestimate, because as a note to the 
accounts states; no values have been attributed to those assets which have 
been fully depreciated in the-historical cost accounts ... (035, p.22). 
The cost of sales adjustments, amounting to £0.4m, has been calculated 
by reference to internal information. The monetary items adjustment was 
calculated on the average inflationary rates applicable to the cost of 
sales and fixed assets adjustments. 
The CCA operating profit was then-arrived at after charging depreciation 
. . 
and the cost of sales on the basis of the current values to the business 
of the physical assets consumed during the year. The CCA figures show a 
pre-tax profit of £1.4m in 1976, compared with a historic cost profit of £1.7m. 
Total gains for the year (including available profit) amounted to £4.3m, and 
total equity capital and reserves were £19.7m compared to £5.2m in historic 
costterms (035, p.5). As a result of the revaluation of fixed assets, stocks 
and investments £3.7m was carried to a Revaluation Reserve. From the· data 
available pre-tax historic and replacement cost rates of return on net capital 
employed may be obtained. Excluding goodwil\ Aberthaw earned a 13.8 per cent 
pre-tax return on capita·l. If gains on monetary liabilities are included 
the replacement cost rate of return is 5.9 per cent. (2.9 per cent excluded 
gains on monetary liabilities). A striking change and one which highlights 
both the ·effects of undervaluing fixed assets and the reduction in the 
real value of monetary liabilities. 
(ii) Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd. (Blue Circle Cement) 
A.P.C.M. must have been one of the earliest companies to make adjustments 
for inflation in its accounts, having introduced the following measures over 
20 years ago. The charge for depreciation of fixed assets is charged from 
the dates of original use, or subsequent revaluation, plus an additional 
charge representing the increase in depreciation for the year required to 
take account of the increase in the replacement costs of fixed assets from 
the date of the last valuation, or acquisition, to the mid-point of the year. 
~~ :·~ ·~ 
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Surpluses· or deficits arising at the time of revaluation are transferred to 
a fixed asset. replacement reserve. According to the· 1976 accounts (037, p.20) 
assets were last revalued at 1st January, 1974. 
. . 
The additional depreciation is charged to the profit and loss account, 
this, like the surplus on revaluation, being transferred to the Fixed Asset 
replacement reserve. In 1977, this additional depreciation charge amounted 
to some £10m. The basic principle is similar to that used by British Gas 
Corporation in its supplementary depreciation charge. However, the main 
difference is that APCM records the increase in fixed assets, BGC does not. 
A supplementary current cost statement, produced in accordance with 
the Hyde Guidelines, is also presented (038, p.6). Since depreciation is 
charged on a current cost basis in the historic cost accounts, the extra 
information in the supplementary statement is limited to a cost of sales 
adjustment (£5.9m) and a gearing adjustment~2.lm). The current cost element 
of depreciation is shown as £18.3m, made up of £11.3m additional depreciation 
and £7m. extra depreciation resulting from asset valuations. The cost of 
sales adjustment is calculated on stocks of goods, raw materials and fuel, 
but not engineering stores. 
(iii) Ketton Portland Cement·co. Ltd. 
In 1973 this company became a wholly oWned subsidiary of T.W. Ward Group. 
The annual reports of Ketton Portland up to this date do not refer to any 
attempts at inflation accounting. 
(iv) Rugby Portland Cement Co. Ltd. 
Any methods of accounting for inflation within Rugby Portland Cement 
will have to wait until a general consensus is arrived at. As the Chairman 
has noted {040, p.l8):-
11It is apparent that inflation accounting will be the 
subject of considerable debate before a.new.system is 
completely finalised. While, therefore, I have no doubt 
that adjusting accounts for inflation is desirable, I can 
see·no point in producitig.accounts.in an entirely new form 
until the final pattern· which·we shall have to follow is 
- estaBlished ... 
But following the publication of the Hyde Guidelines, it was estimated 
that for 1977 pre-tax profit (fl3.8m) would be reduced by about 40 per cent 
if allowance was made for the effects of inflation. 
The revaluation of certain assets of the company in 1973, which produced 
a revaluation surplus of f2.6m (D40, p.l4), has led to the introduction of 
a form of inflation accounting in the shape of increased depreciation charges 
in subsequent years. 
(v) Tunnel ·Holdings·Ltd. 
The Directors of Tunnel Holdings are of a similar opinion to that of 
their counterparts in Rugby Portland. It was stated in the 1976 Accounts 
(D42, p.7) and reiterated in the 1977 Accounts (D43, p.7) that the company 
ez,, 
recognised that the real rate of return on capital in,manufacturing industry 
has been .. dangerously low11 and as a consequence, companies have not provided 
sufficient funds to maintain their businesses. But because of the lack of 
unanimity in the accounting profession on a generally acceptable standard 
practice, inflation adjusted accounts have not been presented. 
However, by revaluing land and buildings in 1971/2 on a going-concern 
basis at f4.95m {D42,p.l6) a rough and ready form of inflation accounting 
has been introduced. This resulted in fl.59m being transferred to reserves 
amd a consequent increase in the depreciation charge. 
(2) I. C. I. 
Imperial Chemical Industries (I.C.I.) was formed in 1926 by the amalgation 
of four chemical companies, namely Brunner, Mond and Co. Ltd., Nobel Industries 
Ltd., The United Alkali Co. Ltd., and British Dyestuffs Corporation Ltd. 
By 1973 it had over 400 subsidiaries and was Europe•s largest chemical 
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manufacturer. 
Up to the end of the 1975 financial year, I.C.I. had published 
accounting data on a CPP basis, for comparison purposes. However, in the 
1976 accounts this practice was discontinued, following the publication of 
. . 
E018, and the acknowledgement in the Accounts that CCA is of"greater relevance" 
than the CPP method (044, p.9). 
I.C.I. make the point that CCA asset valuations involve more subjective 
judgements than are required by histor·ical accounting (044, p.9) but do not 
seem to consider this a major problem. 
The data published in the 1976 accounts were not based on detailed 
revaluations of assets, because there was insufficient time to carry out 
such exercises. But the 1977 accounts publish a comprehensive current cost 
statement covering the two years 1976 and 1977. The comparative historic 
cost and current cost data for 1977 are produced in Table 1. 
A number of interesting points emerge from Table 1 and from the accompanying 
notes (045, p.36). In practice each asset class has a range of depreciation 
lives. Historic cost depreciation is based on a conservative view of asset 
lives, in order to make an ad hoc adjustment for inflation. But for current 
cost depreciation average asset lives are assumed to be at the larger end 
of the range. As the Accounts note {045, p.21) current cost depreciation 
lives are up to fifty per cent larger than historic cost depreciation lives. 
This serves to minimise the gap between the size of historic cost depreciation 
and the size of current cost depreciation. This reduces the effect of 
inflation accounting. 
The cost of sales adjustment follows the recommendations of the Hyde 
Gutdelines. 
However, I.C.I. departs from the Hyde Guidelines in its gearing 
adjustment. In an approach similar to that suggested by Kennedy (77, p.63) 
r ,•. r 
. . . 
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TABLE 1: .. CURRENT. COST. STATEMENT' FOR. I, C ~I. 1977 
. . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . 
.. ·_- _- _ ·.HISTORICCOST. ·:-:. -.--.-c~-c.A~-. -.--: 
.. -.--:£nL. ·.--.-.-.--.-.-.--."£tiL. -.--_"£iJL _._ ... __ .£in_ 
Trading Profit -
Less inflation adjustments: 
depreciation 
cost of sales 
Erosion of net.monetary.assets __ . 
552 
. . ' . . . . . 
552 
182 
57 
.... 12. . . - -251-
Pre-Interest Trading.Profit. .. 552- -- -- .. 301-
Plus Investment Income 65 
Net profits of associated 
_ . _companies 31 
Less Employees profit sharing 
bonus 29 
Interest payable 107 
Exchange loss on net current 
assets overseas 
Profit before Taxation and grants 
Less Taxation less grants 
Profit after taxation and gra·nts 
Gearing Adjustment 
Exchange gain on Financial 
items 
29 
Profit before.minority.interest .. _. _. __ . 
96 
648 
69 
483 
202 
281 
. ---281.- -
Average assets.employed. ___ . __ .... __ ... _. ____ .. _ .3600. __ . 
65 
31 96 
397 
29 
107 
40 
261 
142 
119 
59 
27 86 
205 
6185 
. Pre~Interest.Return.on.CapitcH- .. ------.----. --. .'.l5.3% ........ - .4.9% 
Source: I.C.I. Annual ·Report·and-Accounts 1977 pp.22, 36 
.. ~ :··. ~· 
..i.~ ··_) f.l 
the gearing adjustment is, effectively, divided into two parts. 
Thfs is achi"eved · by consi deri_ng trade creditors as negative monetary 
assets, rather than as monetary liabilities. This helps to reinforce the 
distinction between an entity view of the firm and a proprietary view. 
. . 
Accordingly I.C.I. make an adjustment for the erosion ~n the real value of 
net debtors. This is shown as an addition to trading profit before interest. 
The gearing adjustment·per·se, that is the net holding gain on assets 
financed by net non-trading liabilities (borrowings less cash), is shown 
as an addition to post interest profit. 
A further departure is represented by an adjustment for exchange gains 
or losses on the non-sterling part of non-trading liabilities. This either 
increases the gearing adjustment, in the case of an exchange gain, or 
reduces it, if exchange losses are incurred. 
Other minor adjustments are made in respect of taxation and grants. 
(3) 11 Shell 11 
The Royal Dutch/Shell Group is owned by two non-operating parent 
holding companies, The Royal Dutch Petroleum Company having a 60 per cent 
interest and the 11 Shel,.. Transport and Trading Co. Ltd. a 40 per cent 
interest. 
The principal investment held directly by Shell Transport and Trading 
Co. Ltd. are its 40 per cent shareholdings in the Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd. 
and in Shell Petroleum N.V. These two companies are the main holding 
companies owning the total group interest in the other, servicing and 
operating, companies forming the Royal Dutch/Shell Group. 
Comp.~nies like Shell U.K. Ltd. are merely operating companies within 
this structure. The 1976 accounts of Shell U.K. Ltd. make no mention of 
accounting for inflation. However, there is a note to say (046, p.27) that 
from 1st. January 1976 the company has changed from a depreciation to a 
depletion basis for the writing down of the value of production assets in 
,/' .-.... -. 
~ ~' I i. 
J- .... ~ 
the North Se~ gasfields~ That is such·assets as platforms and infield 
pipelines·were to be·written·down·on a unit of production basis. The char.ge 
of policy·resulted in an increase in retained earnings at 31st December 1975 
of £3.5m to reflect the partial release of depreciation provided up to this 
time under the previous policy. 
Subsequently, in 1977, Shell U.K. stated that inflation accounting 
would not be introduced until there was a consensus of opinion in the 
accounting profession and until it was clear which method of inflation account-
ing would be most suitable for the company. (047, p.4). 
The parent company, Shell Transport and Trading, however, have produced 
a fairly comprehensive set of inflation accounts prepared on a CPP basis 
and which relate to the operating activities of the Royal nutch/Shell Group 
as a whole. The supplementary information has been provided for a period 
of five years from 1973 onwards. · 
When compared with::the accounts calculated on a historic cost basis 
the CPP accounts for 1977 show a 5.9 per cent return on net assets, compared 
with a 19.2 per cent return on historic cost.(D49, p.50). The table below 
presents the .other salient changes in the balance sheet data for 1977, 
after adjusting by the Retail Price Index. 
In the 1976 Accounts (048, p.31) the company noted the publication 
of ED18 but pointed to the controversial aspects of it. Especially relevant 
to 11 She11 11 are the major practical problems relating to overseas subsidiaries 
and associated companies. Also important from Shell's point of view are 
developments in U.S.A. because the bulk of crude oil is traded in dollars, 
and in Holland because that is the home of one of the parent companies. 
Both these countries have produced draft inflation accounting proposals, 
but as in Britain, nothing universally acceptable has been agreed. Until 
such time as there is unan-imity the company states that it will continue 
to produce comparable accounts on a CPP basis. 
-~ i"'; =~,' 
,..._ ·..• ~· 
TABLE.·. 2: ::·COMPARISON. OF. HISTORIC. COST AND CPP. RESUlTS. FOR ·-ROYAL ·-DUTCH/ 
.... ·-· ...... . 
. ·SHELL .. GROUP'FOR'l977 
total revenue 
depreciation 
cost of sales adjustment 
gain on net monetary 
liabilities 
net income 
2. Balance Sheet 
;net property and plant 
investments in Associated 
companies 
riet current assets 
minority interests 
HISTORIC COST CPP 
· .. _ ... _ .. _· .. --.-.£in_· .... _ .. _ ... £m. 
23,963 
617 
1 ,340 
8,141 
591 
3,209 
898 
24,894 
1 ,231 
396 
397 
774 
13,408 
1,654 
3,433 
1,679 
Source: Shell Transport and Trading Co~ Annual Report and Accounts 
1977 pp.S0-1. 
As hinted at above inflation has a great effect on Shell Trasnport from 
an international point of view. The existence of differential inflation 
rates (most relevant in the case of U.S. dollar and Netherlands guilder) 
between currencies means that if the transfers of non-sterling property, plant 
and equipment are recorded based on historical exchange rates, a substantial 
understatement in current sterling terms results. The Accounts claim that 
the difference between these two figures, in 1976, was £1 ,830m. The 
additional effect of associated companies using closing rather than historical 
rates would have increased the Group's investment by about £520m. It is 
believed. that th.e. complications· of historic exchange rates are approximately 
a 11 owed· for o,Y" the· use of the· Reta i 1 Price· lndex, because this reflects 
. . . 
implicitly the higher rate of inflation in the UK than in other countries. 
. . 
It is interesting to study B.P. not just because it is the largest 
industrial concern in the U.K. in terms of turnover, but because at the end 
of 1977 about 31 per cent of the shares of B.P. were owned by the government 
and 20 per cent by the Bank of England. The remainder is held by about 177,000 
stockholders. Under an amendment to the Company's articles of association, 
introduced when the government acquired its interest in 1914, the government 
has the right to nominate two members of the Board with power to veto any 
resolution. This r.ight of veto has never been used, and the government has 
undertaken not to interfere in the company's commercial affairs. 
The 20 per cent share held by the Bank of England was purchased in 
1975 following liquidity problems of Burmah Oil Co. Ltd. The Bank of England 
has undertaken not to exercise the voting rights attached to its holding, and 
the government has said it will not exercise a greater proportionate voting 
power. Indeed the government decided in December 1976 to dispose of some 
of its share. 
It is clear from the above outline of its capital structure given by 
the company (D~l, p.21) that the company is mid-way between being a nationalised 
firm at the one extreme and a private company at the other, and so it is 
interesting to assess wheth•r the introduction of accounting for inflation 
is different from private or nationalised industries. 
In fact B.P. produced comparable CPP accounts for the financial years 
1974 and 1975. However, following the publication of Sandilands and ED18 
the company no longer regarded the publication of CPP accounts as helpful and 
have therefore. di.sconti nued the exercise. · 
. . 
Like~ numb~~ of the-~the~ co~ce~~s analysed-in this chapter, B.P. support 
.. 
the basic principles behind the CCA proposals but have certain reservations. 
These are, as specifically referring to B.P. :-
(i) the need for agreement on the treatment of oil reserves and overseas 
assets; 
(ii) the need for more harmonisation between the differing world-wide 
requirements for inflation accounting. 
(iii)the existence of excess capacity in the oil industry means that the 
replacement cost for shipping and distillation assets bears no 
relationship to either realisable asset values or earning capacity. 
The first two reservations arise since B.P. must comply with the 
inflation accounting rules in other countries where the company has operating 
assets. This problem also affects Shell Ltd. 
If the company is to continue as a going concern then the problem of 
replacement cost equalling realisable value is irrelevant. Further, the 
reduction of earning ability, due to excess capacity, should be reflected 
in the specific indices used to value assets. 
Nevertheless, whilst stating these reservations, a supplementary current 
cost statement is provided , in accordance with the Hyde Guidelines. The 
comparative historic and current cost data are reproduced below. 
TABLE 3: CURRENT-COST ADJUSTMENTS FOR·B~P. 1977 
£m £m 
Income after customs duties 
... and.sales.taxes ........ _-_. : . ..... - .. - .. - .. 12,258.0 
Less operating costs- 9561.0 
historic cost 
--:--·--depreciation--··-· · ·-- ·303.7 · · · · · · ·9;864.7 
Pre-interest historic cost 
.. profit 2,393.3 
II 
Cont'd. 
· £m · £m 
Inflation adjustments: 
depreciation 203.0 
... cost. of. sales.·.·:·:.·:·:. :·:. ····. :·:. ·:·:. ·:·:123 .o·:. ·:·:. 326 ;o 
Pre-interest current cost 
. operating. profit.·:·: .... ·:· . . ·:·:. ·:· . . :·:. . . . . .. 2,067. 0, 
Less interest and financing cost 207.5 
Add gearing. gain.... . . . . . . . . . ... 101.0· ..... 106.5 
Post interest current cost 
.profit ................. . . .............. 1,960.5 
Source: B.P. Annual Report·and Accounts 1977 pp. 14,28. 
5. Inflation·Accounting·in Industry·in·General 
A random sample of 242 companies was sent a mailed questionnaire as 
part of the investigations of the Sandilands Committee (G4) 22 . From the 
fifty per cent of companies who responded, the extent of inflation accounting 
was found to be as shown in Table 4. Clearly, the evidence from the 
published accounts of the companies studied above suggests that they are 
little different from industry in general, as evidenced by the data in the 
Table. 
The nationalised industries have been discussed in detail in the 
previous chapter, buf it is noteworthy that adjustments for inflation in 
the management accounts are no more in evidence than is the case with the 
published accounts. 
With respect to quoted and smaller companies it was interesting to 
test for significant differences in the degree of implementation of 
inflation accounting, especially in the light of recommendations that larger 
firms should show a lead23 . The results of these tests indicate very little 
... 
"ii - ' .~ 
•"- -· .: ... 
~ . -- . --- .. 
TABLE. 4 !_·_INFLATION. ACCOUNTING. IN. INDUSTRY. IN· GENERAL 
... ·.·Mariageiriei:it. Accounts. ·:r?ubli shed·. Accounts 
Annual Adjustments made 
for the i"mpact.of inflation Quoted Smaller Nation- Quoted Sml Nation-
.. alised · alised 
..... ·:·.-~~~~-.--._Co~~ .... ln:~L ... _Co~~ Cos. tnd. 
(%) (%) (out of 
7) 
(%) (%) (out of 
(a) Fixed assets in the 
bal~nce sheet 
(b) depreciation 
(c) cost of stocks consumed 
(d) cost of holding cash and 
other monetary assets 
(e) The gain to the equity on 
borrowing 
Number.of companies. 
13 
11 
10 
9 
9 
14 
14 
18 
14 
7 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
'87 . ' .. 28 ' ' ... ' . 7 
11 4 
7 4 
5 7 
3 7 
5 
.87 28 
Source: S_andi 1 ands · Corim'li ttee ·Report · Crtnid · 6225 p. 261 , 287 
TABLE 5: ADJUSTMENTS TO ACCOUNTS FOR INFLATION~DIFFERENCES'BETWEEN QUOTED 
AND SMALLER COMPANIES 
Annual Adjustments 
made for the impact 
of inflation on 
(a) Fixed assets in 
the balance sheet 
(b) Depreciation 
(c) Cost of stocks 
consumed 
(d) Cost of holding 
cash and other 
monetary assets 
(e) the gain to the 
equity on 
Published Accounts ..... Management.Accounts 
t-test Yates corrt'd t-test Yates corrt'd 
Chi-Square Chi-square 
1.0739 I, 0, 7577 -0.1369 0.0100 
0.5814 0.0345 -0.4274 0.0037 
-0.4219 0. 0015 -1.1396 0.5259 
-0.9390 0.0907 0.7671 0.1689 
. . . . borrowing .... ·:. '' .... 1.3477. ' .. '.0.3158.'.' '' '.0.3216 .... 0.0025 . 
7) 
1 
7 
-~ . ' ~~, 
..... -· !·.ol 
Note: 1. S.ig. p.t !0"1"\e\itl 
2. degrees of freedom for (.i} t-test = n1 + n2 - Z = 113 
--(ii) Yates corrected- Chi-s.quared = 1 
3. Yates corrected Chi -s.quared results are as computed by SPSS. 
(see 125). 
evidence of any differences. Nonetheiess, the results are· reported in 
Table 5. Indeed the only significant difference at the ten per cent level refers 
. -
to the adjustment to be made for the gain to the eq~ity on borrowing. The 
very low incidence of inflation accounting is strikingly in contrast to the 
percentage of companies claiming to be in favour of introducing inflationary 
adjustments. 
The evidence from Sandilands24 indicates a range of favourability from 
eighty two per cent of smaller companies favouring adjustment to fixed assets 
in the published balance sheet to for~y two per cent of quoted companies in 
favour of adjustments to the cost of holding cash and other monetary assets in 
the management accounts. The dichotomy between what is favoured and what 
is practiced must surely be attributable to the lack of consensus in the 
accounting profession concerning the exact nature of adjustments for 
inflation. 25 
Further evidence, if such were needed, that relatively few firms .are 
making any attempt at accounting for inflation is provided in a study by 
Nguyen and Whittaker( 126 ) which investigated the importance of a high rate 
of price inflation26 in causing the amortisation funds accruing to individual 
industries to fall short of their replacement needs. They found that all 
industries in the study, except gas and electricity, had amortisation funds 
considerably less than their replacement requirements. For nine of the 
industries analysed amortisation funds were less than half of their replacement 
- -
requirements. For example vehicles, shipbuilding, mineral oil refining, and 
Iron and Steel had amortisation funds as a proportion of replacement 
requirements:of 8 per cent, 30.per cent, 34 per cent and 36 per cent respectively. 
Thus many firms· were likely, they concluded~ to face. difficulties in financing 
. . 
these .. deficits .. and the rate of growth of their investments was likely to 
be seriously affected. 
Part 2: ·surmnary.·and .. Conclusions 
A great diversity in approaches to accounting for inflation ~:~·ave been 
reported. The simplest way to summarise the findings of this survey is 
provided below: (Table 6). 
The following conclusions may be drawn. 
(1) At the time of writing neither the nine major nationalised i-ndustries 
nor the private firms considered, have pursued methods of accounting for 
inflation very far. However, there is both explicit and implicit evidence 
that this arises from the lack of unanimity in the accounting profession 
about which method(s) to choose. 
(2) As a result of the lack of consensus a majority of the firms and industries 
studied have been prepared to make ad hoc adjustments for inflation. It is 
argued here that, because these have varied between industries, inter-
industry comparisons are distorted. 
(3) Consequently there has been little progress towards implementing the 
proposals of the 1961 White Paper, and hence small improvement 
in the information available to assess the efficiency of the nationalised 
industries. 
(4) The limited use of other efficiency criteria in the nationalised industries 
(such as those proposed in G3) is well documented and the practical problems 
of implementing the theoretical tools are understood (for example see 121). 
It is surprising, perhaps, that there has been so little pressure to introduce 
inflation accounting, which .is conceptually more straightforward and which 
possesses greater practical applications than the other efficiency criteria. 
. . . .. . 
:_- ·.i~ 
Table 6: Check list of approaches to inflation accounting by the 
·nationalised industries and selected private firms. 
!used in 
INFLATION ACCOUNTING 
I 
INDUSTRY /FI R~1 Supple- ! Internal No. !His tori cal mentary Exercises Attempt I Accounts data 
1. Nationalised I 
Industries. I 
Brit. Airways I ./ I BGC ./ 
BSC ./ 
Brit. Rail ./ 
Elec. encl. 
""' NBC ~ 
NCB vi' 
NF.C / 
Post Office ./ i I 
2. Private Finns 
Aberthaw and Bristol 
./ Channel 
A.P.C.M. 
./ ./ 
Ketton Portland 
./ 
Rugby Portland I 
"" Tunnel Holdings I v· I. C. I. t/ i 
Shell 
./ I 
I 
I 
3. Part Nationalisec I 
/Part Private 
B.P. ~ I 
I 
i 
Other 
aci hoc 
methods 
./ 
./ 
""" 
""" ./ 
./ 
./ 
./ 
./ 
~ 
' i 
I 
I 
l 
I 
I 
' j i t 
i 
~ 
l 
l 
., 
I 
I 
• .. -ol 
~, .. ; 
.... ~-·-' 
(5} . -The reduction of declared profit levels occasioned by a measure 
of compensation for inflation in accounting, be it by supplementary 
depreciation or . ..:· charging capital to revenue, may help to 
protect:industries against crude use of profits figures by the Price 
Commission and the Press; but it may have the effect of helping to 
obscure the true rate of return being earned. 
(6) There is very little difference between the attempts made by the 
nationalised industries and the attempts made by the private firms 
considered. Nor can these be said to differ from the position in industry 
in general. 
(7) The problems of comparability of the results of the nationalised 
industries being complicated by ad hoc inflationary adjustments has been 
alluded to above.. But from the evidence presented here there appears to 
be a problem arising from following the recommended Hyde Guidelines. This 
is that some nationalised industries are charging supplementary depreciation 
and then adding back a gearing adjustment. Those nationalised industries 
without Public Dividend Capital, have made no gearing adjustment. Thus 
in order for comparisons to be made on a like-with-like basis it appears 
that profits before interest and gearing adjustments should be used. 
-~ ~ .. -. 
..... _rJ 
PART I I : FO.OTNOTES 
1. With the passing of the Civil Aviation Act 1971, which brought together 
BEA and BOAC. 
2. The corresponding total of shareholders• funds for 1975/6 on a CCA basis 
was £596m, according to the 1976/7 accounts. 
3. The Secretary of State continues to set a target rate of return before 
interest, as required by the British Airways Board Act 1977 . 
. 4. The change, of course, means an increase in the average depreciation life 
of Sl-11 aircraft. 
5. A note on p.l4 of the 1972/3 accounts considered that no useful purpose 
would be served by revaluing land and buildings. 
6. At the end of 1975/6 financial year, reserve9 totalled £84m (1975/6 Accounts 
p.l3). 
7. Where r = rate of return, ~ = profits, K = capital stock. 
8. 1 s t May , 19 49 . 
9. See Gas Act 1972 Section 16, p.l3 for the conditions for this to occur. 
10. See Gas Act 1972 Section 2(2) parts (c) and (h) for precise definitions. 
11. Some storage is necessary because it is impossible to extract gas at a 
fast enough rate to meet daily peak winter demands. The main method, although 
there are also LNG holders and linear storage systems, is 11 line-packing .. 
whereby, overnight, gas is drawn from the North Sea and stored under higher 
pressure than usual in the main transmission system. 
12. For 1976 financial year. This also included £45m relating to assets which 
under the present conventions are life expired. 
13. This was arrived at by using the Retail Price Index to convert historic 
cost figures by reference to the dates on which the expenditure occurred. 
This had to be estimated in a number of cases. 
14. p.2. 
15. Because of Defence Regulation ~QN which suspended publication of the accounts. 
This was not revealed until publication of the 1947/8 accounts. 
16. Note that net fixed assets are calculated net of historic cost depreciation 
only. 
17. Also, of course, there is private passenger and haulage, but these tend to 
be in different market sectors. 
18. Since 1973 Ketton has been a subsidiary of the T.W. Ward Group. 
19. The author would like to thank Dundee College of Technology Library for making 
this information awailable to him. 
~~ • '! :~J 
L.::..6 
20. This index is published.in.HMSO Housing.Cons.tructi.on. Statistics 
21. This excludes Carrington Viyella Ltd., a company i.n .which I. C. I. has a 
large shareholding ·(35 p.c. in 1973) but whose. accounts are not consolidated 
with I. C. I. 
22. For the method of selection and source of this sample see (16) Annex B 
pp. 284-285. See also Annex F op.cit. p. 287 for a detailed analysis of 
the number of firms in each indus try se 1 ected; and Annex A op. cit. p. 279 
for the questionnaire used. 
23. For example see F.E.P. Sandilands Inflation Accounting Cmnd 6225 1975 
para. 552 pp. 166-167. 
24. Sandilands op.cit. p. 260. 
25. It must be borne in mind that the Sandiland•s survey was carried out in 
1974. The evidence in the rest of part three relates to the position at 
the end of 1977. However, as the accounting profession was little 
nearer-agreement in 1977 than it was three years earlier it was not 
thought that the time-lag results in any significant discrepancies. 
26. At the time of their study (1975) price inflation was running at an 
annual rate of 16 per cent. 
PART 3: REPLACEMENT COST RATE OF RETURN FOR THE GAS INDUSTRY 
. . ~ 
·; .. i __ ; 
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INTRODUC'ri ON 
In previous chapters the theoretical economic and accounting 
aspects of performance measurement in general have been discussed. 
It was concluded that for overall performance measurement a 
replacement cost rate of return should be made. Different 
definitions of replacement cost and the use of different price 
indices to measure assets will produce different cost rates of 
re·turn. 
To recapitulate, bri~fly, the replacement cost rate of 
return to be used in this-context is to be-determined by: 
(i) A revaluation of all assets of the firm (including 
stocks) using specific indices for each asset. 
(ii) Consequent upon (i), an adjusted depreciation allowance 
using specific indices. 
(iii) An adjustment to the cost of sales. 
(iv) An estimate of the real gain on holding assets. 
(v) An estimate of the real loss on holding net monetary assets. 
(vi) An adjustment to turnover and oper.ating costs to take 
account of the fact that they accrue throughout the year. 
In part two it was shown that the nationalised industries 
as a whole have made little progress ·tm1ards the introduction of 
inflation accounting, and hence ·they have made little progress 
towards the use of a replacement cost rate·of return. It was seen 
that the gas industry has made the greatest advance in this 
direction. 
This part, then, sets out to provide an independently 
' ,.. -
.... , · .. : 
.:.~ .-··, ·· .. : 
determined replacement cost rate of raturn for the gas industry, 
using the above adjustments as a . ·• .oasJ.s. 
I·t is recognised that it would be a little dubious to compare 
the replacement cost rate of return of the gas industry with its 
historic cost rate of return and with, say, a replacement cost 
rate of return for all manufacturing industry, at one point in 
time, because of the possible distortion created by short term 
economic factors. For example, price control in the nationalised 
industries. Thus the replc.trement cost rate of return has been 
calculated for the period 1960/61 to 1977/78. Taking a period 
of this length also provides sufficient date on the performance 
of the gas industry prior to the Gas Act 1965 which instigated 
the movement towards a centralised ;;;tructure, culminating in the 
formation of the British Gas corporation (B.G.C.) in 1973. 
The first chapter discusses the methodological problems 
encountered in revaluing the assets of the British Gas Corporation 
~ presents estimates of the gross replacement cost valuation of 
the assets of B.G.C. In the second chapter the estimated replace-
memt cost rates of return for the period under study are presented 
and discussed. This includes comparisons with the historic cos·t 
· rates of return earned by the industry and comparisons on a 
replacement cost basis with other broad sectors of industry. 
Part 3. ch. 1 
Estimations of the Gross Replacement Cost of 
the Assets of B.G.C. - 1960/61 to 1977/78 
Introduction 
A preliminary task was the identification of broad 
categories of the fixed assets owned by the gas indust~. This 
helped the determination of the price indices·necessary to 
make the revaluation adjustments. Fortunately, this information 
is provided in the annual reports and accounts of the industry 
The following table presen·ts a detailed breakdown of the 
historic cost valuation of the fixed assets of BGC: 
Type of Fixed Asset and Percentage of Total 
Fixed Assets Represented by Each Asset 1977/78 
I ~---------T_Y __ P_e __ o_f __ A_s_s_~~-----------·-------------4-A-s_s_e_t ___ v_a_l_u_e __ (_£m __ )-4-%---of tota1 
(1) Freehold Land and Buildings 114.8 4.8 
; 
(2) Long Leasehold Land and Buildings 12.3 0.5 
(3) Short Leasehold Land and Buildings 6.6 0.3 
~------------------------------------·----r------------------r---------·----
To:tal Land and Buildings 133.7 5.6 
---
I 
(4) Mains 1365.8 57.2 
(5) Services 261.3 11.0 
(6) Gasholders and other storage 3.8 
(7) Plant and Machinery 324.8 
{8) Meters 123.0 5.2 
{9) Mo·tor vehicles and Mobile Plant 24.7 1.0 
{10) Furn:j:ture,F1·ttings & Office Machinery 18.7 
I {11) Miscellaneous 42.2 
0.8 
1.8 
~----T-o-·t_a_l __ ._F_i_x_e_d ___ A_s_s_e_t _ s*---------------------+-----2-3_8_3--.-8--------t--lOO.O 
--------------------------------·-----------------------------~ 
Source: BGC Annual Re·oort and Accounts 1977L78 p .40. 
* excluding assets of subsidiary companies. 
~~ , .. , ~.! 
-·- ; i.•l 
r·t is most important to note that the data shmr~n in 
Table 1 represent the sum of investments less displacements 
(i.e. gross book value) since vesting date, and do not include 
prevesting assets. Prevesting assets are quite significant 
but any amounts relating to these were written out in 1973. 
Even before this date any data relating to prevesting assets 
referred only to net book values. For purposes of revaluing 
assets net book values provide insufficient information. They 
represent ·the original investments less accumulated depreciation 
provisions but for asset valuation gross book values are 
required. 
As the data in the accounts is deficient to the extent 
that prevesting data is excluded, and complicated by displace-
ments since vesting day the original approach tr~as to make 
estimates of the numbers of buildings, mileage of mains, number 
of vehicles etc. These raw data could ·then be multiplied by 
an "average" valuation for .. ·each type of asset to produce a 
replacement cost valuation. Although this approach could not 
be used in the end, the methodology is reported for reference 
purposes a'l:ong with the actual method used. 
Me~hodol•:>gy 
1. Land and Buildings 
Land and Buildings present the main problem because it is 
not possible simply to adjust the net book value shown in the 
accounts by the appropriate index. Ideally, without the benefit 
of internal valuations by the Corporations surveyors, it ~OL.'/J. 
b~ · b4.,!)t . to obtain an estima·te of the numbers of the buildings 
... -· "'~ ! I : ' 
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o\med by the industry. This is because (i) the cost or 
valuation of land and buildings for former undertakings ·taken 
over in 1949 were written out of the records on 31.3.73, the 
date of formation of B.G.C., as t~ey could not then be 
separately identified.As the Corporations accounts state some 
of these assets have a substantial value. Although, in relative 
terms much of this will have been overshadowed by the 
construction post vesting-day of a number of administration 
centres. Much of the prevesting land and buildings '-'17ill have 
been written off with the advent of North Sea Gas. 
(ii) freehold land is not depreciated but buildings standing 
thereon are depreciated and, to complicate matters further, 
over varying periods. 
(iii) it is also important to know where the land and buildings 
are because of significant regional variations in land and 
buildings valuations. 
Once the numbers of buildings had been obtained it was 
then envisaged that estimates of value would be obtained by 
asking a qualified ,surveyor to estiinc"ite the valu(:!S of some 
11 typical 11 gas co:rporation . buildings (shmV"rooms, offices, 
etc) using a measure of size as a guide to value. Then indices 
could be applied to produce a time-series of valuations for 
the period under .study. 
However, this initial approach was unsuccessful, for 
reasons which will become clear below: 
(i) Estimation of numbers of buildings 
The initial direct approach of a mailed request (see pt.3 
Appendix I for a specimen copy of the letter) to all twelve 
. ,.. .,. i ~~· :_:·~ 
BGC regions for information failed partly because of the BGC 
policy of not providing general information on a regional 
basis, 1 and partly because of the high cost of producing the 
data required. 
It was surprising to be told during an interview with 
BGC accounting management that there was no complete and 
comprehensive asset register. This, it was pointed out to 
the au·thor, was mainly due to historical reasons at the time 
of nationalisation~ 2 
A second approach, based on the assumption that most 
commercial premises will have a telephone number, was to use 
the Post Office telephone direc·tories for Britain as a 
source of BGC premises. This is not wholly accurate because 
of deficiencies in the telephone directories (e.g. because of 
delay in publication premises disposed of may still appear) and 
the policy of some regions ·that callers shoul3 telephone a 
central unit and not their local showroom (see, pt.3 Appendix II 
for the methodology of estimating showroom figures for these 
regions) • 
Using telephone directories it is possible to stratify 
BGC premises into the categories upon which valuations could 
be estimated. (E.g._ Headquarters, (national, regional, area) 
showrooms, service centres, gasworks, gas terminals, 
distribution offices, etc) • The data assembled from the 
search of the telephone directories is presented in Pt.3 
Appendix III. Land and Buildings are categorised in·to 
.I 
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twelve sub-headings broken down by Region3 
(ii) Estimating size and valuation 
Whilst the numbers problem could be solved, as outlined 
above, there remained the problem of producing a size-
distribution of the different types of buildings to which 
estimated valuations of "typical" showrooms, offices etc could 
be applied. Information on physical size, e.g. floor area, is 
not available publicly. It was suggested that the rateable 
) 
values of a representative sample of premises should be obtained4 
and ·that this would provide a good proxy for size for valuation 
purposes. However, for a number of reasons this approach to 
valuation of land and buildings did not provide an answer. 
These are: 
(i) rateable value bears no direct guide to market capital 
value, which we ·take as the nearest estimate to replacemen·t 
cost. Rateable values are derived from annual rental values 
as they occurred in the open market at the time of the 
compilation of the rating lists. The gross rateable value of 
a showroom, say, would be based on the estimate of the annual 
rent which could have been obtained for it if offered to let, 
vacant, on the assumption that the tenant would pay rates and 
the landlord would bear the cos·t of repairs and insurance. 
Problems arise because of the dearth of open market trans-
actions for certain types of property. 
(ii) hereditaments occupied by the gas and electricity 
authorities are excluded from rating by sections 33 and 34 of 
the General Rate Ac·t 1967, but there are certain exceptio·ns 
in sections 33(2) and 34(2), e.g. showrooms and offices not 
situated on operational land. These latter are assessed in 
the normal way5 , which as seen in (i) above is unsatisfactory 
for capital valuation purposes. As regards gas hereditaments 
on operational land it is impossible, from the rating lists, 
to assign a rateable value to each type of premise, because 
gas hereditaments are entered as a total sum for each local 
authority rating area. 
As was pointed out to the author: 
" ••• The "gas hereditaments" are merely an apportionment, 
for the rating area, of a global rateable value calculated 
and amended from time to time, according to statutory 
formulae based upon numbers of therms supplied per mile 
of trunk main. 
"Although the historical roots of the global total 
originated in rateable values which were themselves 
derived from valuations, even those were based upon the 
accounts of gas undertakings and are not related to the 
market value of the buildings and other assets. In short, 
the gas hereditaments are not now (if they ever were) an 
indication of property values 11' 6 
Thus the use of rateable values for capital valuation had · 
to be discarded. 
The approach used. 
Recour~was then made to the information contained in 
the annual reports and accounts. Since vesting date the 
accounts contain data on annual investment in land and 
building, and all other assets, and also data on "investment 
less displacements". Now this is important because from 
1967/68 onwards displacements of land and buildings involved 
in gas manufacture increased with the advent of North Sea 
Gas. As the accounts note (DlO, p42 Note 1 (d). 
"The unamertised residue of costs of coal-based 
plant made obsolete as a result of new sources of 
gas supply and technical developments has been 
-; ·-. :·, 
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taken to.displaced plant account. This account also 
include~ the unamortised b~lance of 6il-ba~ed plant 
taken out of commi-ssion sooner than ·.expected. due to .. 
the introduction of natura 1 gas. . .. ·proceeds from the 
sale of assets are applied to reduce· tn·e unamorti·sed 
balance ... 
. . 
Initially the intention was to write this off by 1980-81 but this 
was brought forward to the end of the 1977/78 financial year as the accounts 
note (011, p.43 Note 1 ccs). 
Quite clearly this action will have a marked effect on the age profile 
of BGC's land and buildings]'. In calculating the replacement cost of the 
land and buildings it seems reasonable to assume, given the above note, firstly 
that the older land and buildings will be displaced first, and secondly that 
the land and buildings displaced will be disposed of. A note of caution is 
entered here because it is likely that some of the land content will be 
retained. However, giyen the data limitations it is not possible to assess 
what this is. Hence in the following estimates this problem is ignored. 
The effect,if the land content is present,will be to deflate the estimated 
replacement cost. It is thougbt that the effect will not be significant. 
Now using the data in the accounts there are two ways of calculating 
the length of the age profile, both of which produce the same result. The 
first is based on data gross of depreciation, the second is based on data 
net of depreciation. Using data gross of depreciation and defining It = gross 
investment in an asset in year t, Jt =displacements in year t (i.e. assets 
taken out of use before being fully depreciated), Kt =disposals in year t 
(i.e. assets taken out of use after being fully depreciated), the age profile 
(n) of the assets in use is approximated ~Y the number of years of investment 
in an asset that it takes to solve the following: 
·r i' T T 
ZIt = ~ I -t ZJt <£ Kt T = current year 
t = T-n t = v t = v t = v V= vesting day 
.,~ ,._ ... :; 
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In words, the age profile of ·th•3 asset is estimated by summing 
backwards the gross inves·tments in the asset until the total 
is approximately equal to the total of gross investments from 
vesting day less the gross value of displacements an~ disposals 
since vesting day. The same age profile may be obtained by 
using net data. This "gross method" has been used to revalue 
each asset category of B.G.C. Thus it is necessary to bear the 
above expression in mind when each asset category is discussed 
subsequently. 
If we return to the case of land and buildings it is seen 
that if the above procedure is followed then because of 
displacements of gas making land and building since 1967/68 the age 
profile becomes pr0gressively shorter from 1967/68 omo1ards. Thus 
for purposes of estimation the replacement cost of land and 
buildings an age profile ranging from thirteen years (1977/78) 
to eigh~een years (pre-1966/67) has been used. 
It is conceded that this age profile seems somewha·t shorter 
than may be expected. Indeed, BGC depreciate buildings over a 
longer period than this. But given the limitations of the data 
available to the author it seems impossible to make any further 
refinements. For example, an inspection of the accounts readily 
reveals a practice of redefining asset categories from year to 
year, so that assets may be switched from one category to another. 
Further, the lack of any data on investments prior to 
vesting day has meant that annual investments in land and 
buildings prior to 1949 have had to be estimated. For purposes 
of this exercise annual investment in land and buildings prior 
.: ~-· .... ! 
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to 1949 was-assumed to be equal in real terms to the average 
of the three years 1949/50 to 1951/52. This applies here to 
the period 1949/50 to 1943/44. The reasonableness of this 
assertion is based on the assumptions that immediate post-war 
demand did not fluctuate and that the individual gas companies 
did not increase investment because of the knoWledge that 
nationalisation was imminent. 
The choice of an index for land and buildings 
Two alternative indices present themselves: 
{i) The index of the average price of new dwellings - mortages 
approved with Building Societies.8 
{ii) The index of the cost of new construction, which measures 
the average change in the cost to clients of new building and 
civil engineering work in general, rather than changes in the 
cost of particular types of work. 9 
The former index is concerned solely with private domestic 
properties and thus has a narrower base. But it has the advantage 
over the latter in that it includes the cost of land in new 
dwellings which the latter index does not. 
The choice of which index to use hinges on the effect 
of the land element over the period under study. Inspection of 
Fig.l, which plots the two indices for the period under study reveals 
the following. The pattern of the two indices are very similar, 
although at different levels, up until the early 1960's when they 
converge. After 1970 the average price for new dwellings index is 
growing at a faster rate. This is attributable to the shift in the 
relative price of land in the early 1970's during the property 
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boom. As the land element is important in an assessment of 
capital value it was decided to use the average price of new 
dwellings index. 
It was seen above that the estimated age profile of land 
and buildings was from 13-18 years. Assuming that this 
remains constant throughout the period a series of price indices 
is required from 1943/44 onwards to enable the replacement cost 
valuation of land and buildings.in 1960/61 to be estimated. 
As the new dwellings index is not published prior to 1956 the 
following solutions were employed: 
(i) The missing ~ata for 1949 to 1955 were estimated by splicing 
the new dwellings index with the new construction index.10 
(ii) Prior to 1949 the Building Materials index was spliced 
11 
onto the above data. 
Thus, in general, the replacement cost valuation of land and 
buildings in any~ar is estimated by: 
T 
T = 1 t 
t=T-n 
2. Mains 
n = length of age profile 
= annual investment in 
t land and buildings 
= index for land and 
buildings at end of 
age profile 
= averagel2annual price 
for land and buildings 
for each year in the age 
profile. 
According to the Gas Corporation accounts, mains represent 
the greatest proportion of total assets, measured at historic 
cost. (£1365.8m or 57% of assets). Although the accounts give 
a figure of mileage of gas mains in use 136,000 miles in 
1977/78 it is difficult to arrive at an accurate replacement 
.. · .... .-·) 
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cost valuation by multiplying this by, say, an index for steel 
tubing or average cost data because of the great diversity in 
type of pipe (diameter and material) between the National and 
Regional transmission systems. Diameters range from 48" to 
3", and materials can be steel or plastic. This can result in 
large differences in the cost of mains pipe per mile. Plastic 
piping in use tends to be smaller in diameter, although this 
alone does not a:::count for the difference in cost. Metal 
pipes have to be welded together, then each weld has to be X-
rayed for defects. As a further safety measure the metal pipe 
is then filled with water and pumped up to a pressure twice 
that of normal use and kept there for twenty four hours to 
test the strength of the weld. Further, as the welding of the 
pipes is a specialist task,labour costs are extremely high. 
Hence the wide differences in average costs per mile. 
However, in the absence of apy internal information on 
costs per mile being released by BGC it was necessary to use 
the information published in the annual report and accounts 
. . . 13 
on ~nvestments ~n ma~ns. 
Unlike land and buildings mains have not been so affected 
by displacements aris~ng from the advent of natural gas. Thus 
a constant age profile may be used. The depreciation life used 
by BGC is forty years. It seems reasonable to use this as an 
approximate length of the.age profile of mains,. as it is necessary 
to sum the annual investments in mains for the whole period 
1949/50 to 1977/78 until it equals the total of gross Investments 
less displacements and disposals at the end of 1977/78 which 
suggests an age profile lar-:Jer ·than 29 years. However, 
the absence of da·ta pre l9ll9/50 means that annual investment 
prior ·to ·this date must be estimated. 
For purposes of this exercise it is assumed that 
investment in mains (and by implica·tion services) remained 
equal in real terms to the average of the three years 1949/50 
to 1951/52 for the period prior to 1949/50 under study. Whilst 
there would have been net investment in this· period for safety 
reasons and to serve extra consumers it is recognised that 
th•3 constancy assumption is a fairly strong one. However, 
constraints of the data available mean that this is unavoidable. 
The most suitable indices to use for adjusting the annual 
investments in mains would appear to be: 
(i) Steel Tubes index which covers MLH 312 - for the period 
1949/50 to 1977/78, spliced to produce a continuous series 
with base year 1970 = 100. 
(ii) Iron and Steel index, for the period 1920 to 1949, 
spliced onto the s·teel tubes index. This is a more general 
index than the Steel Tubes index, but it is the most suitable 
index prior to 1949. 
Given the above the replacement cost valuation of mains 
(Mt) for any year could be estimated by the following: 
T tiT) annual investment in mt = $ MT = mt mains 
t=T-40 Mit MIT = index for mains at end 
of the age profile 
Mit = average annual price 
index for mains for each 
year in the age profile. 
It is worth mentioning, en passant, that for mains, and 
services, the assumption of con·tinuity is crucial for the 
estimated replacement cost to be greater than historic cost. 
In the, admittedly unlikely, event of the gas industry 
ceasing to exist then the opportunity cost calculation of 
mains is likely to be very close to zero. Only the Water 
Authority could find any alternative use for them and it is 
very unlikely that the pipes '1.'17ould be the same network 
that they would r ~quire. In all probability the cost of 
removing ·the mains from the ground would outweigh any scrap 
value. So mains are quite literally a sunk cost. The land 
under which they run does not enter the problem as BGC merely 
has easements thereon, i.e. the right to use the land in 
order to inspect the pipes. 
3. Services 
Basically, these are the pipes running from the main 
in the street to the customers ho•ne. But neither the pipe 
diameter nor the length of pipe ·is standard. 
There are. ·no complete records of the number of services 
in use. Of course, there is one for every customer (almost 
14 million at 1975/76 year end) but there are also a great 
many services in homes that do not use gas, where perhaps 
a previous tenant had gas taken out but the current tenant 
has not replaced it. The question arises as to hO\'l many 
of these, if any, can be regarded as assets. Some will be 
u~ed again in future others will not, but without the benefit 
of the internal research that has been carried out on customer 
gains and losses it is impossible to estimate what this figure 
14 
may be. 
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Furthermore, no internal information is available on 
costs of services, nor can the information on average costs, 
contained in the published accounts, be considered sufficiently 
reliable. 15 
Therefore a similar procedure was adopted to that outlined 
above for mains. The age profile of services was estimated to 
be. fifteen years. This is less than the depreciation life 
used by BGC which is twenty years. HmoTever, it may be regarded 
as a reasonable depiction of the truth because the average age 
of services has been lowered by the significant increase in 
new customers (a ten per cent increase since 1968/69) and the 
advent of natural gas which may have led to the replacemen·t 
of older services for safety reasons. 
For obvious reasons the indices used for services were 
the same as those used for mains. One minor problem here is 
that some ·o_f_ the later service pipes are plastic not steel. 
However, this problem '"'as considered to be immaterial. 
If we denote the replacement cost valuation of services 
by (St) then, given the above, for any year: 
T 
~ st 
t = T-15 
SIT 
Sit 
4. Gasholders and other storage 
= 
= 
-
annual investment in 
services 
index for services at 
end of the age profile 
average annual price 
index for services for each 
year in the age profile. 
With the advent of firstly L .. N .G. from Algeria and 
secondly North Sea Gas the methods of storage in the gas 
........ .; 
industry changed quite dramatically. Gas from Algeria 
had to be stored in specially constructed holders mainly 
at Canvey Island but also in the Regions (e.g. Partington 
in N.W. R~gion). Much of the gas from the North Sea is 
stored by "line-packing" overnight, because it is not possible 
to meet daily peak demands by dra1111ing directly from the North 
Sea. "Line-packing" consists of storing gas in the main 
distribution network. Some gas is still stored in gasholders, 
although many have now been razed, and some is stored in a 
system of densely looped pipes. Clearly then it would be 
expected that the accounts should show an increase in 
investment per year in :3torage capacity. But it is also 
expected that Investment minus displacements and disposals 
should be quite small as much storage equipment suitable only 
for to~gas is being made obsolete before the original planned 
date. As already noted in the case of land and buildings these 
obsolete asse·ts are being transferred to a displaced plant 
account. The data in the accounts clearly reflect this, but 
it also presents something of a problem. In order to revalue 
the assets an age profile is required to which our indices can 
be applied. It is unclear from the accounts just what is the 
age of the storage capacity being displaced. We must assume 
it is the oldest storage capacity. However, another problem 
arises because changes of asset category definitions mean 
that the data for Investments minus displacements do not 
reflect the true picture of what has been displaced. Thus 
it is not possible to arrive at the time age profile of storage 
capacity. Nor is it clear that the length of the age 
profile is declining over time because the above produce 
contradictory effects. Thus for simplicity a constant age 
profile was assumed throughout the period under study. The 
length of the age profile was estimated to be nineteen years 
by summation of the gross annual investments backwards from 
the end of the period until the total figure for gross 
Investments less Displacements and disposals at the end of 
the period was reached, as with previously discussed assets 
pre 1949 investments were assumed constant in real terms and 
equal to the average of the three years 1949/50 to 1951/52. 
The choice of an index presented a problem as (i) there 
is no wholesale price index for gasholders, and (ii) an index 
was required to cover the period 1942/43 to 1977/78 because 
of the length of the age profile. No single suitable index 
covers the whole of this period in the U.K. 
It was decided that the following would be the most 
suitable indices: 
(i) vats, tanks, cisterns and other industrial hollow-ware 
(MLH 399/7) and its forerunner, industrial hollow-ware for 
the period 1949/50 to 1977/78. 
(ii) The wholesale industrial materials (non-food) spliced 
with (i) for the period prior to 1949/50. 
The latter was chosen in preference to the Iron and 
Steel index, and the u.s. metal container16 index because 
when plotted on a graph it proved to be the closest fit to 
the vats, tanks etc. index. 
and 
1~0 
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From theabove the replacement cost valuation of gasholders 
other storage 
T 
= z 
t=T-19 
(GT) may be estimated by solving, in general:-
= annual investment in 
gasholders and storage 
= index for gasholders at 
end of age profile 
= average annu& price 
index for gasholders 
for each year in the 
age profile. 
5. Plant and Machinery 
This category of asset has perhaps experienced the 
greatest change since the early 1960s. The advent of natural 
gas has led to the scrapping of most of the plant and machinery 
used for town gas manufacture. It has also led to an increase 
in equipment such as pumps and compressors for use in 
distributing gas from the beach-head to the regions and within 
regions. and into storage. Consequently the age profile has 
been shortened. Plant and machinery of the former type was 
depreciatedover a period of up to twenty years, whereas the 
newer equipment is mainly depreciated over five years 
The age profile of plant and machinery was estimaed 
in the same manner as for the assets discussed above. As 
a result of the vast changes taking place in the usage of plant 
and machinery in the gas industry, as noted above, the age 
profile was found to range between eight years (1974/5) and 
twelve years (pre 1967/S).As the effects of investment in. 
North Sea Gas begin .to work themselves out, so that new 
investment in plant and machinery outweighs displacements, 
the age profile of this asset has begun to lengthen (to 
"" 1-:"1 ... 1 I ~ .. ·~)· 
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eleven years in 1977/78) • 
Index choice was somewhat problematical for this asset 
as the potentially most interesting series did not begin 
until the early 1960 1 s and late 195o•s. After comparing, 
on a graph, the likely candidates - viz. the wholesale 
price index, Iron and Steel index, u.s. annual general 
purpose machinery {unadusted and adjusted), and the UK pumps 
valves and compressor index, it was found that the following 
produced the most reliable continuous series for.~ whole 
period: 
(i) UK pumps index {SIC,MLH 333/1) for 1977/78 to 1956 Q.l. 
(ii)the wholesale price index spliced onto (i) for the 
period prior to 1956 Ql. 
Hence the replacement cost of plant (PT) and machinery in 
any year may be obtained by satisfying the following: 
T 
p = '£ 
T t=T-n CIT) where pt Pit 
6. Meters 
pt 
PIT 
Pit 
n 
= 
= 
= 
annual investment in 
plant and machinery 
index for plant and 
machinery at end of the 
age profile 
average annual price 
index for plant and 
machinery for each year 
in the age profile. 
= length of age profile 
The initial approach towards estimating the replacement 
cost of meters was to attempt to estimate the number of meters 
and their types. Once this information was obtained it was 
intended that average prices of meters would be applied to 
each category to obtain the replacement cost. In the end this 
was not the approach used but it is reported for information 
purposes. The method used is discussed subsequently. 
Unfortunately the accounts of BGC do not record any 
information about the numbers of meters owned; thus it was 
necessary to make estimates. As was seen above (Table B fn.l4) 
the customers of BGC fall into three broad categories, domestic 
industrial and commercial. In the nature of things these three 
categories of customers will require very different types 
of gas meter. For example the amount of gas used by an 
industrial concern is likely to be very much larger than that 
used by the ordinary domestic household. Thus there will be 
differences in the cost of a meter depending upon the use to 
which it is put. 
A complicating factor is that the number of meters 
will not correspond to the number of customers. The reasons 
for this are: 
(i) Domestic customers 
The existence of multiple-households in one dwelling, 
e,g. private·ly rented flats and bedsits. According to the 
17 1971 census about 1.5 per cent of the estimated 16.45 million 
dwellings in England and wales were occupied by more than 
18 
one household. Now in the case of BGC the percentage of 
multiple occupancy households will be lower than this because 
many dwellings that are counted as having more than one 
household from the point of view of the Census will be flats 
where the occupiers are separate customers of the Gas 
Corporation. There remains the problem of a landlord letting 
. . . 
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his house into bedsitting-rooms and flats and having a separate 
meter for each room. However, entire. evidence available19 it 
appears that less than half of one per cent of meters are 
located in multiple occupancy dwellings. Thus it is assumed 
that the problem will not be significant. Hence the number 
of domestic customers will be taken as a proxy for the number 
of domestic meters. 
(ii) Commercial and public administration customers 
This category includes things like offices, schools, 
colleges and universities in addition to shops, hotels, public 
houses, garages and so on. There will be multiple meters per 
customer mainly in the public administration category. For 
example a university will be regarded by the Gas Corporation 
as being one customer, but it is likely to have a number of 
reters e.g. one in each hall of residence; one in each separate 
teaching building; and one in the administrative block. 
From the information available to the author it appears 
that a ratio of two to one commercial customer is areasonable 
estimate to use. 
(iii) Industrial customers 
To the extent that a firm has separate premises it will 
have more than one meter. A firm may also have a secondary 
or sub-meter where an interruptible load contract is in 
existence. An interruptible contract is made where the gas 
corporation agrees to sell gas to the firm at a reduced price, 
in return for which the firm is prepared to be switched off 
temporarily, at short notice, when BGC requires the gas to 
"~ . ;.-} 
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supply peak demand elsewhere. This will be the case.for 
e~ample in the middle of a cold winter. The firm will then 
switch to the use of an alterative fuel, in many cases oil. 
Again, on the basis of the confidential information 
supplied to the author an average ratio of two meters to one 
industrial customer is a reasonable estimate. 
On this basis, then there are 13,365,000 domestic meters 
and 1,120,000 industrial and commercial meters (twice 560,000). 
20 The next problem is to estimate prices for each type of meter. 
Prices vary greatly especially industrial gas meter prices. 
Prices for industrial meters range from £47 for a small 1~ inch 
diameter connection21 to around £900 for special meters. However, 
it must be borne in mind that BGC receives a discount of 
approximately one third off the above prices to private 
customers. Thus the following prices were used in the 
calculations of the replacement cost of meters: 
£ 
Domestic - prepayment 18.67 
credit 12 
Industrial/ - average 120 
Commercial 
It will be observed that there are two types of domestic 
meter, prepayment and credit. In recent years there has 
been an accelerating trend towards the use of credit meters 
because from the gas corporation point of view it is cheaper 
to read a meter for credit than to send someone to collect 
the money. 'Also, credit meters are more secure, i.e. there 
is not the danger of losses due to theft. The tariffs of 
BGC reflect this; it is advantageous to all customers, except 
very small users of gas, to have a credit meter. However, a 
"~ r ,-~ 
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large number of prepayment meters remain. Hence it is 
necessary to estimate the split between prepayment and 
credit meters. Using the information available a split 
of 25 per cent prepayment and 75 per cent credit meters 
was estimated. Now BGC had 13,365 million domestic 
customers at the end of the 1975/76 financial year. On 
this basis 3,341,250 were prepayment customers and 10,023,750 
were credit customers. 
Using this information the replacement cost of meters 
could be estimated. 
would be given by: 
For 1975/76 the replaceme-nt cost (R ) 
76 
where AC = average cost of 
meter 
P = prepayment customers 
c = credit 
I = industrial and 
commercial. 
However, whilst this approach is satisfactory for recent_ y~ars 
it had to be abandoned for estimating replacement cost over 
the period 1960/61 to 1977/78. This is because it was 
impossible to obtain a full series of meter prices for the 
period as the manufacturer did not keep the information for 
this length of time. It also proved impossible to obtain 
information to verify that the propor.tions of types of 
customers, and of the split between credit and prepayment 
meters had remained constant. 
The.methodology used throughout the period was to 
estimate an age profile of meters in the same manner as that 
' . . 
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described for previous assets. The age profile was estimated 
at fifteen years by this method. This compares with a 
depreciation life of meters and electronic control equipment 
of ten years 22 used by ·BGC. It is felt by the author that 
a fifteen year age profile errs on the correct side as casual 
empiricism would suggest that the life of the most meters is 
for longer than ten years. There is also some evidence (G7, 
para 4.5) that book depreciation lives are on the whole 
shorter than actual depreciation lives. This asset category 
has not been significantly affected by the changes necessitated 
by the coming of North Sea Gas. Rather than replace the whole 
meter, in order that the higher pressure natural gas could be 
controlled correctly, a.governor~s fitted to each meter. Hence 
a constant age profile over our period is assumed. 
The annual investments in meters were adjusted by the 
following indices: 
(i) process measuring and control instruments (MLH 354/2) 
for the period 1977/78 to 1957/58. 
(ii) the wholesale price index spliced onto (i) prior to 
1957/58. 
The latter index was used because the index for 354/2 is not 
published before l958Ql. A number of possible alternative 
indices were investigated, for examples the iron and steel 
index, the index for industrial hollow-ware and the US 
index for metal containers (unadjusted and adjusted for 
differential inflation rates) • However, by inspection the 
wholesale price index proved to be the best fit. 
-'~ , ; 
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Using the above information the gross replacement cost 
value of meters (~) may be obtained, for any given year by 
satisfying the following: 
T 
27 where 
t=T-15 
7. Motor vehicles and mobile plant 
r 
t 
= annual investment 
in meters 
= index for meters at 
end of age profile 
= average annual index 
for meters for each 
year in the age 
profile 
Ideally it would be preferred if data were available 
on the number of cars, vans, lorries etc. owned, together 
with an age distribution. Obviously in the absence of a 
comprehensive asset register, this would be impossible to 
achieve. How~ver, replacement cost valuation may be arrived 
at by taking the latest available year end total of gross 
investments less historic cost displacements and disposals 
since vesting day and then adding back the investments made 
23 in each year until this figure is arrived at. This should 
range between three and five years, as these are the 
current depreciation periods of cars and vans, and commercial 
. . 1 24 veh~cles respect~ve y. This provides an approximate age 
distribution. When the exercise was carried out the age 
profile was found to range from seven years (1977/78) to 
eight years (pre 1970/71). This may be explained by the 
fact that until recently the depreciation period for this 
category was five to ten years, so that ~he change to a 
shorter depreciation period is still w0rking its way through. 
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Given the age profile the gross replacement cost value 
of mot r vehicles may be estimated in two ways. The first 
method is to estimate the average cost of an item in this 
category (ACVt), typically the "gasboard van", in the year 
of purchase, and dividing it into the annual investment (vt) 
the number of vehicles purchased (wt) each year is obtained. 
The gross replacement cost valuation of motor vehicles 
and mobile plant (Vt) is then obtained by: 
where NT= 
T 
~ w 
t=T-n t 
= average cost of a van in 
the current year. 
However, whilst this method can be used with the avai~le 
25 data, it was felt that a more appropriate method would be 
to take the age profile as calculated and to multiply each 
vt by the ratio of the index of motor vehicle prices at the 
end of the.period to the average motor vehicle price index 
for each year (t) in the age profile. Symbolically, the 
following expression is to be solved: 
T 
= ~ 
t=T-n 
where: 'v 
t 
n 
VIT 
VIt 
= 
= 
= 
= 
annual investment in 
vehicles 
length of age profile 
index for motor vehicles 
at end of age profile 
average annual index 
for motor vehicles, 
for each year in age 
profile. 
This second method is to be preferred because the index 
takes into account more than one type of motor vehicle, which 
is more representative of the real state of affairs. Moreover, 
purely from a pragmatic viewpoint, the data is more readily 
available. It proved almost impossible to obtain prices for 
one van throughout the whole period since records are not 
kept for that length of time, nor was the. model in existence 
throughout the period. 
The indices used for adjusting the annual investment-
data were: 
(i) wholesale price index for motor vehicles (covering MLH 
classes 380 to 385) for 1977/78 to 1960/61. 
(kk) the general wholesale price index, non-food manufacturing, 
for pre 1960/61. 
The index for motor vehicles using MLH 381 was thought to be 
most appropriate but this index was not published prior to 
1963. Other indices were investigated, for example the UK 
Iron and Steel index, and US motor vehicle index (adjusted 
for different general inflation rates) • By inspection on a 
graph the general wholesale price index was seen to approximate 
best to the index for MLH 380-385. 
8. Furniture, fittings and office machinery 
Since no method of estimating numbers of "typical" 
furniture, fittings and office machinery could be readily 
identified the approach used was as described in previous 
sections of this chapter, such that the following· equation 
is solved to yield the gross replacement cost of furniture 
etc (FT): 
F = T 
T 
~ 
t=T-n 
where: f 
t 
n 
= annual investment 
in furniture. 
= length of age profile 
index for furniture 
etc. at end of 
age profile 
.,. ~ ~-:-! 
J. · ... iJ 
= average annual index 
for motor vehicles 
for each year in 
age profile 
The age profile of furniuure and fittings was found to range 
from eight years (1977/78) to eleven years (prior to 1968/69). 
This compares to a depreciation life of five years used by 
BGC. The difference is accounted for by a reduction in the 
depreciation life from ten years which is still working its 
way through existing furniture and fittings. 
The indices used were: 
(i) Wholesale price index for metal furniture, office and 
works equipment (MLH 399/1) for 1977/78 to 1957/58. 
(ii) wholesale price index for domestic furniture, spliced 
into (i), for 1957/58 to 1952 Ql. 
(iii) the US Commercial Furniture series adjusted for different 
levels of general inflation for 1952 Ql to 1949/50. 
As with all other assets, where the age profile extended 
. 26 
back beyond 1949/50, annual investments were estimated by 
assuming that they were equal, in real terms, to the average 
of the annual investments in the years 1949/50 to 1951/52. 
9. Miscellaneous 
The very nature of this category makes it difficult to 
arrive at anything more than a very rough estimate of its 
replacement cost. The data as presented in the accounts 
indicate that there has been much change in the definition 
of miscelleneous since vesting day. 
The age profile was thus estimated by summing backwards 
until the annual investments equalled the total of investments 
less displacements, for each year in the period 1977/78 to 
1960/61. The age profil•3 was found to range from sixteen 
years (1977/78) to nine years (1974/5). 
Since this asset is heterogeneous it is possible only 
to use a general index ·::o make adjustments. The index thus 
chosen was the index of wholesale prices: all manufacturing 
industry manufactured products: home sales, not seasonally 
adjusted. 
By solving the following equation the estimated 
replacement cost valuati9n (ZT) is obtained: 
T 
~ 
t=T-n 
Summary and Conclusions 
where zt = annual investment 
in miscellaneous 
in year t. 
n 
= price index for 
miscellaneous at 
end of age profile 
= annual avera~e index 
:Eor each year i:n the 
age profile 
= length of age profile 
In summary, it is seen that the methodology used was 
the same for each asse·t. For any year in the period an age 
profile was estimated by sui~ming back the gross annual 
investments in each asset until the sum equalled the total 
of inves·tments less displacements and disposals since vesting 
day at that year end. Each annual investment was then 
adjusted to obtain the estimated replacement cost valuation. 
This was achieved by multiplying the annual investment by 
the ratio of the year•s end index to the average annual index 
,• r• ') ~. I " : 
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for each year in the age profile. 
That this method is not perfect is readily admitted. 
But data deficiencies prevented the use of any altern~. tive 
method. Even where data \0/ete available so that alternative 
methods could be used, for example in the case of motor 
vehicles, there were stronger arguments in favour of using 
price indices. Price indices provide a broader base than 
the average cost of a "typical" asset. Secondly, there 
is at least some evidence that price indices are better 
guides to estimating replacement cost than current suppliers 
price lis·ts ( 3, pp 249-50) • Two further arguments are 
adduced in favour of the methodology used here. It provides 
a consistent approach for each asset and it provides a 
suitable basis for the calculations ·of annual depreciation 
provisions, which are used ·to estimate net book values. These 
are discussed in the next chapter. 
A final point concerning the methodology used by the 
author relates to the problem of whether this methodology 
estimates exactly, underestimates or over-estimates the 
actual replacement cost of the assets of BGC. It is felt 
that. in total replacement cost will be slightly o~er-estimated 
because of the weighting introduced by using a long age profile 
for mains, which is by far the largest asset category. 
At the beginning of this chapter a table showing the 
historic cost gross bool<: values of the assets of BGC was 
presented. The following table reproduces the information 
shown there and presents the estimated gross replacement 
cost of the assets of BGC for 197'7/78. The results for the 
Type of Asset Historic Cost Replacement Cost 
£m % £m % 
Land and 133.7 5.6 339.9 4.0 
Buildj.ng 
Mains 1365 .a 57.2 5770.2 67.8 
Services 261.3 11.0 888.9 10.4 
GasHolders and 89.6 3.8 249.8 2.9 
other Storage 
Plant and 324.8 13.6 763 .o 9.0 
Machinery 
Meters 123.0 5.2 301.7 3.5 
Motor vehicles 24.7 1.0 54.9 0.6 
Furniture, 18.7 0.8 32.7 0.4 
Fittings etc. 
Miscellaneous 42.2 1.8 117.1 1.4 
Total 2383.8 I 100.0 8518.2 100.0 I 
Replacement Cost 
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period 1960/61 to 1977/78 are presented in Part 3 Appendix 
IV table l(a). 
Clearly, gross historic cost book valuas understate 
replacement cost gross book values. Historic cost gross 
book values are 9nly about one quarter the size of replacement 
cost gross book values. Whilst for most assets replacement 
cost is about two to three times greater ·than historic cost 
for mains and services it is 4.2 and 3.4 times as great, 
respectively. As these two assets together account for 
two thirds of historic cost valuation it is they who are 
mainly responsible for the excess of replacement cost over 
historic cost being as larg~ as it is. To some extent this 
difference is accounted for by the longer age profile 
used in calculating the replacement cost of mains, but as 
the age profile for services was shorter than the historic 
cost depreciation life the difference must be attributable 
to the increase in the relative price of the steel content 
of steel tubes. 
· In part 2 of this thesis, the attempts of BGC at inflation 
accounting were outlined. It was pointed out there that, 
whereas BGC have introduced a supplementary depreciation 
charge they have published no data on the replacement cost 
of the assets to which this depreciation relates. However, 
estimates of replacement cost were made available to the 
author on the understanding of confidentiality. On the whole 
it appears that the estimates presented here are within about 
ten per cent of the estimates made by BGC. 
Part 3. Ch. 2 
Estimates of the Replacement Cost Rates of 
Return of BGC - 1960/61 to 1977/78 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter estimates of gross replacement 
cost of the fixed assets of BGC were presented. This 
chapter presents the results of adjusting the profit and 
asset data of BGC for inflation along the lines laid 
out in part 1. 
Adjustments to Historic Cost Data 
A. Asset Valuation 
1. Fixed Assets 
Fixed assets were revalued using specific indices. 
The methodology was outlined in the previous chapter. The 
same approach was used to value fixed assets using the 
·general, i.e. retail price, index (see Pt.3 Appendix- IV 
Table l(b) for the results). 
To arrive at net book value the following approach 
was used. Firstly annual replacement cost depreciation 
was calculated. This is also necessary for calculating 
pre-interest income. For any year in the period 1960/61 
to 1977/78 each estimated replacement cost of the annual 
investment for each year in the age profile was divided 
by the length of the age profile. The totals of each 
of these provide the annual depreciation provision for 
each asset. Symbolically, the general expression for 
annual depreciation provision for any asset (D ) is given 
T 
by:-
T T 
DT ~ xt = t=T-n n = ~ dt where: X = replacement cost t=T-n t 
of each annual 
investment in 
age profile 
n = lenlth of age 
pro ile 
dt = xt 
n 
Having obtained dt and DT the net book value (NBV) of any 
asset in any year can be found by the following. It was 
the 
argued in part two that the net book value is not the replace-
ment ~cnst .· gross book value less the sum of the annual 
replacement cost depreciation provisions, since earlier 
provisions serve to p~ovide for the replacement cost of 
the asset at what it is estimated to be in the ealier years 
not at the end of its life. Rather the NBV is estimated by 
subtracting from each annual investment's replacement cost the 
current depreciation provision multiplied by the number of 
years of that investment's life that have expired. Thus 
with an eight year age profile the latest investment has 
subtracted from it one years' depreciation and the investment 
made eight years ago has eight years depreciation subtracted. 27 
Thus, symbolically, the NBV of each annual investment in the 
age profile (.bt) is given by: 
b = x - {d a) 
t t t 
where a = no. of years in the 
age profile that have 
expired. 
The NBV for each asset in any year (BT) is thus given by: 
. .. _. ..... 
. . :~ ~-; ;) 
T 
~1 B = ~ b T t=T-n t 
The annual r~acement cost depreciation estimates, using 
specific indices are presented in Part 3, Appendix IV 
Table 2, and the replacement cost NBV's using both specific 
and general indices are given in Part 3, Appendix IV Tables 
3(a) and (3(b). 
An additional adjustment was made to the estimated Net 
28 Book Values for the years 1975/76 to 1977/78. In 1975/76 
BGC began to charge the cost of replacing certain categories 
of assets directly to revenue. For purposes of this exercise 
it was decided that this charge rightly,belonged to annual 
investment. It was treated separately because it is not clear 
precisely to which assets this amount relates. The results 
of the adjustment are shown alongside the NBV of fixed assets 
in Table 1. 
2. Other Assets and Liabilities 
(i) Stocks were revalued using the general wholesale price 
index, as this category includes gas, appliances and other 
stores. 
(ii) all other assets and liabilities are regarded as being 
monetary and thus are entered at the same amounts as shown 
in the historic cost accounts. This includes "Displaced 
Plant" account which contains the historic cost, less 
depreciation provisions, of assets made obsolete by the 
advent of natural gas. As such the replacement cost 
valuation is of no interest. 
The total net assets, broken down by type, are shown 
for the ·period 1960/61 to 1977/78 in Table 1. 
B. Profit Valuation 
(i) Turnover and operating costs 
These were adjusted by the retail price index (1970 =100) 
such that recognition was made of the fact that turnover 
accrues and costs are incurred throughout the year. Thus 
in order that all turnover and costs are measured in year-end 
£s' the totals at the end of the~ar were multiplied by the 
ratio of the year end index to the average index for the 
year. 
It was assumed that deferred charges and displaced 
plant were deducted at the year end. 
(ii) Replacement cost depreciation 
See section A above for method of calculation. 
(iii) Cost of Sales adjustment 
See part 1 Appendix IV part I for the methodology. 
(iv) Adjustment for maintenance of real value of net 
monetary assets 
Net monetary assets, are, basically, net trade assets. 
These were adjusted, using the reta~l price index, by the 
averaging method, as for stocks etc, to convert to year-
end £s' • This provides the amount to Which net monetary 
assets would have to rise to maintain their .real value. The 
difference between this and historic cost is the necessary 
adjustment to maintain real value. 
I 
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Table 1: Replacement Cost Net Assets of BGC Em 
1- 1977L7B 1976/:a_ 1975L76 1974L75 1973L7!1: 1972L73 1971L72 121oLn 1969L2o ] 
1. Fixed Assets replacement cost NBV 4839.9 43 56.8 3457.4 3159.7 2034.5 1791.7 1685.4 1638.6 ' 1472.6 
2. Capital expenditure charged to 
re·,enue by BGC - replacement cost NBIT. 203. 1 110.6 49.5 - - - - - -
3. Deferred charges: conversion to 
natural gas - 148.3 273.3 295.9 293.2 256.5 248.0 173.9 76·.3 
4. Displaced plant - 82.3 137.6 143.2 122.0 90.6 64.0 25.0 16.2 
5. Investments 33.7 65.5 57.6 32.8 21.6 22.8 20.8 20,6 18.1 
6. Hire purchase and deferred pay-
ment accounts 73.7 65.4 59.3 51.3 52.9 54.3 54.3 49.2 51.3 
. 7. Balance of Compensation & balance I 
of d~scount on British Gas Stock . - - - - - - 4.8 "6.0 6.8 
~qrrent assets ~ liaailities ' 
B. Stock replacement cost 120.3 13 5. 5 112.6 97.4 79.3 80.4 78.0 91.3 90.5 
9. l'l:metary assetsi 591.0 520.4 451.5 377.8 314.8 239.0 248.4 244.0 208.8 
Less: 
i 10. Monetary liabilities* (347.0) (278.8) (266.4) (229.4) (177.7) (148. 5) (148.6) (165.0) (150.1) I I 
Ill. Net bank overdraft+ 21.4 ( 5.·0) (6.6) (5.1) (6. 3) (6.1) (5.9) (7.4) (8.3) 
Total after hank overdraft 5536.1 5201..0 4324.8 3923.6 2734.3 2380.6 2249.2 2076.2 1782.2 
Add back bank overdraft (21.4) 5.0 6.6 5.1 6.3 6.1 5 .• 9 7.4 8.3 
Total net assets 5514.7 5206.0. 4331.4 3928.7 2740.6 2386.7 2255.1 2083.6 1790.5 
Notes: Fixed Assets of former undertakings, shown in Gas Council accoun~ pre 1973, disappear here as they are i.ncluded within 
the replacement cost estimates. 
i includes debtors, accrued revenne, prepayments, money market investments, government compensation receivable: excludes cash. 
*· includes current liabilities and provisions, and other temporary deposits: excludes bank overdrafts. 
+ BGC distinguish "Bank loans and overdrafts" and "Bank overdrafts", the former is treated as a capital liability, the latter 
as a current liability. Here they are all treated as capital liabilities. 
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·I j Table 1 (contd) . Replacement Cost Net Assets of BGC £m 
i j 196Bl69 1967l68 1966l67 1965l6G 1964l65 1963l64 1962l63 196ll62 1960l61 
l 
'l 
1. Fixed Assets replacement cost NBV 1194.3 1067.7 84a.o 6a5.8 609.2 568.9 518.3 504.9 499.4 
2. Capital expenditure charged to 
revenue by BGC - replacement ~ost 
- - - - - - ·- - -
j 
i 3. Deferred charges 30.6 6.4 0.9 - - - - - -
j --ii '··· .:_• 
. : ... :-.) 
·1 •-s-Q.), 
1.5 
. 
4. Displaced Plant 7.7 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.1 1.2 0.2 -
5. Investments 16.1 7.4 4.6 4.9 4.8 5.0 5.5 5·.a 5.5 
6. Hir,~ purchase and deferred payment 
accounts 51.4 50.1 52.2 58.2 56.9 50.9 46.7 45.2 46.0 
i 
I 
I 
! 
• 
7. Balance of compensation & balance 
of discount on British Gas Stock a.6 , a. 1 9.3 9.5 11.3 14.6 15.1 17.9 18.5 ' i 
I 
Current assets & liabilities 
i 
' ; 
i a. Stocks replacement cost a7.5 92.2 al. a 65.1 63.a 5a.4 51.0 53 .a 54.2 
i 
·, 
'i 
·I 
I 
I 
9. Monetary assets 194.4 165.1 144.1 133. a 123.6 115.9 110.1 96.9 85.5 
Less: 11 (152 .4) (117.3) (104.0) (a3. 5) (7a. a). (76. 5) 10. Monetary liabilities (159. 5) (65.0) (60.0) 
11. Net bank overdraft (6 .3) (a.4) (4.1) 
- (4.1) (4.1) (4.1) (2. a) (0. 5) 
I 
1 
1 Total after bank overdraft 1424.a 123a.l 1021.0 a54.a 783.5 731.9 663.3 655.9 64a.6 
Add back bank overdraft 6.3 a.4 4.1 - 4.1 4.1 4.1 2.8 0.5 
Total net assets 1431.1 1246.5 1025.1 a54.a 7a7.6 736.0 671.4 65a. 7 649.1 
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Table 2: Pre-interest replacement cost profit of BGC ~ 
' 
1977L78 1976L77 1975L72 1974L75 1973L74 
I 
Turnover - adjusted for inflation 2694.1 2128.3 1731.4 1135.7 103.3.0 
Less: 
Operating costs - II II ·" 1653. 5 1286.5 ~147. 5 934.9 714.2 
Deferred charges - (unadjusted) 155.7 148.3 87.0 73.9 44.6 
Displaced plant - ( II ) 83.2 80.6 48.7 38.2 30.0 
Pre-interest, pre-depreciation trading 
surplus 801.7 612.9 448.2 288.7 244.2 
Deduct: 
Replacement cost depreciation+ 367.1 322.1 274.3 262.3 203.8. 
Cost of sales adjustment 14.1 20.6 15.4 19.3 11.1 
Adjustment for maintenance of real value 
of net monetary assets 10.5 18.6 17.7 14.2 7.4 
Add: 410.0 251.6 140.8 (7.1) 21.9 
Real holding gain on assets* 1234.7 1008.7 604.4 943.6 222.2 
Real holding gain on stocks 1.8 1.6 (1. 5) 2.1 1.4. 
Pre-interest replacement cost profit 1646.5 1261.9 74.3.7 938.6 245.5 
--- - ---- ---'-----
'! includes interest receivable. 
+ 
* 
includes an apportionment of "capita 1 expenditure charged to revenue" 197 5/76 to .1977/78. 
includes holding gain on'bapital expenditure charg~d to revenu~ 1975/76 to 1977/78. 
1972L73 1911L72 1970L71 1969L7o 
947.8 811.6 718.3 678.7 
632.6 564.4 522.2 505.7 
32.8 16.9 11.3 5.7 
13.4 
- - -
I 
269.0 230.3 184.8 167.3 
176.6 161.6 140.5 124.9 
4.9 4.2 7.0 4.7 
4.3 3.6 . 3.3 1.4 
83.2 60.9 34.0 36.3 
67.3 78.5 80.4 106.2 
(1. 3) . (0.8) (0.3) 0.1 
. 149.2 138.6 114.1 142.6 
-----
-
--- - ---- --
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Table 2 (cant) Pre-interest replacement cost profit of BGC £m 
1~68L69 l~§ZL68 i966L67 1965L66 1964L65 
Turnove~- adjusted for inflation 663".9 600.0 565.0 574.1 538.9 
I.ess: 
Operating costs - .. .. .. 514.7 509.1 479.1 489.2 459.1 
Deferred charges - (unadjusted) 2.2 0.5 - - -
Displaced·plant- ( .. ) - - - - -
-
Pre-interest, pre-depreciation trading 
surplus 147.0 90.4 85.9 84.9 79.8 
Deduct: 
Replacement cost depreciation+ 105.7 94.8 79.7 68.7 62.6 
Cost of sales adjustment 2.1 3 .o 1.2 1.5 2.1 
Adjustment for maintenance of real value 
of net monetary assets 1.1 0.2 0. 5 0.6 0.9 
38.1 (7.6) 4.5 14.1 14.2 
Add: 
Real holding gain on assets* (28. 5) 22.9 16.0 10.5 18.2 
Real·holding gain on stocks (1.6) 0.1 (0.8) (0.6) (0.3) 
Pre-interest replacement cost profit 8.0 15.4 19.7 24.0 32.i 
! includes interest receivable. 
+ 
* 
includes an apportionment of "capital expenditure charged ·to revenue" 1975/76 to 1977/78. 
includes holding gain on'bapital expenditure charged to revenue' 1975/76 to 1977/78. 
1963L64 . 1962L63 1961L62 1960L61 
500.1 486.0 448.9 420.7 
43 5.1 423.1 388.7 364.7 
- - - -
- - - - : 
65.0 62.9 60.2 56.0 
59.2 55.5 54.7 53 .• 3 
1.1 
' 
0.5 0.8 1.3 
0.2 0.5 0.7 0.3 
4.5 6.4 4.0 1.1 
32.0 24-.8 32.0 43.5 
0.2 (0. 5) (0.8) (0.1) 
36.7 30.7 35.2 44.5 
(v) Real holding gains 
These are calculated by taking the difference between 
NBV on a specific index basis and NBV using a general index. 
For fixed assets these are presented in detail in Part 3, 
Appendix IV Table 3(c). 
After all these adjustments had been carried out pre 
interest replacement cost profit was estimated. The 
results are presented in Table 2. 
Digression 
Before considering the replacement cost rate of return 
a digre·ssion is made to compare the replacement cost 
depreciation provisions calculated here with those used by 
BGC. The comparative data are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3: Comparison of Replacement Cost Depreciation 
Provisions 
1977/78 1976/77 
"£In £In £In £m 
MY DATA 351.6 313.9 
1 Historic 196.0 176.4 BGC 
Supplementary 145.4 102.6 
BGC Total 341.4 279.0 
MY ERROR +3.0% + 12.5% 
Notes: 1. Source: D12, p.3B. 
Comparison can only be made for two years as BGC have 
only provided supplementary depreciation provisions for this 
number of years. Consequently, it is not clear whether the 
1977/78 data represent a sustained convergence of the two 
approaches. It is known that the BGC approach was different 
for 1976/77 than the approach used by the present author, 
and that the method used by BGC was likely to lead to an 
underestimate rather than ·the reverse. For example not all 
assets were revalued. Nor did BGC have a complete asset 
register in 1976/77 on which to base revaluations. It is 
suggested that the convergence in 1977/78 is due to improvements 
_made by BGC in these areas of their methodology. The method 
used by the present author may lead to overestimates 
particularly with respect to mains where a long age profile 
was used. 
In sum the two approaches may reasonably be said to 
produce results which are not too dissimilar. 
Replacement Cost Rate of Return on Net Assets 
In Table 4 the results of the exercise for the full 
period 1960/61 to·l977/78 are presented. It should be 
noted that the data on historic cost rates of return have 
been adjusted to fit the definitions of profit and capital 
laid out in part one of this thesis. 
The trends of the historic cost series and the replacement 
cost series (excluding holding gains) appear similiar, but 
with the former about four per cent per annum higher, until 
1973/74. After this date the two series diverge, a very 
Table 4: 
YEAR 
1960/61 
1961/62 
1962/63 
1963/64 
1964/65 
1965/66 
1966/67 
1967/68 
1968/69 
1969/70 
1970/71 
1971/72 
1972/73 
1973/74 
1974/75 
1975/76 
1976/77 
1977/78 
.. - .-, ~~ '.! ~) 
Pre-interest Rates of Return of BGC - (bank 
overdraft included in assets) 
RATE OF RETURN* 
** *** 
Historic cost Replacement Cost 
inc.holding exc.holding 
gains gains 
% % % 
4.2 6.9 o.2 
4.4 5.3 0.6 
4.6 4.6 1.0 
4.4 5.0 0.6 
5.4 4.1 1.8 
5.5 2.8 1.6 
4.6 1.9 0.4 
3.8 1.2 - 0.6 
6.5 0.6 2.7 
6.5 8.0 2.0 
6.1 5.5 1.6 
7.1 6.1 2.7 
7.7 6.3 3.5 
5.5 9.0 0.8 
5.5 23.9 - 0.2 
10.8 17.2 3.3 
15.6 24.2 4.8 
24.1 29.9 7.4 
* as defined in pt.1. 
** Average net assets as the denominator. See Part 3 Appendix IV 
Table 4 for details. 
***The method of ca1cu~ation of replacement cost takes into 
account that assets are acquired throughout the year, 
thus there is no need to take the average. 
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clear demonstration of the overestimation inherent in 
historic cost data in times of rapid inflation. 
When the replacement cost series, including holding 
gains, is considered a different picture emerges. This 
series appears to be very erratic, as might be expected 
since this reflects changes in relative prices. 
It is interesting to note that this series rises 
above the historic cost rate of return series after 1972/73. 
From Part 3, Appendix IV Table 3(c) it is apparent that this 
is due to the real unrealised holding gains being obtained 
on mains and services after this date. This is a reflection 
of the change in the re~tive prices of steel, and hence 
cf steel products. 
Replacement Cost Rate of Return for BGC compared with that 
for industry in general 
A number of institutions have produced estimates of the 
replacement cost rate of return on capital for industry 
in general. Four of the most readily accessible series of 
estimates are reproduced in Part 3, Appendix IV Table 6. 
The Monopolies Commission series and the NEDO series are 
estimates for large, quoted, U.K. Manufacturing companies. 
The Trade and Industry and Bank of Engla.nd series are for 
industrial and commercial companies. 
In choosing the most suitable series to compare with 
the BGC series the Monopolies Commission and the NEDO 
series may be readily .disposed of. As BGC is not a manufactur-
ing concern it seems unrealistic to compare its performance 
... ~ .. .. . 
. !. ;_.' (J 
. h h f f . . 29 w1t t at o manu actur1ng compan1es. The series for 
industrial and commercial companies is to be preferred. 
Both the industrial and commercial companies series 
30 
considered used the same data base, but different 
adjustments are made to the data. As Part 3, Appendix IV 
Graphs 1 and 2 show,both series follow almost exactly the 
same trend for most of the period. The only years of 
divergence are 1968 to 1971. The choice between the two 
must be somewhat arbitrary, but it was decided to use 
tre Trade and Industry series on the grounds that it was 
slightly more complete and demonstrated a slightly smoother 
trend. 
Before direct comparisons could be made, however, it 
was necessary to make adjustments, so that the BGC and the 
Trade and Industry series were constructed on comparable 
bases. This entailed the deduction of the net bank overdraft 
from net assets in the BGC historic cost and replacement 
cost series; and the adjustment of the BGC income data to 
reflect only replacement cost depreciation and the effects 
of stock appreciation. The adjusted data are presented 
in Table 5 (for details see Part 3, Appendix IV Tables 5,6) 
The BGC and Trade and Industry series are compared 
in Figure 2. 
The comments on Figure 2 fall into two areas: 
(i) the recovery of BGC since 1974/75, using the historic 
cost yardstick, is striking~ It is not matched by a recovery 
in the general historic cost index. That the historic cost 
Tabl·e 5: 
Year 
1960/61 
1961/62 
1962/63 
1963/64 
1964/65 
1965/66 
1966/67 
1967/68 
1968/69 
1969/70 
1970/71 
1971/72 
1972/73 
1973/74 
1974/75 
1975/76 
1976/77 
1977/78 
Source: 
.. ~ . .. :"! 
J .. ·-· ~-
Pre-interest rates of return of .BGC - (excluding 
bank overdraf·t; inflation adjustments limited to 
depreciation, cost of sales and replacement cost 
fixed asset valuation). 
·• 
--
Historic Cost* Replacement Cost 
Rate of Return 1---· Rate of Return 
With stock Without stock 
adjustment adjustment 
% % % 
4.2 0.1 0.3 
4.4 0.5 0.6 
4.6 0.9 1.0 
4o4 0.6 0.7 
5.5 1.7 2 .o 
5.5 1.5 1.7 
4.6 0.4 0 •. 5 
3.8 -0.7 ·-0.5 
6.5 2.4 2.6 
6.5 1.9 2.2 
6.1 1.4 1.8 
7.1 2.5 2.7 
7.7 3.1 3 • .3 
5.5 0.5 0.9 
5.5 -0.7 -o.2 
10.9 2.5 2.8 
15.6 4.0 4.4 
24.2 6.8 7.1 
-----. 
* average net assets 
See Part 3, Appendix IV, Tables 4,5 for details. 
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' 
rate of return of BGC has so improved is attributable, 
basically to the expansion in demand for gas since the 
1973 fuel crisis, the relaxation of price controls in the 
nationalised industries and the increases in gas prices 
sanctioned, against the industrys advice, in April 1977 as 
part of the efforts by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to 
reduce the public sector borrowing requirement. 
It should be borne in mind that the pre-interest 
historic cost rates of return as published by BGC since 
1975/76 are 8.6 per cent (1975/76), 9 per cent (1976/77), 
and 14.2 per cent (1977/78). These are to be compared 
with the historic cost rates of return· for these years 
shown in Table 5. Since 1975/76 BGC have deflated their 
historic cost rate of return by charging capital to 
revenue, and by charging supplementary depreciation (since 
1976/77). The data in Table 5 have these deductions added 
back so that the rates of return are comparable for the 
h 1 . d 31. w o e per1o • 
(ii) The real rate of return on capital in the gas industry 
is almost as high as that for industrial and commercial 
companies if deductions are not made from profit for stock 
appreciation.When stock appreciation is deducted the real 
rate of return of BGC exceeds that for industrial and commercial 
companies for the last two financial years in the period. 
Clearly, stocks are fairly negligible in the context of 
BGC when compared with industry in general. 
The findings presented·here would suggest that in the 
. .~. ... 
::. ~~- ~.J 
last two years the real rate of return of BGC has not 
been below that earned by the private sector, which is 
the claim of BGC in justifying its profit levels (Dl2,p8)o 
On the contrary, it has exceeded the real rate of return 
in industry generally. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The method of adjusting the gress asset replacement 
cost data presented in part 3 chapter 1 has been outlined 
here~ By subtracting replacement cost depreciation net 
replacement cost book values were obtained. Adjustments 
were also made in respect of the replacement cost of certain 
assets charged to revenue by BGC but which, using the 
definition of assets outlined in part 1 chapter 1, should 
be added to capital stock. Stocks were revalued using the 
general price index whilst other assets were regarded as 
monetary and were. left unadjusted. 
The adjustments to profit were also made according 
to the model set out in part 1 chapters one and two. 
It was shown that, despite the problems of obtaining 
data to make the adjustments,for inflation, the depreciation 
provisions produced here compare reasonably well with those 
provided by BGC over the two years for which comparisons 
can be made. But it is possible that the method used here 
overestimates slightly, particularly in the case of mains 
where a long age profile was used. 
Two series of replacement cost rates of return have 
~; ~~ .. · .~ 
J!. ... !\.. 
been produced. The first, using the model developed here, 
enabled comparisons to be made with the historic cost 
rates of return earned by BGC. The series excluding real 
holding gains follows a similar trend to the historic cost 
series but at a level of about four per cent per annum lower, 
until 1973/74 when the two series diverge. This reflects 
the increased burden of providing for the replacement of 
assets. The series including holding gains behaves more 
erratically since relative prices may be expected to move 
in favour of or against the gas industry over time. Much 
of the excess of this series over even the historic cost 
series after 1972/73 is attributable to the massive real 
holding gains on mains and services. 
The second series confined its adjustments to revaluing 
capital at replacement cost, and adjusting income for 
replacement cost depreciation and for the increased cost of 
sales. These adjustments are those suggested by the Hyde 
Guidelines. A number of replacement cost series for industry 
in general exist. It was decided that the series produced 
in Trade and Industry was the most suitable for comparisons 
with BGC. The main points to emerge from the comparison of 
BGC with industry in general are, firstly, that using historic 
cost data BGC has recovered relative to general industry 
after 1974/75. Indeed, after 1976/77 the historic cost rate 
of return of BGC exceeds that for general industry. Secondly, 
the replacement cost rate of return of BGC is below that of 
industry in general for most of the period but exceeds it in 
the last two financial years if stock appreciation is 
deducted. This is a finding contrary to the view expressed 
by BGC (Dl2, p.8) that its profit levels have been below 
those for private industry. 
-~ ;·_: -~, 
_._ • d 
Part 3 Footnotes 
1. It is important to remember that since the formation 
of BGC in 1973 no regional accounts are published. This 
has meant a great reduction in the published information · 
available to the public. 
2. Prevesting day, 1st May 1949, gas, electricity and 
water often were controlled by local authorities under 
the general heading of public utilities. These were 
usually ba·sed on the same site. On nationalisation it 
was considered too complex a task to identify each 
separately for .accounting purposes. Thus a lump sum 
was entered into the accounts for each region. The 
problem is complicated as some of these assets will 
have been disposed of by now. 
3. Although Post Office telephone directoiYareas do not 
conform to BGC regional boundaries, each gas entry in 
the telephone directory is clearly labelled with the 
region it belongs to. 
4. The Rating Valuation Lists are open to public inspection 
at all local authority rating offices, and information 
may also be obtained by telephone. For economy reasons 
the representative sample would consist of the rateable 
values of BGC premises in the Northern Region. If a 
similar size distribution for all regions is assumed 
then regional indices could be applied to produce a 
national figure. 
5. See Lawrance D.M., Rees, W.H., and Brittan w. (80) 
for a comprehensive description of rating valuation 
methods. 
6. I am indebted to Mr. G.B. Brook, District Valuer and 
valuation: Officer for Durham, for this and other 
information on rateable values. 
7. It will also sharply affect the net profits declared 
by BGC. This is considered in detail below. 
8. Source, Economic Trends Auqust 1974 (p.20) and other 
issues. 
9. Source Price Index numbers for Current Cost Accounting 
p.4, various issues. 
10. we may estimate the trend of the new dwellings index 
before 1956 by regressing the quarterly average price 
of new dwellings index (APNDI) as the dependent variable, 
on the quarterly new construction index (CNCI) the 
independent variable to estimate the equation: 
(APNDI) t = a + b ( CNCI) t + £ t where t is a time subscript 
and ~ t is an error term. 
Using 1956 to 1976 data the equation was estimated as: 
(APNDI)t = -41.67736 + 1.38632 (CNCI)t 
n = 81 
R2 = 0.92482 
s.e.= 17.15167 
The estimated observations are plotted in Fig. 1, but 
the following compares the estimated observations with 
the spliced observations. 
Table A 
estimated spliced 
(1970=100) (1970=100) 
1955 Ql 51.0 41.9 
1954 Ql 45.7 39.4 
1953 Ql 45.7 39.4 
1952 Ql 48.4 40.7 
1951 Ql 41.5 37.6 
1950 Ql 30.4 32.6 
1949 Ql 29.0 31.9 
Clearly, the ~pliced series provides a smoother trend. 
It also avoids the "bump" between 1956 and 1955 w.here 
the estimated series joins the APNDI actual series. 
It is assumed from this that for.other instances, ~ere 
indices have to be joined because observations do not 
stretch back far enough, that a more accurate estimate 
is o~bined by use of the splicing technique rather than 
regression estimates. 
11. Source Monthly Digest of Statistics 1946 to 1949. 
12. The average index is used to take account of the continuous 
nature of investments, and is :fb und by: 
end year index + beginning year index 
2 
13. An alternative approach is to use data on mileage of 
mains in use and annual investment in mains (in terms 
of cost and new mileage laid). 
The average cost per mile of new main (ACMt) will equal 
..... ~-' 
. ~( ··~· ~.J 
the additional cost of new mains 
year (CMt) divided by the number 
laid (NMt) in any year, i.e. 
CMt 
NMt 
laid in a particular 
of miles of new mains 
Using data from the 1977/78 accounts (Dl2, pp 40,64) 
the above becomes: 
£95.2 
m ACM78 = _1_6_8_5~miles = £56.500 per mile 
Total mileage in use at the end of 1977/78 financial y€f!C 
was 136,000 miles. Thus the replacement cost of mains 
at the end of 1977/78 (M78 > is 
M78 = 136,000 X £56,500 = £7,684 m 
However, this method was rejected as it was considered 
that the overall average cost was a poor proxy for 
average cost of different types and sizes of mains. 
This is confirmed when it is considered that using 
the above calculation for 1975/76 data produces a 
replacement cost estimate of £13,185m •. Clearly, the 
replacement cost of an asset is not going to fall by 
over forty per cent overtwo years especially when it 
is realised that an extra 3,000 miles of main were in 
use at the end of 1977/78~ 
14. The number of services may be estimated by taking the 
number of consumers, which is published in the annual 
report. These are shown below for 1977/78 
Table B 
BGC customers at the end of the 
1977/78 financial year 
Type No. (000) 
Domestic 13,963 
Industrial 70 
commercial 483 
and Public 
admin. 
Total 14,516 
Source: BGC Annual Report and Accounts 1977/78 p.64 
.~" ~·. ..) 1 ~· ~.1 
15. The annual report and accounts provides data on the 
number of new services laid, and annual investment in 
services, so that using the data outlined in footnote 
14, .above, the average cost and replacement cost of 
services may·be estimated in the same way as for mains. 
Let ACS~ = average cost of the new service pipe in 
year t:~ est= additional cost of new services laid 
in year t: and NSt = no. of new services laid in 
year t. 
. 
. . 
est 
NSt 
Using data from the 1977/78 accounts (012, pp 40, 64) the 
above becomes 
£25.5m 
322,000 = £79.2 per service. 
The Estimated •rotal number of services in use at end 
of 1977/78 was 14.516m, thus the replacement cost 
valuation of services (S 8 ) is estimated at: 7 . 
s 78 .= £79.2 x 14.516m = £1149.67m. 
However, this method was rejected for the same reasons 
given for not using the method outlined in footnote 13, 
above, i.e. an unweighted average is biased because it 
does not take proper account of differences in type and 
size of service. Also, this method appears to give 
inconsistent results, when compared with those for 
mains over the twoyears from 1975/76 to 1977/78. 
Whereas the replacement cost of mains was estimated 
to fall 'by over forty per cent, that of services was 
estimated to rise by over sixty per cent (from about 
£702m). Clearly as these two assets are closely 
related it would be expected that di.anges in valuation 
would move i.n the same direction. 
16. u.s. indices were considered here and in the cases of 
one or two other assets o.n the grounds that where 
certain commodities are traded in \'/Orld markets the 
trend of the indices in different countries should be 
approximately the same. It should also be the case 
that if the US index is adjusted to take account of 
the differing rates of general inflation between US 
and UK the fit should improve. This adjustment was 
made but it provided no better fit. The adjustment 
was made as follows. If the specific US index = x, 
general US index = G , general UK index = G and 
"f" . d US th I UK Th'· UK spec~ ~c ~n ex= y, en y = x. G KG s· -~s 
holds as long as there is a constant U u 
relationsh~p between the general ill< and US indices. 
.~~ ~·.- :~] 
~- . ~ 
By inspection this was found not to be the case and 
to some extent accounts for the relatively poor fit 
of the adjusted US index. 
17. O.P.C.S. 1971 Census Housing Statistics Report Part II/ 
III, Eno;Jland and Wales, Table 9 p.l78. 
18. For Scotland o.4 per cent of the 1.72 million dwellings 
are multiple occupancy. See: General Register Office 
Edinburgh 1971 census Housing Report Table 9, p. 116. 
19. Undertakings of confidentiality prohibit the publishing 
of the exact figures. 
20. It is worth bearing in mind ·that for practical purpos.es the 
Gas Corporation owns all the meters in existence, according 
to one of the main manufacturers (UGI(meters) Ltd) who 
are contracted to the Gas Industry. A few meters are bought 
privately but these may be ignored for asset valuation 
purposes. 
21. This and all other meter prices were supplied by UGI(Meters) 
Ltd, 170 Rowan Road, SW16 and refer ·to prices at the end 
of the 1975/76 financial year, exclusive of connecting 
pipes, V.A.T., or Department of Energy stamping fee. 
22. See Dl2 , p .43, notel ( v) 
; 
23. As with all assets whose replacement cost is estimated 
by this method it is assumed that none of the assets 
purchased within the age profile will have been disposed 
of. 
24. See Dl2 p .43. note 1-(v) 
25. For example the gross replacement cost for 1975/76 was 
eestimated, the following table summarising the relevant 
data. 
See page 60, Table c 
Thus V = 37074. 1316.75 = £48.8m. Note that this is 
gross 76 replacement cost. As all cars are not new net 
replacement cost is estimated - see below 
26. This applies to all assets except motor vehicles and 
plant and machinery where the age profiles were short • 
.. 
27. Note that for purposes of the calculations made here 
depreciation has been calculated in whole years 
provisions only. The effect of this is to understate, 
slightly, the NBV. 
Year cost of van Annual investment No. of Vehicles Average annual 1 
- new 1 in vehicles 2 purchased • I motor vehJ.cle ~ 
I price index I 
I 
£ £m 1970=100 
3 
I 
I 
1969/70 506 3.1 6126 92.0 
1970/71 523 3.2 6119 101.6 
1971/72 599.33 4.0 6674 111.1 
1972/73 641.67 3.6 5610 118.6 
1973/74 733.67 2.1 2862 129.4 
1974/75 922.33 4.7 5096 163.5 
1975/76 1316.75 6.0 4557 202.6 
Total 26.7 37074 
Notes: 1. Derived from average price of a six cwt. Ford van in each based 
on information supplied by Marketing Dept. of Ford Motor Co. 
2. Source: BGC and Gas Council annu~ reports and accounts for the 
period. Note also that the sum of seven years investments 
slightly exceeds the gross book value for motor vehicles at end 
of 1975/76 (£25m). 
3. Source: Trade and Industry, Board of Trade Journal (pre 1971), 
and c.s.o. Price Index Numbers for Current Cost Accounts of 1976. 
1-3 
Ill 
t1' 
1-' 
CD 
('l 
.. 
~ Ill ~ ::t ::s 
CD ::s i3 
::s c t1' 
Ill CD 
::s 1-' 11 
CD rn 
~ 1-'· 
Ill ::s 0 
::s < 11'1 
0.. CD rn < 8 rt CD El ::T 
rt CD I-'• ~-r;;..'1 
0 ::s (') 
11 rt 1-' c·., 
CD e,:) 
-::· I-'• rn 
CD ::s 
::T 
I-'• < s:: (') CD 11 
1-' ::r' g. CD 1-'· 
(') Ill 
1-'· 1-' rn 
::s CD CD 
a. rn 0.. 
CD 
~ 
o IC'l 
0 
rn'Oj rtG"l ('l 
.. 
' , ... -
.... ~ . ,' ~ \ 
" . ···.1 ;._ ~ C·.fl 
28. ~ne relevant repl~ment cost data for capital expenditure 
charged to revenue was calculated as follows: 
Table D: Capital Expenditure charged to Revenue 
75/76 76/77 77/78 
£_m £m £m £."ll £m 
Historic Cost 48.1 103.7 192.7 
Replacement 52.0 62.3 70.1 
Cost (specific) 60.6 122.9 68.2 
94.2 232.5 
(general) 52.7 61.5 67.1 
59.9 121.4 65.3 
--
92.8 225.2 
real holding (0. 7) 1.5 7.3 
gain 
depreciation 3.5 4.2 4.7 
(specific) 4.0 8.2 4.5 
6.3 15.5 
NBV 49.5 110.6 203.1 
A depreciation life of fifteen years was assumed, this being 
a rough average for all assets. 
29. we may adduce other reasons for rejecting the Monopolies 
Commission and NEDO series. Neither series covers the 
whole of the period under study. The Monopolies Commission 
series only makes adjustments for stock appreciation, 
retrospectively, post-1964. 
30. See notes to Part 3, Appendix IV Table 6 for details. 
31. It may also be noted that BGC depressed their profits 
data for the financial years 1975/76 to 1977/78 by 
increasing the charge against revenue for costs of 
conversion to natural gas and plant mode obsolete by 
the advent of natural gas. These deductions were not 
added back. 
PART FOUR 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
SUMMARY 
As stated at the outset the aim of this thesis has 
been to develop an optimal yardstick for measuring 
performance in the nationalised industries. We take as 
a base the arguments in the White Papers (G2,G3,G6) that the 
nationalised industries should, as far as possible, be 
run on commercial lines with the government left to solve 
the social welfare problems. 
Accordingly, the possible methods of measuring 
performance have been surveyed and appraised. One of the 
main points to emerge from this discussion was that no single 
yardstick can describe everything that we may wish to know 
about the firm. We require different tools for different 
jobs - for measuring producivity, liquidity and profitability. 
But, it was argued that we should strive to use one yardstick 
as a preliminary indicator of the health of the industry. The 
yardstick chosen was a rate of return on capital employed. 
However, its definition and use are not without problems. 
The conceptual problems of capital and income valuation were 
examined in some detail. It was seen that the objective at 
hand would determine what should be included in capital 
~; and income valuation. As the objective here is the measurement 
of the overall performance of the firm all resources available 
to the firm should be taken into account. Thus, for example, 
loans, inclusive of bank overdrafts, should be included in 
i ~·~ 
LW~ 
capital. Income should be assessed before the deduction 
of loan interest since it is the existence of the loan which 
enabled the firm to perform in the way that it did. Interest 
payments were regarded as payments to the suppliers of 
capital, not as a cost. In other words an entity view of 
the firm was taken. In addition income-was assessed after 
charging the cost of replacing the assets of·_the firm, i.e. 
after depreciation. 
The point was also made that comparisons of performance 
over time would be distorted if firms charged capital items 
against profit. This practice reduces profits in the current 
year since it deducts the full cost in one year of items 
which last longer than one year. 
Three possible methods of capital valuation were 
discussed - net realisable value, present value and 
replacement cost. The assumptions were made, which are 
consistent with standard accounting practice, that the fir.m 
would remain in business for the foreseeable future and that 
the firm was not declining or in a declining industry. Hence, 
it was argued that the opportunity cost of the assets was 
best measured by their capital value not their net realisable 
value. It was further argued that replacement cost provides 
the best approximation to capital value. In the case of 
income measurement it was contended, using a HiCksian definition 
of income, that the maintenance of capital should be inter-
preted as meaning the maintenance of the real level of the 
..• :~· :-) 
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income stream ~o the firm. Thus we are concerned with 
maintaining the purchasing power of the assets of the 
entity, rather than maintaining its physical assets. 
The above definitions were arrived at under the 
assumpt_ion of a world with no general inflation but with 
shifts in relative prices (i.e. specific inflation). In times 
of general inflation the firm must make further adjustments 
if it is to abide by our definitions of income and capital 
used above. For examples, it must provide for the increased 
cost of replacing assets and stocks. These adjustments alter 
the information produced by our yardstick and hence the inter-
pretation we place on its meaning. 
Thus it was necessary to survey the inflation accounting 
debate and to assess which adjustments would be most appropriate 
for the task of measuring performance. It was concluded from 
the arguments presented that the proposa~made by the Hyde 
Committee seem to be all that are likely to be implemented 
by the accounting profession in general, because of the 
necessity to appease conflicting interests. But, from the 
point of view of measuring performance in the nat~onalised 
industries they were not sufficient adjustments eo the rate 
of return on capital employed. 
Taking an entity view it was suggested that the following 
adjustments should be made: 
(i) Capital Revalue at replacement cost using specific 
indices. 
(ii) Income 
..... , .. ~ 
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- (a) depreciation should be based on the 
replacement cost of the assets of the firm. 
No provisions should be made for back-log 
depreciation. 
(b) a further deduction should be made from 
income for the increased cost of replacing 
stocks. 
(c) an adjustment should be made for maintaining 
the real value of net trade monetary assets. 
(d) the gearing gain was irrelevant from an 
entity viewpoint, but the real gain, i.e. 
the difference between the specific-index 
valuation and the general-index valuation 
of non-monetary assets should be added back 
to income. 
(e) turnover, other income and operating 
costs should be revalued to the value of the 
monetary unit at the year end. 
Thus we have our yardstick model. Before it is possible 
to use this model it is necessary to analyse the methods of 
inflation accounting which have been introduced into the 
accounts of the nationalised industries, since we wish to 
know what efforts have been made already to provide more 
meaningful data for performance measurement. The results 
of this survey were presented in part 2 chapter 1. The 
second chapter in part 2 presented a survey of inflation 
accounting in selected comparable private firms and industries. 
This was necessary, since if significant differences are observed 
in the methods of inflation accounting employed by the public 
and private industries comparisons of performance will be 
distorted. 
The following ronclusions were drawn from the discussion 
in part 2: (i) the introduction of inflation accounting had 
not progressed very far in either the nationalised industries 
or the private firms studied, principally because of the lack 
of uncertainty in the accounting profession; {ii) inter-
industry comparisons have been distorted because of the 
heterogeneity of ad hoc methods introduced; {iii) there has 
been little improvement in the information available to measure 
performance; {iv) the introduction of inflation accounting 
in the nationalised industries would be more feasible than 
some of the criteria laid down in governrnentaWhite Papers 
{G2, G3); {v) the reduction of declared profit levels by the 
use of inflation accounting may help to protect the industries 
against the crude use of profits figures by the Price Commission 
and the Press; but it may help to obscure the true rate of 
return being earned; {v~) there is little difference between 
the attempts at inflation accounting made by private and 
nationalised industries; {vii) the nationalised industries, 
in implementing the recommendations of the Hyde Guidelines, 
should declare profit before interest and without a gearing 
adjustment, since an entity view should be taken. 
Thus the evidence presented in part 2 seems to reinfor~e 
stro~gly the argument that the correct information is not 
being provided to decision makers and commentators. Moreover, 
it could be said that there is a certain lack of understanding, 
on the parts of decision makers and commentators, of the 
information presented to them. 
Having examined the measures already introduced the 
ground was clear to use the model developed in part 1. 
1 -:: r: 
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The gas industry was taken as a case study since it 
has undergone a vast transformation in the last twenty 
years; it has progressed farthest of all the nationalised 
industries in the introduction of inflation ·accounting, 
encountering much criticism inthe process wifurespect to its 
motives and the data it has used. 
The period 1960/61 to 1977/78 was chosen to reflect the 
effects of the transformations that the industry has undergone 
in terms of changing fuel sources and the change to a 
centralised administrative structure. The period chosen also 
encompasres the effects of restr~ints on pricing in the mid-
1970's. 
The methodological problems encountered in estimating a 
replacement cost rate of return seri·es for the gas industry 
in this period have been discussed in detail. These probl.ems 
centre on the sources of data. Since it was not possible 
to obtain unpublished material on costs, values, and numbers 
of buildings, cars and other assets data published in the 
annual reports and accounts of the industry were used. 
This necessarily reduces the degree of accuracy which may be 
placed on our data. Nevertheless, estimating the age profiles 
of assets using this data and then calculating replacement 
cost depreciation provisions still provides a reasonable 
comparison with the provisions made by B.G.C. The reduction 
in the difference between the estimates made by BGC and our 
own, from a difference of 12.5 per cent in 1976/77 to 3 per 
cent in 1977/78, may be attributable to refinements made 
··~ ~- : ... J 
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by BGC. Principally, these refinements are in respect of 
the use of a more up to date asset register. Alternatively 
it is conceded that it may equally be due. to chance. In any 
case, the estimates provided by our model can be said to 
correla;te reasonably well with those produced by BGC as 
a certain member of BGC financial accounting department 
commented "a million pounds either way makes little 
difference". 
Two basic series of replacement cost data were produced. 
The first, using the model developed here, enabled comparisons 
to be made with the historic cost rates of return earned by 
BGC. The replacement cost series was presented with and 
without an adjustment for real holding gains on assets. The 
series i-ncluding real holding gains behaved in an erratic 
fashion - which may be expected as relative prices may move 
in favour of or against the gas industry. The effects of 
changes in the relative prices of land and, latterly, steel 
were clearly demonstrated. The series excluding real holding 
gains was observed to move in a similar trend to the historic 
cost index, but at an appreciably lower level. This, clearly, 
reflects the increased burden of providing for the replacement 
of assets .• 
The second series confined its adjustments to those 
suggested by the Hyde Gui~elines, i.e. capital was revalued 
at replacement cost and income was adjusted for replacement 
cost depreciation and the increased cost of sales. This 
enabled comparisons to be made with data produced for industry 
~ =· ~-:' 
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in general. It is interesting to compare the replacement 
cost series for both BGC and general industry since if 
resources in the public sector do not earn a comparable 
rate of return to that earned by resources in the private 
sector this may be indicative of a misallocation of resources • 
Comparisons with sectors of manufacturing industry were 
rejected since BGC is not a manufacturing concern. Nor is it 
a service industry in the same sense as, say, the retail 
trade. It has retail outlets but these deal with a minor 
proportion of its business. Hence it was felt that industry 
in general provided the most suitable comparison. 
The main points to emerge from the comparison with 
replacement cost rates of return earned in the private sector 
was that the replacement cost rate of return for BGC is below 
that for industry in general throughout the period, except 
for the last three years. Since 1974/75 a recovery is observed 
in the BGC series whereas the general industry series declines. 
This is attributable to the relaxation of price controls in . 
the nationalised industries, and to the effects of stock 
appreciation. The greater effect of the latter on general 
industry than on BGC is clearly shown in part 3 chapter 2 
figure two. As BGC draws its gas direct from the North Sea 
(except gas required to meet peak loads) its stocks are 
low relative to the volume of its sales. This is patently· 
at variance with the position in general industry. 
If the historic cost data had been presented in the 
way BGC present it in their accounts the recovery of 
BGC's performance since 1975/76 would have been greatly 
reduced. However, for purposes of comparisons any ad hoc 
deductions made by BGC have been added back. 
General Conclusions 
It is felt that the following conclusions should be 
stressed: 
(i) the evidence from part two of this thesis strongly 
suggests that the accounting profession should reach a 
consensus on a standard code of accounting for inflation, 
rn/ 
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otherwise intra and inter fir tcomparisons will become 
increasingly distorted. The government has put forward 
a discussion document relating to improvements in company 
reports (G6).and whilst it is agreed that many of the 
proposals contained therein are meritable they are surely 
secondary to the fundamental need for companies to introduce 
a coherent system of inflation accounting. 
(ii) on the evidence presented here both the replacement 
cost series produced, our model and the Hyde Guidelines, 
provide a better measure of performance than historic cost 
data. 
(iii) the model developed here should be preferred to that 
outlined by Hyde since it provides a more comprehensive 
set of adjustments for inflation. 
(iv) the argument that a model such as that advanced here 
is too complex to implement in practice surely holds little 
water. If reasonable results can be produced given the 
limited resources available to the author, then large 
firms with large accounting departments should be able to 
do likewise. In any case once the groundwork has been done 
for earlier years the task is a relatively simple one in 
succeeding years. 
(v) it is hoped that the example presented here will be 
followed by the introduction of inflation adjusted Rate of 
Return data in the nation[ised industries as a whole. But, 
as already pointed out this may have to await a consensus 
of opinion in the accounting profession. 
(vi) the replacement cost rate of return series presented 
here will, it is hoped, indicate to decision makers and 
commentators the real position, with respect to performance, 
in the gas industry. Hopefully, it may serve to remove some 
of the accusations that excessive profits are being earned 
by the gas industry. It is only within the very recent past 
that the gas industry has caught up with industry in general. 
But the evidence presented in part two iends weight to the 
argument that BGC is attempting to obscure the true historic 
cost position. 
(vii) the fact that a replacement cost series has been 
produced indicates that the model outlined here can be used 
in practice in the nationalised industries. As such it may 
be preferred to some other efficiency criteria such as 
marginal cost pricing and investment appraisal techniques for 
assessing overall performance. 
(viii) the results outlined here go some way towards 
satisfying the recommendations of the 1961 White Paper (G2, 
, ... . 
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p.7 para. 19(b)) that the nationalised industries should 
make replacement cost depreciation provisions. ·It also 
provides information to aid decision makers in setting 
inflation adjusted financial targets for the gas industry. 
Inflation adjusted financial targets were suggested recently 
in Cmnd 713l(G7, paras. 69-75) 
(ix) but, it is stressed that the data presented here can be 
only ~ tool, albeit we believe the main one, in a range of 
tools necessary to measure the performance of the firm as a 
whole. This range of tools should include many of the 
performance measures discussed in Part 1. ch.l. 
APPENDICES 
Part 1: APPENDIX I 
AN OUTLINE OF GOVERNMENTAL GUIDELINES ON PERFORMANCE 
MEASUREMENTS AND EFFICIENCY CRITERIA IN THE NATIONALISED 
INDUSTRIES 1948/1978 
In the immediate post-war period there did not appear 
to be much serious concern with obtaining optimum performance 
in these industries. As the Select Committee on Nationalised 
Industries (S.C.N.I) recalled the initial financial obligation 
imposed upon the Nationalised industries was merely: 
11 The duty of raising revenues that would, taking 
one year with another, be not less than sufficient 
to meet all items properly chargeable to revenue 
including depreciation, the ·redemption of capital 
and the provision of reserves ... 1 
Clearly, this provided little information that would lead 
to an optimum allocation of resources in the nationalised 
indus tries. 
However, it was not until 1961 that ministerial powers 
of control were reviewed. 2 The main proposals of ~he White 
Paper may be summarised as follows: 
(i) Revenue Account 
(a) surpluses should cover deficits over a five-year period 
after charging interest and depreciation on a historic cost 
basis. 
(b) there should be provision for the amount necessary to 
cover the excess of replacement cost depreciation over historic 
cost depreciation. 
,, ,., ~ 
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{c) there should be allocations to general reserves in 
order to cover capital development costs and such contingencies 
as premature obsolescence. 
{d) each industry should earn a target rate of return on 
capital investments or, depending on the industry, a target 
level of internal funding. 
{ii) Capital Account 
(a) discussions will be held with regard to each industry's 
plans for the next five years. 
(b) the government will fix an upper limit of capital 
expenditure for the next two years in each industry. 
{c) the government will approve proposed borrowings on 
the basis of annual estimates. 
(d) the government is to be informed of the extent of 
investment on new projects with a low rate of return. 
Variations in the required rate of return between industries 
were allowed and were meant to take into account the differing 
11 SOcial obligations .. amongst the industries. 
However, these proposals were criticised, mainly because 
of the claimed shortcomings of setting a target rate of return. 
This, it was argued, may make management take a short term 
view in order to achieve the set objective. · This might not 
necessarily be best for the industry in the long run. It could 
lead to a red~ction in investment because that would depress 
the short term rate of return. At the time the recommendations 
of the White Paper with respect to depreciation allowances 
,_ , .. ~~ 
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based on replacement cost seemed to be ignored, possibly 
because in 1961 the rate of inflation was not as high as 
it is now. 
3 The 1967 White Paper sought to overcome some of the 
shortcomings of the 1961 Paper. The major proposals were: 
(i) the introduction of a Test Discount Rate (T.D.R) as 
a criterion of investment. This was originally set at 
8 per cent but was subsequently revised to take account 
of the change in corporation tax. The T.D.R. was to be 
consistent with, "the average rate of ·return in real terms 
looked for on low-risk projects in the private sector in 
4 
recent years". 
(ii) in an attempt to avoid cross-subsidisation and misallocation 
of resources the White Paper suggested pricing at short run 
marginal costs (SRMC) where there was spare capacity. In the 
long run to ensure continuous supply the industries were to 
price at long run marginal cost (LRMC) 
(iii) whilst recognising the difficulty of reconciling the 
prescribed rate of return on new marginal investment and 
marginal cost pricing with an overall, or average, rate of 
return on assets it was proposed that ex post financial 
objectiVes would continue to be set. These would be set at 
different levels for different industries, to reflect their 
differing market conditions. 
(iv) provision was made for compensation to be paid to the 
industries in the case of losses incurred by the industries 
being forced by the government to act against their:own 
,. , ... -~ 
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interests. In addition to the above the recommendations 
of the 1961 White Paper with respect to replacement cost 
depreciation were reiterated. 
By the introduction of ex ante in addition to ex 
post guidelines the 1967 paper went much further than the 
previous legislation. But it needs to be borne in mind 
that only a very small amount of investment in the nationalised 
industries is subject to full investment appraisal using the 
5 
test discount rate. Much investment is determined by prior 
strategic decisions, e.g. in British Gas the decision to 
purchase the output of the North Sea gas fields, meant large 
investments in a national gas distribution grid, but this 
cannot be disaggregated for appraisal because it is part of 
a total system. 
Problems have been encountered which have prevented 
the introduction of marginal cost pricing to any great 
6 
extent. A detailed discussion of marginal cost pricing 
is outside the scope of this thesis, but see part 1, 
Appendix II for an annotated bibliography. Here it will be 
noted that economic theory impl~es a contraction or expansion 
of the industry and its services until Price = LRMC in each 
of its markets, but given the other obligations of the 
nationalised industries this is not possible.· An example, 
is the case of BGC which has an obligation to supply all 
its existing customers. 
~~ ~·.; =::' 
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A recent study by NEDO (120) has criticised the guide-
lines in the 1967 Paper as being too simplistic and has 
pointed to the problem of lack of continuity. which has 
meant there is no effective system for measuring performance 
and that there is no framework for setting out the Long Run 
Objectives and strategies of the Nationalised Industries. 
The study suggests that financial and economic objectives 
should be laid down for each industry individually. To this 
end it proposes that for each Nationalised Industry there 
should be a Policy Council to set .the objectives and 
strategies and performance criteria, a separate corporation 
board to manag~ the industry within this framework, and 
that there should be more rational financing arrangements 
taking account of the environment of each industry. 
These proposals suggest an important move away from 
the so-called "Morrisonian arms length" approach (see 152). 
The NEDO study has been criticised for failing to 
define the role of the nationalised industries (152) and for 
failing to provide and consider much new or hitherto 
unpublished information (164). Pryke (146) has&so pointed 
to instances of misleading information, e.g. overstatement 
of the rise in gas output in the decade 1964/5 to 1974/5; 
and inconsistencies such as its conclusions on the relative 
labour intensiveness of the nationalised industries. 
At least one commentator (152) thought that some 
of the NEDO proposals should be tried, but expressed doubts 
as to whether sponsoring departments were willing to forego 
some of their powers and whether trade unions and the 
corporations themselves would cooperate. However, the 
governmen~s proposals rejected many of the suggestions of 
the NEDO report as it was considered they would slow down 
the decision process. 7 Instead it was suggested that the 
acisting general powers of sponsoring departments should be 
extended and be made more specific, after consultations with 
the industry concerned. At the general level it was 
proposed that in fu.ture the sponsoring minister could appoint 
civil servants to the Board of an industry. 8 Also plans 
for tripartite discussions of forward planning, for cooperation 
with suppliers, for consultations on five year plans and for 
' 9 
a three year period were laid down. 
More specifically the following financial and economic 
framework was out-lined: 
1 . 110 • Investment Appra~sa 
(i) As the T.DR system had proved useful only for 
small individual projects a required rate of return (RRR) was 
to be set, which was to be earned on new investment as a 
whole. This opportunity cost of capital to be earned on new 
investment over its working life was set at 5 per cent in real 
terms before tax. This takes into account the pre-tax 
rates of return earned in private companies and likely trends 
therein. Consideration of social time preference is also 
made, but as the Paper itself admits11 this is · difficult 
---- ----------
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to measure. 
(ii) The general TOR will no longer be specified for 
investment appraisal. Instead specific rates will be 
set for each industry which take into account the sectoral 
and social objectives set for an industry. 
2 . . 1' 12 • Pr1c1nq Po 1cy 
(i) It was recognised that in many cases LRMC could not 
be used as prices were market determined. In Price-making 
industries the government should determine the overall 
financial target and thus the general level of prices in 
the light of the general policy objectives. 
(ii) To avoid arbitrary cross-subsidisation of groups of 
consumers the structure of prices should be related to the 
structure of costs e.g. with respect to peak and off- peak 
pricing. 
3. 
(i) 
13 Financial Targets 
Each. profitable industry will be set a percentage rate 
of return to be earned pre-interest on net assets. Alternatively 
a rate of return on turnover may be used where the industry 
is labour rather than capital intensive. 
(ii) Self-financing ratio targets were rejected as the Paper 
points out, and as has been pointed out elsewhere (e.g. 68) 
self-financing ratios reflect changes in the level of 
investment as much as changes in the level of profitability. 
(iii) financial targets were to be put on an inflation 
adjusted basis, dependent on the present accounting practices 
G':l ••. .., 
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of the indusby in question and the timing and nature of the 
general move to inflation accounting. 
{iv) The level of each financial target was to takeaccount 
of. the expected return from effective, cost conscious 
management of existing and new assets; market prospects; 
the ~cope for improved productivity and efficiency; the 
opportunity cost of capital; the implications of the Public 
Sector Borrowing Requirement; counter-inflation policy; 
and social and sectoral objectives. 
4. Other 14 
(i) In addition to the above there will be industry 
performance indicators such as: labour produ~v.ity and 
standards of service. 
(ii) cash limits will be imposed on loans, public dividend 
capital and grants. Provision was made for these to be 
exceeded in certain cases. 
{iii) Public Dividend Capital will be made available only 
to those industries which are fully viable and especially 
subject to cyclical fluctuations. The paying of interest 
on these loans will be used as a discipline on the industries 
in the absence of a stock market stimulus. 
(iv) Loans provisions will be changed so that the n:ationalised 
industries can include medium term loans in a capital debt 
structure which at present consists mainly of temporary and 
long term debt. 
C"~ ·- • 
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(v) Interest payable on loans for long term capital 
projects where returns will not accrue for a number of 
years will be capitalised and written off during the 
assets• lives rather than being charged to revenue.· 
The above proposals have been dwelt upon at length 
because it is felt that they represent a culmination of 
the previously diverse approaches, and that they represent 
a more realistic and comprehensive approach than hitherto 
seen. How the proposals will work in practice, however, 
remains to be seen. 
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Part 1: Appendix II 
An Outline of the Main Issues involved in the 
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Practical Application of Marginal Cost Pricing 
and Investment Appraisal. 
Introduction 
A detailed discussion of the efficacy of Marginal cost 
pricing and investment appraisal is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. However, from the importance placed upon these 
techniques in successive White Papers on government guidelines 
for performance in the nationalised industries it is 
necessary to consider, briefly, the main issues involved 
in their practical application. 
1. Marginal Cost Pricing 
The usual argument for marginal cost pricing is that 
under conditions of market imperfection, and assuming profit 
maximisation, a misallocation of resources occurs, from the 
viewpoint of society. This _may be clearly illustrated b¥ 
taking the elementary comparative-static text-book diagram: 
0 ~------~----~~----~-----Q 
Fiq. 1 Marginal Cost and 
Profit Maximisation 
Equilibria 
MC = marginal cost 
AR = average revenue 
MR = marginal revenue 
under profit maximisation price is Op and output is OQ p p 
! ..
:. 
e, .~. ~ 
~v~ 
However, there is some additional output which can be produced, 
at a price no less than marginal cost, but at less than Op , p 
i.e. OQ - OQ • The resultant price is OP which leads to 
m p m 
profits of less than the maximum level, but which may use 
resources previously engaged in a lower valued alternative 
use and which makes the good available to anyone prepared to 
pay P = MC = AR. 
If the time dimension is introduced, with associated 
capacity utilisation and scale considerations, then the 
familiar result of P = SRMC = LRMC can be derived under 
assumptions of perfect knowledge, a ne~ firm, no technical 
change, constant factor prices, and perfectly divisible 
plant (see Webb, 194, pp 15-21). 
However a number of problems arise when marginal cost 
pricing using Paretian welfare assumptions is introduced in 
p~actice: 
(i) In decreasing cost industries marginal cost pricing will 
lead to financial deficits being earned. (See Webb op.cit.) 
One solution to this is the use of multi-part tariffs where the 
running charge is related to marginal cost and the fixed charge 
(to be paid out of consumer surplus) is at a level designed to 
cover accounting costs. But this infringes the Pareto conditions 
because some consumers who value the marginal unit of 
consumption above its marginal cost ·could not consume the 
good as they have no consumer surplus out of which to meet 
the fixed charge. The solution to this problem, that of 
perfectly discriminatory pricing, is faced with problems of 
insufficient information relating to individuals demand 
curves and prohibitive costs of administration. We return 
to other problems related to the absence of Pareto optimality 
below: 
(ii} In practice plant may not be perfectly divisible. Thus 
pricing at SRMC will encounter capacity constraints as 
output is expanded. Boiteux (122, p.70} and Williamson (203, 
pp 68-69} have shown that whilst it may be socially optimal to 
increase capacity, since - there is a welfare gain, financial 
losses may be earned as p = SRMC ~ LRMC. Turvey (180} has 
taken the analysis a stage further by introducing the problem 
of a multi-plant industry with plants of different ages and 
vintages~ Usually incremental capital will be more efficient 
than its predecessor. If so,LRMC pricing must be based on 
the total costs of the marginal unit ti.e. on SRMC of the 
marginal unit subject to total costs of that unit being 
recovered} • In this case the more inefficient units will 
make a loss and it can lead to an overall loss for the firm. 
Webb (193, pp 93-5} suggests instances where 
indivisibilities may not present a problem for example ex ante 
the investment decision, the length of the time period and 
the use of credit arrangements. But these go only a little 
way to solving the problems of indivisibilities. Indivisibil-
ities will also present problems when peak-load pricing is 
cmsidered. 
(iii} In practice the demand curve is unlikely to be of the 
form portrayed by elementary analysis. For example irregularities 
in demand occur for gas and electricity at breakfast and 
evening meal times. 
At its simplest the peak-load may be considered for a 
periodofaday with equal length off-peak and peak period and 
with only one plant of fixed capacity operating at full or less 
than full capacity depending on the time of day. BoLteux 
{Op.cit. p. 73 et.seg) has shown that if the two demands 
are close together or plant cost is high it is optimal to 
depress the peak. Williamson {203) carries the argument a 
stage further by considering unequal length of off-peak 
and peak periods. Williamson shows that peak load price 
will always exceed, LRMC, and off-peak load price less than 
LRMC, assuming divisible plant. Also it is only when the 
off-peak load fails to use plant to capacity when priced 
at SRMC that the peak load bears the whole burden of capacity 
costs. The firm will earn net revenue of zero in this 
analysis. Williamson goes on to show (op.cit. pp 80-81) 
that if indivisibilities are introduced the firm need not 
necessarily earn zero profits because with indivi.sibilities 
the peak load price is not necessarily greater than LRMC. 
Whilst the above impart some of the complexities of 
reality to basic marginal cost pricing a number of reservations 
remain. For example Turvey (183) has alluded to the following, 
multi-plant firm with plants of different ages and vintages; 
capacity cost may not be a simple function of peak demand (e.g. 
hydroelectric power); available capacity may be less than 
installed capacity because of maintenance thus the capacity 
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constraint is reached sooner than expected: interdependence 
of demand curves over the cycle, the load curve is likely to 
be continuous rather than two-level in practice: from the 
point of view of administration of tariffs and comprehensibility 
of them by consumers there is a limit to the number of tariffs 
that may be used in practice: the development of off-peak 
consumption resulting from higher peak charges may require 
subsidiary changes (e.g. night tariffs in electricity required 
the development of storage appliances):· system interdependence 
may exist, with the result that the incremental system costs 
following the construction of new capacity will not be the 
sum of its capital and running costs: peak load pricing will 
have different effects depending on whether the peak-load 
is firm or shifting: and peak load pricing may affect the 
d~tribution of income. Turvey (182,186) and Boiteux (op.cit 
p.l07) have shown that if the firm is faced with an investment 
decision the system interdependence problems may be solved 
by considering marginal operating costs, which can be equated 
with marginal expansion costs. They show that at the margin 
the present value of the output of a new plant, with each 
unit of output·valued at marginal system operating cost equals 
the present value of its capital and operating costs. If an 
increase in peak load is considered, with system interdependence, 
it can be shown (Turvey, 182) that the marginal system cost of 
the increase in peak-hour consumption will be the cost of 
the new plant less the present value of the saving in total 
off-peak running costs. Problems remain in the estimation of 
incremental capital costs. But as Turvey (182) points out 
these may be directly determined only by simulating the 
running of the system over a number of years. If the peak 
is shifting peak load pricing may be advantageous since 
depressing the peak may reduce the amount of capacity 
required (Boiteux op.cit. pp 81-82). The question of 
maintenance effects on available capacity has been recently 
studied, for example by Crew and Kleindorfer (26) who suggest 
conditions for optimal reliability levels. A number of 
writers have considered the problem of the uncertainty of 
forecasting peak loads: foremost amongst whom have been 
Brown and Johnson (18,19) and Turvey (185). Brown and Johnson 
show under the assumption of physical rather than price 
rationing that with uncertainty the appropriate price to 
charge is that price which clears the market when demand is 
at its lowest peak position. They also show that under certain 
conditions peak and off-peak prices should be equal. Turvey (185) 
has questioned, as being unrealistic, their assumption of 
physical rationing: preferring prices as rationing devices. 
Peak load pricing has been used in practice, for. example 
and 
the'tarif vert•of EDF,/the 'white meter• tariff of the Electricity 
Boards. Tzoannos (188) bas shown how seasonal tariffs can be 
used in the gas industry in Britain, whilst Levy-Lambert (91) 
bas described examples in the French public sector. The 
welfare effects of peak load pricing and multi-part tariffs 
have been outlined in (i) above. 
It must also be noted that, in effect, peak load pricing 
deals wit.h multiple products. For example, electricity 
units sold at different times of the day are different 
products, since the consumer wants electricity at Sp.m. for 
cooking, he can't substitute cheaper units of electricity 
at 3p.m. 
(iv) The foregoing argument about marginal cost pricing 
is based mainly on the assumption that P = MC in the rest 
of the economy, as Rees (148) has pointed out this 
requirement is not met in practice because of various 
imperfections. Lipsey and Lancaster (93) showed that under 
non-pareto optimal conditions the determination of output 
based on marginal cost pricing could result in a less than 
optimal allocation of resources Misha.n (108) has demonstrated 
that it is necessary to consider to what extent competing 
sectors depart from optimality and \11hether the competing 
sectors are substitutes or complements. More operational 
approaches by Davis and Whinston (31,32) and Turvey (186, 
pp 22-27) take a piecemeal approach arguing that it is 
permissi.ble to disregard ignorance about optimality elsewhere 
and to include only that which ~known if it is important. 
Turvey's analysis provides pricing rules for the case where 
the final product of a single product industry in the public 
sector is closely related to a similar final product produced 
by the private sector. But there are problems with this 
analysis. Firstly, it requires information on the relationship 
between prices and marginal costs in the private sector, which 
may not be available. Secondly, industries in the public 
sector are usually multi-product, which complicates the 
resulting price structure. Thirdly, with information ~vels 
being so imperfect it is not possible to tell if this is 
better than average pricing. or not. Fourthly, as pointed 
out by Ruggles {156) and other writers, pricing proportional 
to marginal costs, which under certain conditions Turvey's 
solution may require, has disadvantageous welfare implications, 
such as altering the trade-off between work and leisure. But 
Turvey's method may provide a practicable solution in a 
second best world, where the optimum conditions are not met 
in general. 
The effect on optimality of the introduction of financial 
targets has been studied by a number of writers. In the 
case of an absolute profit constraint Baumel and Bradford {8) 
ha~ shown that this will lead to a deviation of prices from 
marginal cost throughout the economy, the precise nature of 
the deviation depending upon the nature of price changes, 
differences between marginal revenue and marginal cost and 
changes in output levels. However, they do provide a 
11 quasi-optimal 11 solution, i.e. the maximisation of the level 
of satisfaction of any one individual, given the utility level 
of each other individual. For quasi-optimality, and for 
minimisation of departures from marginal cost pricing because 
of an absolute profit constraint, they show that the relative 
quantities of outputs should be kept unchanged from their 
optimal marginal cost pricing propositions. In the case of 
a return on capital constraint Gravelle {' 49, 50) has .shown 
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that optimal prices will be equal to actual marginal costs 
but will differ from first best prices since actual costs 
are greater than minimum costs due to the effect of the 
financial constraint on the input mix. Gravelle concludes 
that if financial targets serve as some form of "tax" the 
rate·of return target is inferior to the absolute profit 
constraint since it leads to inefficient means of production, 
more complex pricing rules and requires more information. 
However, this analysis ignores (a) the problem of setting 
correctly the absolute profit levels which, if it is to mean 
anything in terms of efficiency must be related to the 
industry's capital stock, (b) ex ante it may not be possible 
to set the financial constraint to cover cqsts (although 
imperfect information may produce this result under any 
pricing formula), (c) it may be impossible to obtain the 
required information on elastisities of demand etc. 
(v) Time lags in constructing new plant may mean that by the 
time it comes into production the demand conditions for the 
products of the industry may have changed. The extent to 
which this presents a problem will depend on how accurately 
forecasting has developed within a particular industry. 
(vi) Turvey (186, p.69) has shown that the introduction of 
time into the analysis requires a reassessment of the pricing 
rule producing a different set ofmarginal costs. Notions of 
a pl_anned time stream of outputs, of discount rates and 
expected future capital and running costs must be taken into 
account. The existence of time introduces ambiguities to the 
s,~ . . ,~, 
f.J .!.:. ;..., 
terms short runand long run, since as the time in. the future 
when new plant will be introduced approaches the amount of the 
new capacity ceases to be variable. Planned investment decisions 
become realised. This distinction must be made between the 
"short tenn pricing rule" and the "long run investment rule". 
Turvey (op.cit) shows that the following guides are necessary. 
In each period price is whichever is the greater of (a) the 
running cost of that capacity which is partly utilised or (b) 
the level required ~o restrict demand to capacity. The amount 
of new capacity coming into operation in any period, if 
positive, is such as to make the expected discounted sum of cost 
savings from having the extra unit of capacity of vintage v 
in period t equal to the present worth now of the capital cost 
of the unit of new capacity which becomes operational in 
t = v. Planned discounted price equals planned discounted 
marginal cqst in all future periods except where new capacity 
is to come into operation in an amount which is now irrevocably 
determined. 
Conclusions on marginal cost pricing 
The main issues involved in marginal cost pricing have 
been outlined above. It has been seen that a comprehensive 
set of tools exist for the use of marginal cost pricing. 
In practice the introduction of marginal cost pricing 
under Pareto optimality assumptions has been shown to be 
virtually impossible. Basically such assumptions as 
perfectly divisible plant, perfect foresight, and prices 
equal to marginal costs throughout the economy are too 
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restrictive to allow practical appliations. other problems 
also arise such as the accounting losses resulting from 
pricing at long run marginal cost in decreasing cost industries. 
This would be inconsistent with a government imposed financial 
constraint. If departures from Pareto optimality are assumed 
then marginal cost pricing in practice is possible, for 
example peak loading price and multi-part tariffs. Questions 
arise regarding the inequity of preventing some from consuming 
the good because, although they value the good:~t_the price 
charged for the marginal unit, they have no consumer surplus 
out of which to pay the fixed charge. 
However, a number of other problems remain which cast 
doubt on the efficacy of marginal cost pricing in practice~ 
(i) the problem of forecasting marginal costs based on output 
streams at current prices, l?eca.use of uncertainty and/or 
inflation. (Bates and Fraser op.cit. p.71) 
(ii) LRMC pricing does not determine the proper rate of 
adjustment of actual prices to changes.in costs. In making 
such changes account may also have to be taken of the effect 
on the industry's surplus (Tivey, 180) 
(iii) time lags may occur in the adjustment of demand to 
changes in price, and actual change in demand may be different 
from expected (Bates and Fraser op.cit. p. 65) 
(iv) in practice the price/qu~ity relationship may not be 
constant even for one product in one market. For example, 
Johnson (67) has described the existence of three such 
relationships in the industrial market for gas (load retention, 
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new business and changeover). This price may not be determined 
by marginal cost but by a "building brick" approach where, 
in the case of the price of industrial gas, price depends 
on such factors as the market price of the competing fuel, 
the operating costs of competing fuel, the installed cost of 
a competing fuel burner, installed competing fuel storage 
cost, installed cost of a gas burner, changeover inertia and 
gas premium over other fuels. 
(v) Marginal cost pricing, may lead to underpricing since 
whilst allowance may be made for replacement of capital it 
may be difficult to allow for such costs as developing new 
gas fields and gas making processes. 
2. Investment Criteria 
The principles of investment appraisal are well described 
in Henderson (58). 
In making its decision whether to invest or not the 
firm wants to be fairly certain that the returns on that 
investment will cover the initial outlay. Capital projects 
Y' 
may be viewed as a series of cash flows, and the company 
must look at those cash flows that are incremental to the 
acceptance of a proposed project. Tne DCF rate of return 
on an investment is that discount rate required to equate the 
present value of its stream of future cash flows with the 
present value of the capital outlay. To assess the validity 
of a project in the nationalised industries, in the following 
equation set V = 0, and compare r with the test discount rate 
(T .D .R.) • 
v=- K 
0 
Bl 
+-(l+r) + 
where v = present value 
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K = capital outlay in year o 
0 
B1 ,B2. Bn= net benefits in each year to some final year n 
r = rate of return required on the investment project. 
However, the extent to which this type of exercise may be 
carried out in practice will be constrained by the following: 
(i) the determination of the rate of discount 
The question arises as to Whether or not the TDR is 
the optimal proxy for opportunity cost. The possible 
alternatives such as, the rate at which the government can 
borrow on long dated securities, the social time preference 
(STP) rate, the social opportunity cost (SOC) rate or the 
private market incremental rate of return are discussed 
well in Webb (193, Ch.4) and Henderson (op.cit.) The main 
problem reduces to that of reconciling the rate at which 
society discounts the future (the STP) with the rate which 
discounts the use to which the resources employed in a 
project would otherwise have been put (the SOC). One way 
of achieving this is to adjust the money costs of a project 
to produce a 11 shadow-price 11 which reflects s.o.c. (see 
Henderson op.cit. p. 133, and Reed 147 ch.2) The shadow 
price acts as a rationing constraint to reflect the 
opportunity cost of capital. But it is imperfect since 
lagsm project implementation may change shadow prices. 
Also true opportunity cost is measured by the fu.ture effect 
not by what is currently displaced. It may be impossible 
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to achieve STP=-SOC, if there is capital rationing since 
there is likely to be excess demand thus the equilibrium 
condition is not satisfied (see Turvey 186). 
(ii) strategic and tactical decisions and interdependence 
of investments 
As noted by NEDO (120) and reiterated by Cmnd 7131 
(GS) the TDR system had proved useful only for small 
individual projects. It was of little use for strategic 
decisions or where there was interdependence of investments. 
For example the decision by BGC to exploit North Sea Gas 
resulted in many other decisions relating to dist'ribution 
networks, storage facilities etc. The pr.oblem of inter-
dependency is related to the problem of finding the 
optimal plant ~x. By utilising information on load curves 
and plant load factors and by taking a programming approach, 
so that the investment problem is to i~nimise the costs of 
the output programmes Bates and Fraser (7, ch.G) have 
demonstrated the marginal optimality conditions of investment , 
decisions. The model is also developed to take account 
of differing plant lives and technical progress (7, pp. 102-
104). 
If we consider investment in north sea oil and gas, 
this will be affected by the optimal depletion rate of 
these resources. Prescriptions for the optimal depletion 
of exhaustible natural resources are varied and usually 
rely on fairly restrictive assumptions, for examples 
Dasgupta and Heal {30) assume a constant level of population 
through time, whilst Weinstein and Zeckhauser{l95) assume 
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perfect competition and a perfect capital market. In essence 
the optimal depletion rate will be set by society•s time 
preference rate. As the references cited in (i) above, 
show this is almost impossiblem determine in pract~ce. The 
effects on the rate of depletion of the differing relationships 
of the STP to the market rate of interest, of changes in the 
STP, of uncertainties in the size of the natural resource, 
of uncertainties regarding future demand, of the 
conservationist lobby, etc. are discussed well in Robinson 
and Morgan (151). They also suggest a possible solution. This 
involves improving the signalling of the market; producing 
better long term forecastsd demands, supplies, prices etc. 
so that it may be determined how North Sea supplies would fit 
into the energy market on the assumption of free depletion. 
Intervention would only occur if free depletion is identified 
to have substantial problems. A Commission could be set up to 
deal with this, and would suggest various policy objectives 
and solutions. 
(iii) Capital rationing 
Introducing a limited budget means that not all projects 
satisfying the TDR will be implemented. Capital rationing 
may ignore the interdependence of projects thus preventing 
economies of scale in distribution and transmission from being 
achieved. It may also mean less capital intensive investment 
and the incurring.ofadditional future costs to secur savings 
in the short run. Capital rationing may only be imposed for 
a single period, but this raises problems with funds that 
have already been committed. Bates and Fraser (op.cit. p.80) 
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argue that, in appraising a project, if parts of a programme 
are firm commitments and a switch to another project would 
incur costs these costs should be subtracted from the programme. 
If a new programme can be introduced but with costs of 
transition then costs should be added to the stream. They 
also provide a suggestion of how the T.DR may be used to 
minimise costs subject to the capital rationing constraint 
(ibid) 
(iv) Uncertainty 
If we take the case of the gas industry, uncertainty 
may affect the investment decision in five ways - uncertainties 
in demand, supply, demand and supply combined, interruptible 
loads and technical changes. Bates and Fraser (op.cit) 
describe how the effects of these may be simulated by using 
information from load duration curves, degree days and 
estimates of the probability of supply failure. In this 
way whereas the existence of uncertainty means that future 
cash flows and costs of expansion cannot be determined with 
accuracy it is possible to estimate the extent to which plant 
or store size may need to be changed. Linear programming 
may be used to estimate optimum demand patterns and main 
transmission systems over time and hence provide information 
on the investments needed to satisfy these problems (see for 
example P. Masse and R. Gibrat, 122 Ch. 11). 
Conclusions on investment criteria 
The main aim of using investment criteria is to take 
account of tih= opportunity cost of funds being invested. In 
this necessarily brief outline of the main issues it has not 
been possible to discuss in detail the problems of estimating 
t~e social opportunity cost rate of return. However, it 
should be clear that the task is complicated by the existence 
of competing rates of return and of other real world conditions 
such as taxation and inflation. But as Webb (ibid)shows 
these problems may, to some extent, be overcome. But it is 
the existence of other factors such as project interdependency, 
strategic decisions, capital rationing and uncertainty that 
restricts the use of investment criteria, so much so that 
whereas the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries had 
hoped that by the use of marginal cost pricing and investment 
appraisal techniques optimisation in the nationalised industries 
could be achieved, in practice this has been possible in only 
a limited number of circumstances. 
In recognition of this, alternative methods of investment 
appraisal and marginal cost pricing have been suggested in 
Cmnd 7131 (GS). More importantly it is recognised therein 
that the use of ex ante measures alone is not sufficient 
to ensure efficiency in the nationalised industries. The 
complexities of the real world mean actual events turn out 
differently than expected. 
Part 1: Appendix III 
outline of Inflation Accounting Proposals 
The first set of proposals put forward by the Institute 
of Chartered Accountants (I.C.A.) was concerned with 
removing the distorting effects of general changes in the 
purchasing power of money and were published in 1974. (64). 
The main proposals were: 
(a) companies will continue to keep their records and 
present their basic annual accounts in historical pounds 
i.e. in terms of the value of the pound at the time of each 
transaction or revaluation. 
(b) in addition all listed companies should present to 
their shareholders a supplementary statement in terms of 
the value of the pound at the end of the period to which 
the accounts relate. This statement was to contain separate 
figures for depreciation and the loss or gain on net monetary 
items because of inflation. 
(c) the conversion of figures in the basic accounts to those 
in the supplementary statement should be by means of a 
general index of the purchasing power of the pound, which 
from 1962 onwards was to be the Retail Price Index based 
on 1974 ... 100. 
(d) there was to be a note to the supplementary statement 
explaining the basis on which.it has been prepared with 
comments on the significance of the figures. 
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(e) in all supplementary statements except the first all 
corresponding amounts shown for the preceding year should 
be changed from the pounds of current purchasing power 
(C.P.P) at last year to pounds of CPP at this year. This 
entails adjustments to the data shown for turnover and 
operating costs in addition to adjustments to depreciation 
provisions and cost of sales. 
(f) distinction should be made between monetary and non-
monetary items. If a company had a net monetary liability 
rather than a net monetary asset then it was to show a gain 
in purchasing power in its supplementary CPP statement. This 
is a real gain to the equity shareholders in terms of 
purchasing power but because it may be accompanied by a 
reduction in liquidity or excessively high gearing it should 
be shown as a separate figure. SSAP7 pointed out that the 
argument that it should not be shown as profit because it 
might not be possible to distribute it without raising 
additional finance confused the measurement of profitability 
with the·:measurement of liquidity. Further, even without 
inflation all a company•s profit may not be distributable 
without raising additional finance, perhaps for example 
because it has invested in non-liquid assets. It is 
also inconsistent to exclude the gain on monetary items 
when profit has been debited with the cost of borrowing 
and with additional depreciation consequent upon the 
converted cost of fixed assets. 
with respect to the adjusting of non-monetary items 
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for inflation the test of lower of historic cost and Net 
Realisable value (NRV) was to be applied to stocks and 
adjustment made to the figures if necessary. Also, Fixed 
Assets may need to be further adjusted in the light of a 
review of value to the business, the adequacy of the 
depreciation charge needed to be considered; and whether 
it was necessary to include in the supplementary statement 
an allowance for corporation tax, chargeable if a gain was 
made on the sale of assets. 
Thus in these proposals the ICA was setting out to 
take account purely of inflationary effects and to 
ensure that the earning power of the company was preserved 
intact. 
In rejecting current cost accounting (c.c.A.) the 
ICA did recognise its potential as a valuable management 
tool (op.cit. Appendix I, p.l2) rather than its being 
predominantly shareholder orientated. This was because 
replacement cost (CCA) accounting does not isolate and 
record general effects of changes in purchasing power,but 
looks at specific, or relative, price changes and thus aims 
to show the extent to which the firm is maintaining its 
physical assets rather than the amount of purchasing power 
originally invested in the assets. It was· suggested that 
firms who wished could include, in an additional and 
separate supplementary statement, replacement cost information. 
But on the whole replacement cost (CCA) was rejected because 
of subjectiv±ty with respect to choosing of indices, 
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complexity of calculation; because changes in replacement 
cost may not be due to inflation; and because changes in 
technology, for example, may make replacement cost valuation 
meaningless unless it is calculated for the whole of a 
particular industry. 
These proposals gained fairly widespread support, with 
many companies publishing comparable CPP accounts in their 
annual reports. (see part 2 for a discussion of these). 
However, the government decided that further discussion 
was necessary and set up a committee to look at the problem. 
This committee reported in 1975 (G4) and the ICA produced its 
draft proposals based on this Report about one year later. (65) 
The main proposals of ED18 were: 
(a) depreciation to.be calculated on the value to the business 
of the assets concerned· in. terms. of replacement cost and not 
on their historical cost and will thus give a more realistic 
measure of the cost of resources used. In most cases the 
depreciation will be calculated on the replacement cost of 
assets 
(b) cost of sales will be calculated in most cases on the 
cost of replacing the goods sold and not on their original 
cost. 
(c) there will be a new statement in the annual accounts -
the Appropriation Account - in which there will be brought 
together the current cost profit, the revaluation surpluses, 
the amount which the directors consider should be retained 
within the business having regard to their assessment of its 
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needs, and dividends. 
(d) the balance sheet will show current values for most 
assets and will no longer show their historical cost. 
(e) a statement on the change in the amount attributable 
to ordinary shareholders - the equity interest - after 
allowing for the change in the value of money. This will 
clearly show how the company has performed in relation to 
the rate of inflation and will also show its losses or gains 
from the holding of monetary items. 
So in essence this CCA system in arriving at profit 
charges income for stocks consumed and fixed assets used 
based on current replacement cost rather than outdated historic 
costs. Further, it also provides a distinction between the 
profits earned from the operations of the business and the 
money gains resulting from changes in the value of a company's 
assets. 
Despite claims that the proposals of ED18 had received 
wide support from both sides of Parliament, industry and 
the City, (78), a majority of the members of the English 
I.C.A. voted against making any system of CCA mandatory, 
mainly on the grounds of complexity and making too great 
a leap forward. 
A subsequent set of proposals, produced by a group 
chaired by Mr. w. Hyde simplified th~ Morpeth proposals· 
embodied in ED18, with three main recommendations (63):-
(a) supplementary depreciation charge 
{b) an adjustment for the increased cost of sales thus 
showing the time cost of consumption during the period. 
I;;=.· t:• 
f.) ~ v F.J 
and (c) a gearing adjustment which allows companies with 
net monetary liabilities to reduce (a) and (b) by the extent 
to which net debt forms part of the company's t~tal capital. 
There seems to be a certain amount of agreement concerning 
the first two proposals but the third is considered to have 
theoretical shortcomings (92). These points will be 
discussed fully in Ch.2. 
Although the above presents the three attempts at 
setting up an accounting standard the wide diversity in the 
proposals suggests very strongly that there is little agreement 
on the underlying_ theoretical aspects of inflation accounting 
both from the accountant's viewpoint and the economist's. 
Moreover, even if there was agreement amongst the theoreticians 
it is possible, that a~y proposals which are theoretically 
consistent may be rejected on grounds of prach'c_c..l ;ty. 
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(I) The calculation of the stock adjustment 
(i) Revise opening and closing stock to average current 
cost for the year. 
(a) opening stock. 
(b) closing stock 
opening stock x average index for the year 
beginning of year index 
closing stock x average index for the year 
index at end of year 
(ii) Take difference between adjusted closing stock and 
adjusted opening stock. 
(iii) Subtract this from difference between unadjusted closing 
and opening stock. This produces the cost of sales adjustment. 
(II) The calculation of the-.depreciation adjustment 
If an asset is purchased and has a life of n years 
then each annual replacement cost depreciation provision, 
assuming a straight-line method of depreciation, is 
1 x R.C.t and if scrapped at the end of n years depreciation 
n 
in the final year is 1 • RCt - scrap proceeds. If from 0ne 
n 
year to the next the estimated replacement cost increases 
then the depreciation prov~sion will be 1 • RCt+l 
n 
In practice it is likely that the firm will be 
continually acquiring each type of asset. The annual 
depreciation charge for each asset is calculated on the 
same basis as above, only now the process as a whole becomes 
more complex. Note, though, that it is not necessary to 
,,-:: !'". :•J 
~<· ~ 
calculate "backlog" depreciation. But it is essential to 
have an age profile for each asset. Depreciation provisions 
are outlined in more detail in part 3. 
(III) Calculation of real gain on holding non-monetary assets 
A firm has one asset which yields income 
Let Yo = income in year o 
K = capital value 0 in year o, which produces Yo 
I = general price index g 
I = asset specific price index s 
yl 
Kl 
H 
c 
r 
k 
0 
= 
= 
= 
= 
income in year 1 
capital value in 
real holding gain 
rate of return on 
r 
year 1, producing yl 
on capital 
asset 
- (1) if it yields y in perpetuity; 
0 
If general prices rise by I and specific prices rise by I g s 
then at the end of year, 
K = K I 1 0 s 
yoig = yl 
- (2) 
- (3) 
The new value of K required to maintain the real purchasing 
0 
power of the asset is given by: 
- (4) 
Now K - K n = H 1 0 c 
- ( 5) 
substituting (4) 
1 H K - y_ = 1 c - ( 6) 
r 
From (3) K Yo! = H 1 _g c 
- (7) 
r 
using (1) K1 - K I 0 g = H c 
· .. 
,~; r. (-, 
(.; !~' c) 
Finally from (2) K (J; -I ) = H 
0 s g c 
- (8) 
- ( 9) 
That is the real holding gain is the difference between 
the value of K on a specific index basis and its value 
0 
using a general index. 
(IV) Calculation of qain (loss) on holdinq monetary 
liabilities (assets) 
It is assumed that money is only affected by the 
general index (I ) • Therefore defining monetary liabilities g 
by L and following the same approach as above the holding 
gain on monetary liabilities is given by: 
H = -L (1-I ) 
L o g 
and on monetary assets 
H = L (I-I ) • 
A o g 
Part 3: Appendix I: Specimen of Letter sent to all Gas Regions 
University of Durham 
Dear Sir, 
Department of Economics 
23/26 Old Elvet, Durham, DH1 3HY, England 
Telephone: Durham 64466 (STD code 0385) 
Mr. M. Wright Ext. 628 
17th February, 1977. 
I am at present engaged upon research for an M.A. (Economics) Thesis. 
The subject of my research is the performance of the Gas Industry, the 
intention being to compare performance over the period before the forma-
tion of the British Gas Corporation, and afterwards, up to the end of the 
1975/76 financial yea~. I am hoping to use a replacement cost valuation 
of assets in order to obtain replacement cost rates of return on capital 
and replacement cost rates of return on investments over this period. 
It is in this context that I am writing to ask for your assistance. 
My request for assistance concerns the problem of valuation of land 
and buildings. I note from the accounts that land and buildings acquired 
before 1949 were written out of the records on 31st March 1973. I under-
stand, also, that detailed information on land and buildings purchased by 
Area Boards (subsequently Regions) since vesting data, is held by the 
Region concerned. 
In order to obtain a complete replacement cost figure of land and 
buildings I need to have some idea of the value or volume of land and 
buildings (that is in terms of acres of land or numbers of.buildings). 
Further, as buildings are depreciated for periods of up to fifty 
years, it is thus difficult to assess from the accounts exactly what land 
and buildings the Corporation possess and thus impossible to make a replace-
ment cost valuation. Would it be possible the~ to provide me with inform-
ation on how much land and buildings your region possesses? 
I hope that this is not too much of an imposition on your time, and 
that you will appreciate that in the light of recent discussions on the 
use of replacement cost accountancy and the performance of the Nationalised 
Industries what I am attempting to do is to contribute to improving the 
guidelines for measuring the performance of the Public Sector. 
May I also assure you that any information you are able to give will 
be treated as confidential and will not be disclosed. Thank you. 
Yours sincerely, 
---------------------------· -·- - ···-- -· --
. ' .. 
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Estimation of Showroom Numbers 
Inspection of the telephone directories revealed incomplete 
information on showroom numbers for two regions, Wales and 
Southern. 
Intuitively the number of showrooms in a regi.on will be 
mainly dependent upon some function of the population, density 
of population, and·number of gas customers. 
In practice it seems that taking a figure of population 
per square mile for density hides great variations in population 
density, especially true of regions such as Scotland. Taking 
area in thousands of square miles seems to perform better as 
a proxy for density. 
A number of equations were fitted using the above reasoning. 
The following semi-log function appeared to perform best: 
where s = No. of showrooms 
A = Area in thousands of 
square miles 
P = Population 
Using the available data the estimated equation was 
s = - 496,28936 + o.0008A + 67.92533 log P 
(-3 .4394) * (1.4704) (3 .976) * t values in parentheses 
2 
R = 0.72382 * F ratio = 9.173 
*significant at 5% level 
se. 13.53967 
·d.f. = 7 n = 10 
The actual and predicted results for the regions where data 
were available are shown below. 
1:-: r . . • (.} -~) .i 
TABLE A 
PREeiCTED AND ACTUAL SHOWROOM NUMBERS 
Region SA SP Error % Error 
Scottish 110 109 + 1 0.9 
Northern 48 53 - 5 10.4 
North West 126 106 +20 15.9 
North East 70 56 +14 20.0 
' East Midlands 78 91 -13 16.7 
West Midlands 70 88 -18 25.7 
Eastern 76 79 - 3 3.9 
North Thames 80 89 - 9 11.3 
South East 102 95 +7 6.9 
South West 75 68 +7 9.3 
Total 835 834 + 1 -
(.= ... :~: 
l: -·~; 
·~,2 
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REGION 
1. B.G.C. 
2. Scottish 
3. Northern 
4. North West 
.. 
5, North East 
6, East Midlands 
7, West Midlands 
8, WALES 
9. EASTERN 
10. North Thames 
11. South East 
12. Southern 
13. South West 
Total 
•·. 
NATIONAL/ AREA 
REGIONAL H.Q. 
H.Q. 
1 2 
2 10 
-
1 6 
1 4 
2 8 
1 5 
1 5 
1 5 
1 4 
2 6 
4 ·6 
1 9 n.a •. 
1 6 
2 11 
20. 66 
Table .!_\: Land and Buildings of ffiC in 1975 
'rYPE 
CUSTOMER SHOW- GAS"" NATURAL COMPRESSOR 
SERVICE ROOMS WORKS GAS STATIONS 
CENTRES TERMINALS 
3 4 5 
- - - - -
-7 110 20 1 
-
1 48 6 
-
1 
6 126 
- - ·-
- 71 2 1 -
5 78 - 1 2 
5 70 2 - 2 
-
48 6 
- -
2 76 1 2 3 
.-7 80 1 1 
-
'129 102 1 
- -
1 . 64 1 
- -
2 75 1 
- -
48 948 41 6 8 
HOlDER,· DISTRICT L.N.G·. TRANSPORT . MISC. 
STATIONS DISTRIBUTION STORES DEPl'S. 
OFFICES 
6 3 7 8 
- - - -
5 
-
1 1 1 6 
- - - - -
9 6 '1 2 5 
3 8 - - 4 
5 3 ·1 2 5 
1 - - 1 2 
I 
-
1 
- - 3 I. ~ 
1 - - 2 2 
. 3 . 2 I 
- - -
- - - -
5 
- - - - -
1 4 
-
3 6 
23 23 5 11 144 
. ~--ro:- ·--::- ....... . 
.-:·. ("", ,-, 
(; ;_;; r;.) 
Table A. Notes 
1. Number of H.Q. exceeds no. of regions because of 
split sites. 
2. May also exceed number of Areas due to split sites 
3. Where these can be separated from Area H.Q. s. 
4. Obtained from 1975/76 accounts. 
5. Completed ones. Another 16 are planned or under 
construction. 
6. As distinct from gas works, which will also have 
gasholders on the same site. 
7. Often located on gas holder sites. Efforts have 
been made to avoid double-counting here., by cross-
checking addresses. 
8. Includes Research Stations, Training centres, 
Industrial/Commercial Centres, Liquid Gas Centres,· 
Central stores etc. 
9. On the information from the Telephone Dire'ctories 
Area H.Q. could not be separated from cust~mer Service 
Centres which are probably on the same site. 
10. It is known that these are both leasehold. 
Source: Post Office Telephone Directories covering 
the twelve British Gas Regions for 1975. 
; : ?;·~ 
... -.. 
.. ..... 
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! Part 3 Appendix IV . Table l(a): Replacement cost of Assets of BGC- Gross Book Value- Specific Indices 
FINANCIAL YEAR 
ASSET 
1977/a 1976/7 1975/6 1974/5 1973/4 1972/3 1971/2 1970/1 1969/70 196a/9 1967/a 1966/7 1965/6 1964/5 1963/4 
1. Land and 339.9 316.6 307.0 2a6.9 294.5 2a7.3 194.9 16a.4 150.5 152.a 142.6 13a.4 127.6 117.5 106.5 
Buildings 
2· •. Mains 5770.2 5061.2 3a59.6 3514.5 2072.7 1644.0 1512.a 1361.4 12oa.6 a94.1 7a4.1 601.2 5a3.7 547.3 52a.4 
3. Services a88.9 793.7 620.4 596.7 353.1 270.4 239.3 210.1 laa.9 142.7 126.9 107.9 91.6 ao.4 71.9 
I 4. Gasholders & · 249 .a 226.3 la5.5 lao.4 131.3 110.1 103.7 93.5 a6.2 74.6 6a.7 63.6 63.4 65.9 66.5 
i other storage 
I 
5. Plant and 763.0 637.7 642.9 671.7 63a.5 66a.7 656.a 6a4.3 613.4 554.a 543.6 434.0 34a.o 303.9 2a5.6 
Machinery 
6. Meters 301.7 262.9 235.5 196.2 144.9 130.3 120.7 lC::l9.2 95.0 aa.9 a3.a 80.5 a3.7 a2.2 a3.2 
7. Motor vehiclef 54.9 5o.a 44.a 39.5 30.5 27.6 25.2 25.6 22.0 19.7 la.o 16.7 15.a 15.3 14.3 
and mobile 
plant 
a. Furniture, I . fit;~ngs,office 32.7 33.0 31.9 30.6 . 27.1 23.5 2l.a la.7 15.0 11.a 9.3 7.a 6.3 5.a 4.a 
~~::_n~nery 
I 9. Miscellaneous 117.1 aa.l 65.1 42.6 33.5 27.4 24.3 20.3 16.1 12.4 9.2 6.5 4.5 3 .5,. 3.2 
I TOTAL asla.2 7501.9 5992.7,5559.1 3726.1 3la9.3 2ag9.5 26~1.5 2395.7 195l.a,l7a6.2 1456.6 1324.6 1221.a 1164.4 
=· .. ....... -···-.·-··-·· :·' 
Em 
1962/3 1961/2 1960/1 t 
97.0 92.9 a7.a 
499.6 4aa.2 472.0 
64.2 5a.9 53.0 
64.9 65.6 66.3 
265.1 262.3 263.0 
I . 
I 
a3.6 85.3 a7.7 
13.0 -11.7 10.7 
I I 
4.6 4.6 4. 71 
i 
2.5l 2 .9, 2.7 
1094.9 1072.2,1047.7 
~-.·· ...... ~ -':!!'- ··-:-:-·-·;·· . ;- ~----~···-··· ·•. 
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ASSET 1977/8 1976/7 
~· Lar.d and 
Buildings 
308.4 299,2 
. . . 
2.~1ains p919.6 1528,0 
rv1ces ~- 621.2 567,3 
I •l,Gasho1ders 221.8 207.0 
t~.~ 
. ··., 
.... ,_, 
("'-2 
l an.j other storage 
15.P1ant and 723.9 633.8 i machir.erY 
16.Neters 301.1 280.9 
i 
17.Motor 46,0 45.5 
v•~hicles 
and 
mobile 
plant 
8, Furniture 32.0 33.2 
fittings, 
office 
machinery 
r9, Misce11- 103,9 86,9 
aneaus 
! 
Total 16277.9 5681,8 
Table lb, Replacement Cost of Assets of BGC - Gross Book Value - General Index 
£!!! 
FINI,NCIIIL YEAR 
1975/6 1974/5 1973/i 1972/3 1971/2 1970/1 1969/7( 1968/9 1.967/0 1966/7 1965/6 1964/5 1963/4 
262,1 214.9 183.6 168.5 153.9 143.7 130.4 131,3 117.8 112.4 103.4 96.8 90.0 
.. . . 
-
2934.1 2245.2 757,6 5'11.0 1368. 1223.1 030.0 872.8 718.8 599.8 525.6 '176,5 434.2 
485,9 400.3 31<:,9 267,7 230.3 201.9 174.1 152.9 130.1 111.8 96,9 83,9 72.0 
170.7 153.2 128.6 116.9 104.0 95.1 04.7 79,5 69.1 61.6 58,5 57.3 56.4 
628.2 570.7 621.1 674.7 644,1 651.0 594.0 557.9 527.9 419,6 333.4 297,7 281.3 
245.4 207.3 167.4 146.3 130.1 114,2 102.8 95.3 87.7 86,2 87.1 . 85,8 84.1 
42,9 36.1 29.9 28.3 25.2 25.6 22.7 21.0 18.6 17,4 16,3 15.6 14.4 
32.6 28.6 26,6 25.2 22.5 18,7 114.6 12.6 9,6 8,0 6.6 5.9 4.9 
.. .. 
--
' .. 
66.0 41.~ 34.4 29.3 25.4 21.0 16,7. 13,0 9.4 6.8 4.7 3.7 3.4 
4867.9 3897.8 3267.1 2997.9 2703, 2494,3 217!).0 1936.3 :1689,0 1423.6 1232.5 1123.2 1040.7 
--. 
... 
1962/3 1961/2 1960/1 
86.3 82.8 79.1 
402.2 378.5 355.4 
6·1.1 57.·1 50.7 
57.5 57,1) 57.0 
272.5 269,1 258.7 
85.7 86,1 84.8 
13.2 12.2 10.9 
4.9 4.9 5·.11 
I 
3.1 2.9 2.6 
. 
989,5 951,7 904.3 
I 
I 
~ 
\ 
! 
I 
i 
.i 
l 
! 
~ 
I 
I 
! 
l 
l 
1 
! 
I 
I 
! 
I 
I 
I:_ 
I· 
t 
! 
I' !. 
t 
; 
'f_; 
r-
l 
~;· 
r . 
. .
I· 
I 
l 
.. !" 
I 
I 
! 
r.:~· 
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I 
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Asset 
977/8 1976/7 
1. Land and 26.1 . 24:4 
buildings 
2. Mains 144.3 126.5 
3. Services 59.3 52.9 
4. Gasholders 1.3.2 11.9 
and other 
storage 
5. Plant and 69.4 63.8 
machinery 
6. Neters 20.1 17.5 
7. f-lotor 
Vehicles 
7.8 7.3 
and mobile 
plant· .. 
8. Furniture, 4.1 4.1 
fittings, 
office 
machinery 
9. Miscellan- 7.3 5.5 
eo us 
Total 351.6 313.9 
1975/6 
21.5 
96.5 
41.4 
9.8 
71.4 
15.7 
6.4 
4.0 
4.1 
270.8 
Table 2 : BGC - Annual Replacement Cost Depreciation - Special Indices 
...£.!!!.... 
FINANCIAL \"EAR 
. 
1974/5 1973/4 1972/3 1971/2 1970/1 1969/70 1968/9 1967/8 1966/7 1965/6 1964/5 1963/4 1962/3 1961/2 1960/i 
22.1 21-.0 19.2 13.0 11.2 10.0 .9.0 8.4 7.7 7.1 o.5 5.9 5.4 5.2 4.·9 
----
88.3 51.8 41.1 37.8 34.0 30.2 22.4 19.6 16.6 14.6 13.7 13.2 12.5 12.2 11.8 
39.8 23.5 18.0 16,0 14.0 12,6 9,5 8,5 7,2 6.1 5.4 4.8 .4.3 .4.1 3.5 I 
9,5 6,9 5.8 5.5 4,9 4.5 3,9 3,6 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.5 
75,4 79,8 74.3 73.·0 62,2 55.8 50.4 45.3 36.2 29.0 . 25.3 23.8 22.1 21,9 21.9 
13.1 9.7 8.7 8.1 7.3 6,3 5,9 5,6 5.4 5,6 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 
5.6 4.4 3.9 3.6 3.2 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.3 
3.8 3,0 2.6 2.2 1.9 1.5 1.1 0.8 0,7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
.. 
4.7 3.7 3.0 2.4 1.8 1.3 1,0 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 
. 
. 
262.3 203.8 176.6 161.6 140.5 i24.9 105.7 94.8 .79. 7 68.7 62.6 59.2 55.5 54.7 53.3 
----- -----
• 0 - 0 --R·.·--------· '0' =-- . - -·r:· 
.... 
.. , _. .... 
• :~ • '. I 
~~~--~-·• •--·~• ••••••""-• ••"••-•• a•~•· .. ....... -----··- -··-- . ____________ !,.:.·.--·----· ··------·-· -~----·...: ....... :..__ .. __ _ . .:.- ··-=--- . . ·.:.· . -. : ... : 
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Part 3 Appendix IV Table 3(a) Replacement cost of Asset:s of BGC -Net Book value - Specific Indices 
I 
'I 
1 
.! 
1 
i 
i 
·I 
! 
i 
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.j 
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·t 
:j 
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.I 
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ASSET 
1977/8 
I 1. Land and 
B~il.dings 114.9 
2. Mains 3718.4 
3. Services 377.9 
4. Gasho1ders & 123.7 
ether storage 
5. Plant and 272.0 
machinery 
6. Meters 133.8 
7. Motor vehicles 19.5 
& Mobile plant 
8. Furniture, 
fittings, office 11.9 
machinery 
9. Miscellaneous 67.8 
TOTAL 4839.9 
.. 
1976/7 1975/6 1974/5 .1973/4 
114.7 115.5 114.0 124.4 
3324.9 2569.7 2349.1 1383.3 
362.5 305.0 313.8 191.7 
116 •. 1 95.4 96.3 70.4 
232.2 183.9 135.6 144.2 
125.3 121.2 108.1 81.6 
18~9 '18.1 15.3 11.9 
10.5 9.8 10.7 11.9 
51.7 38.8 16.8 15.1 
4356.8 3457.4 3159.7 2034.5 
-
FINANCIAL YEAR 
.. 
1972/3 1971/2 1970/1 1969/7( 1968/~ 1967/8 1966/7 1965/6 1964/5 
I 
136.5 96.8 85.8 76.2 80.1 72.1 68.2 60.6 54.7 
1110.3 1034.2 935.6 819.8 587.9 490.3 388.5 325.0 297.7 
150.0 135.4 120.7 109.7 83.3 73.7 62.1 52.7 46.5 
58.5 54.4 49.1 43.8 37.2 32.8 26.8 25.3 26.3 
224.0 258.1 3S1.6 343.2 337~0 340.6 251.5 175.0 139.5 
74.0 68.1 59.2 49.0 43.2 38.0 34.4 33.8 32.6 
12.1 11.5 11.9 10.4 9.3 8.3 7.6 7.3 7.0 
11.7 12.3 11.3 9 .. 2 7.5 5.5 4 .• 5 3.4 3.1 
14.6 14.6 13.4 11.3 8.8 6.4 4.4 2.7 1.8 
1791.7 1685.4 1638.6 1472.6 1194.3 1067.7 848.0 685.8 609.2 
- - -
_gm 
1963/4 1962/3 1961/2 
48.6 43.3 41.1 
281.5 257.7 249.7 
42.1 37.6 34.8 
27.0 2 6.9 27.9 
129.8 110.4 108.8 
33.1 32.9 33.7 
6.8 . 6.0 5.7 
2.4 2.1 1.9 
1.6 1.4 1.3 
568.9 518".3 1 504.9 
1960/11 
39.2 
243.8 
31.51 
I 
28.6 
112.4 
35.·5 
5.2 
2.0 
1.2 
499.4 
-· 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I. 
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I I. 
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.. j 
I 
I 
I 
i 
,j 
I 
'l 
.. 
ASSET 
!1. Land and 
Buildings ;. 
2. Mains 
3. Services 
4. Gasholders and 
other storage 
5. Plant and 
mac!linery 
6. Meters 
7. Motor vehicles 
and mobile plant 
8. Furniture, 
fittings, Office 
·machinery 
9 Miscellaneous 
TOTAL 
1977/8 '1976/7 
114.1 119.0 
2630.2 2~10.0 
281.1 271.4 
110.4 107.0 
261.0 233.2 
130.0 130.4 
17.0 17.3 
9.8 10.6 
59.9 50.7 
3612.5 3349.6 
1975/6 
109.0 
2030.6 
247.2 
92.8 
183.1 
123.0 
17.7 
1o.o· 
38~9 
2852.3 
;:.':, ·., 
. ~~. · .. 
·-•-hoi.;...._...,_.___ .......... -·•-•·· -•- _........_ ___ ,,,.._ __ ,, 
,•. 
. ~- ··-.~· ,.! 
Table 3(b) =· Replacement cost of Assets of BGC -Net Book Value -General Index 
FINANCIAL YEAR 
1974/5 1973/4 1972/3 1971/2 l970/l 11969/70 1968/9 1967/8 966/7 1965/6 1964/5 
93.9 88.7 86.8 82.1 78.8 70.7 72.2 62.2 58.1 50.7 46.3 
1543.4 1211.2 1078.3 973.8 879.5 734.7 608.8 480.1 384.6 327.6 289.6 
215.4 171.7 148.2 129.7 115.2 100.1 88.3 75.1 64.1 55.8 48.9 
82.0 68.6 62.0 54.8 50.2 43.1 40.0 33.5 26.5 24.0 23.7 
129.8 141.0 227.5 255.5 337 ._2 334.6 341.2 334.1 245.8 169.1 137.3 
' 
111.2 91.9 81.3 71.8 60.7 52.1 45.4 39.1 36.0 34.5 33~7 
14.2 11.7 12.4 11.5 11.7 10.7 9.8 8.5 7.8 7.4 6.4 
10.0 12.3 13.1 12.6 11.2 8.8 7.9 5.6 4.6 3.5 3.2 
16.2 15.2 14.8 15.1 13.7 11.6 9.2 6.6 4.5 2.7 1.9 
2216.1 1812.3· 1724.4 1606.9 1558.2 1366.4 ~222.8 1044.8 832.0 675.3 591.0 
1:!!! 
963/4 1962/3 1961/2 
42.4 40.1 -38.7 
259.9 234.0 219.0 
42.7 38.1. 34.5 
23.9 25.1 26.2 
123.8 112.4 110.4 
33.4 34.1 . 34.9 
6.8 6.1 5.9 
2.4 2.2 2 .o 
1.6 1.4 1.3 
536.9 493.5 472.9 
I 
I 
I 
1960/1 I 
37.7 I 
206.9 
30.7 
26.5 
110.1 
35.6 I 
5.2 
2 .o 
.1,.2 
455.91 
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Part 3 
ASSET 
1977/8 
1. Land and 0.8 Buildings 
2. !olains 1088.2 
3. Services 96".8 
!4. Gasholders & 13.3 
other storage 
5. Plant and 11.0 
m<l.chinery 
6. t-leters 3.8 
7. Motor vehicles 2.5 
& mobile plant 
8. Furniture, 
fittings,offic~ 2.1 
machinery 
9. Miscellaneous 8.9 
TOTAL 11227.4 
- -------
Appendix IV 
1976/7 1975/6 
·(4.3) 6.5 
914.9 539.1 
91.1 57.8 
9.1 2.6 
(1.0) 0.8 
(5.1) (1.8) 
1.6 0.4 
(O .1) (0. 2) 
1.0 (0 .1) 
1007.2 605.1 
Table 3(c): BGC Gains on Holding Assets 
FINANCIAL YEAR 
1974/5 ~973/4 1972/3 1971/2 1970/1 1969/70 1968/9 
20.1 35.7 49.7 14.7 7.0 5.5 7.9 
805.7 172.3 32.0 60.4 55.7 85.1 (20 .9) 
98.4 20.0 1.8 5.7 5.5 9.6 (5.0) 
14.3 1.8 (3. 5) (0.4) (1.1) 0.7 (2.8) 
5.8 3.2 ( 3 • 5") 2.6 14.4 8.6 (4 .2) 
(3 .1) (10.3) (7.3) (3. 7) (1.5) (3 .1) (2.2) 
1.1 0.2 (0.3) - 0.2 (0 .3) (0. 5) 
0.7 (0 .4) (1.4) (0 .3) 0.1 0.4 (0.4) 
0.6 (0 .1) (0.2) (0.5) (0.3) (0 .3) (0.4) 
943.6 222.2 67.3 78.5 80.4 106.2 (28 .5) 
-
.&!! 
1967/8 1966/7 1965/6 1964/5 1963/4 ~962/3 
9.9 10~1 9.9 8.4 6.2 3.2 
10.2 
. 
3.9 ·_ (2 .6) 8.1 21.6 23.7 
(1.4) (2 .o> (3 .1) (2.4) (0.6) . (0.5) 
(0. 7) 0.3 1.3 2.6 3.1 1.8 
6.5 5.7 5.9 2.2 2.0 (2.0) 
' 
(1.1) (1.6) (0. 7) (1.1) (0.3) (1.2) 
(0 .2) (0 .2) (0 .1) 0.6 
-
(0 .1) 
' 
(0.1) (O .1) (0 .1) (0 .1) 
-
(0.1) 
(0.2) (0 .1) - (0 .1) . - -. 
22.9 16.0 10.5 18.2 32.0 2:4.8 
961/2. ~960/1 
2.4: 1.5 
: 
---
. 30.7 36.9 
0.3 0.8 
1.7 . 2.1 ' 
I 
(1.6) 2.3 
(1.2) (0.1) 
(0 .2) 
-
(0 .1) -
- -
32.0 43.5 
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Part 3 Appendix rv Table 4: · Historic cost Rate of Return data 
1977/8 ~976/7 975/6 974/5 ~973/4 972/3 971/2 1970/1 ~969/70 1968/9 1967/8 1966/7• 
Turnover 2582.0 1976:.2 580.4 219.2 979.5 904.8 783.2 689.4 662.4 644.5 590.2 555.5 
Less: 
operating costs 1585.1 1194.5 047.4 853.3 677 .• 2 603.9 544.7 501.2 493.5 499.7 5oo.8 471.0 
deferred charges .155. 7 148.3 87.0 73.9 44.6 32.8 16.9 11.3 5.7 2.2 0.5 
-
displaced plant 83.2 80.6 48. 7· 38.2 30.0 11.6 13.4 
- - - - -
pre depreciation 758.0 552.8 397.3 253.8 227.7 254.7 221.6 176.9 163.2 142.6 88.9 84.5 trading surplus 
Deduct 
historic cost 196.0 176.4 147.3 135.2 113.3 96.7 82.6 68.7 60.8 52.6 45.1 40.1 
r-£epn 
pre interest 
historic cost 
profit 
562.0 376.4 250.0 118.6 114.4 158.0 139.0 108.2 102.4 90.0 43.8 44.4 
Assets 
!.Fixed Ass~ts NBV 1591.8 1586.6 1556.3 1433.3 1412.1 1465.0 1480.1 1448.9 1346.9 1250.4 1100.9 879.4 
2.Cap.expend. 
charged to 192.7 103.7 48.1 - - - - - - - - -
revenue 
3.deferred charges 
-
148.3 273.3 295.9 293.2 256.5 248.0 173.9 76.3 30.6 6.4 0.9 
4.displaced plant 
-
82.3 137.6 143.2 122.0 90.6 64.0 25.0 16.2 7.7 . 1.3 1.5 
5.Investments 33.7 65.5 57.6 32.8 21.6 22.8 20.8 20.6 18.1 16.1 7.4 4.6 
6.Hire purchase,etc 73.7 65.4 59.3 51.3 52.9 54.3 54.3 49.2 51.3 51.4 50.1 52.2 
?.Others 
- - - - - -
4.8 6.0 6.8 8.6 8.7 9.3 
Current Assets 
Stocks 113.6 124.3 104.1 87.0 73.9 78.0 76.1 87.9 88.2 86.5 90.7 81.1 
Net monetary as~ 244.0 241.6 185.1 148.4 137.1 90.5 99.8 79.0 58.7 34.9 12.7 26.8 
~: . .. 
Net Bank overdraft 21.4 {5.0) {6.6) { 5 .1) {6.3) {6.li {5.9 {7.4 ·{8.3) {6.3 {8.4 {4 .1 
Total after 0/D 2228.1 2412.7 2414.8 2186.8 2106.5 2051.6 2042.0 1883.1 1654.2 1479.9 12€9.8 1051.7 
Total before 0/D 2249."5 2417 ."7 2421.4 2191.9 2112.8 2057.7 2047.9 1890.5 1662.5 ;1486.2 1278.2 1055.~ 
Source: ·o7- 012, D52 supplementary statements 
···-----· ....... : --- .. -·- . 
£m 
1965/6 1964/5 1963/4 1962/3 1961/2 1960/1 
562.6 527.6 496.8 478.5 438.6 416.3 
479.4 449.5 432.2 416.6 379.8 360.9 
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
83.2 78.1 64.6 61.9 58.8 55.4 
36.9 35.5 32.7 30.8 30.0 28.8 
46.3 42.6 31.9 31.1 28.8 26.6 
711.8 635.3 589.9 536.2 511.9 500.6 
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
1.5 1.5 1.1 1.2 0.2 -
4.9 4.8 5.0 5.5 5.8 5.5 
58.2 56.9 50.9 46.7 45.2 46.0 
9.5 11.3 14.6 15.1 17.9 18.5 
-64.3 64.7 57.8 50.7 53.4 53.6 
29.8 40.1 37.1 33.6 30.9 25.5 
-
{4 .1) {4 .1 {4.1) {2.8 {0.5) 
·88o.o 808.5 752.3 684.9 662.5 649.2 
880 .o 812.6 756.4 689.0 665.3 649.7 I 
I 
_.,. .. ----~--
Part 3 Aopendix IV Table 5: Replacement Cost Rate of ~turn_~~acement cost dep~eciation a~d cost of 
sales adj_~stments to profits and replacement co~t asset ~aluation only. £rn 
I 
1977/8 1976/7 1975/6 "1974/5 1973/4 1972/3 1971/2 1970/l 1969/7 1968/9 1967/8 1966/7 1965/6 1964/5 1962/4 1962/3 1961/2 1960/11 
... 
Turnover 25!32.0 1976.2 1580.4 1219.2 979.5 904.8 783.2 689.4 662.4 644.5 590.2 555.5 562.6 527.6 496.8 478.5 438.6 416."31 
Less: 3~0.91 operating costis 1585.1 1194.5 1047.4 853.3 677.2 603.9 544.7 501.2 493 .s 499.7 500.8 471.0 479.4 449.5 432.2 416.6 379.8 
deferred charges 155.7 148.3 87.0 73.9 44.6 32.8 16.9 11.3 5.7 2.2 o.s . -· - - - - -
displaced plant· 83.2 80.6 48.7 38.2 30.0 13.4 - - - - - - - - - - - - j 
-pre int, pre dep. I 758.0 552.8 397.3 253.8 227.7 254.7 221.6 176.9 163.2 142.6 88.9 84.5. 83.2 78.1 64.6 61.9 58.8 SS.4i 
surplus I 
Deduct: 
Repl.cost depn. 367.1 322.1 274.3 262.3 203.8 176.6 161.6 140.5 124.9 lOS. 7 94.8 79.7 68.7 62.6 59.2 55.5 54.7 53.3 
Cost of sales adj. 14.1 20 •. 6 15.4 19.3 11.1 4.9 4.2 7.0 4.7 2.1 3 .o 1.2 1.5 2.1 1.1 o.s 0.8 1.3 
":·~· jFre interest 376.8 210.1 107.6 (27.8 12.8 . 73.2 55.8 29.4 33.6 34.8 (8.9) 3.6 13 .o 13.4 4.3 5.9 3.3 0.!3 ~~pl.cost profit 
T;ssets* r=~--
1424.8 1238.1 1021.0 854.8 783.5 731.9 663.3 655.9 648.6 after o/d 5536.1 5201.0 4324.8 3923.6 2734.3 2380.6 2249.2 2076.2 1782.2 
~' :;: ~ 
~t:;;~~ 
before o/d 5514.7 5206.0 4331.4 3928.7 2740.6 2386.7 2255.1 2083.6 1790.5 1431.1 1246.5 1025.1 854.8 787.6 736.0 671.4 658.7 649.1 
after o/d but 
stock at historic 5529.4 5189.8 4316.3 3913.2 2728.9 .2378.2 224 7.3 2012 .a 1779.9 1423.8 1236.6 1020.3 854.0 782.4 731.3 633.0 655.5 648.0 
cost 
~efore o/d but 
stock at historic 5508.0 5194.8 4322.9 3918.3 2735.2 2384.3 2253.2 2080.2 1788.2 1430.1 1245.0 1024.4 854.0 786.5 735.4 671.1 658.31 648.5 
cost 
* see Part 3 Ch. 2 Table -1 for details .• 
·I 
--,--.- --;-•:=:::····:~;::~---·-::--··-. ------ ---·-.;-
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PART 3 APPENDIX IV 
Table 6 : Estimated Replacement Cost Rates of Return for 
Industry in ·eneral - by various institutions 
., . 
(1) 
Monoplies 
NEDO study (2) TRADE AND INDUSTR~3 ) Bank of ENGLAND (4 Q.B. 
Commission 
Historic! Year "Method 4" Historic Replacement Adj .Rept IHistori< Rept Adj,Rept R~pt Adj Rep 
(calendar) Mean Cost Cost Cost post Cost Cost Cost cost Cost 
% % %" ·% % % % %" % % 
1960 13.1 n.a n.a h.a 18.8 13.5 13.2 i9.0 13.7 13,4 
1961 11.1 n.a n.a n,a 16.4 11.9 11.4 16•5 12,0 11.5 
1962 9.5 n.a n.a n.a 14.9 10.8 10.4 15,0 10,9 10.5 
1963 10.2 n.a n.a n.a 16.0 Ll.8 11.3 .16.1 11.8 11.4 
1964 11.4 n.a n.a n.a 16,7 12.5 11.7 16.8 12.6 11.8 
1965 10.7 12.7 11.3 10.2 16.0 11.9 .11.2 16.0 12,0 11.2 
1966 9.2 11.3 9.5 8,7 14.3 10.6 9.8 14.3 10.7 9,8 
1967. 9.4 11.2 9.7 9.5 13.5 10.3 10.0 13.6 10.3 9.8 
1968. 11.0 12,5 10.8. 8,6 14.7 11.0 9.9 14.7 11.2 10.0 
1969 n.a 11.9 9.9 8.9 14.8 1!..0 9.7 13.8 9.9 8.8 
1970 n.a 11.0 8.6 7.0 14.1 10.1 8.3 13.5 9.1 7.8 
1971 6.2 12.0 8.9 7.4 14.6 10.0 8.5 14.3 8.9 8.3 
1972 8.7 13.5 n.a 8.8 15.5 10.2 8,5 15.9 9.3 8.8 I . 
1973 10.3 15.4 n.a 6.0 17.6 10.8 -7.4 18,2 0.1 7.8 
1974 5.8 n.a n.a n.a 1.7. 3 9.6 4.3 17.9 . 9. 3 . 4.6 
1975 5.7 n.a n.a n.a 14.6 6.8 3.2 15.1 n.a 3.5 
1976 n.a n.a n.a n .a 16.3 7.0 3.3 16.8 n.a 3.5 
1977 n.a .n .. ·a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a. n.a n.a 
·-----:-::-·-:-7"·--.:-:· .. o.~-------····--·-···--···-··------- ··-····. -···-·. ---.. ~-. ····----:·---------:-_~··---:--·-.::.,._,:-~···.-· .. '=""·'·:-:~~.-~---. - ... --~"":.":·--·-··~~-·-~--~ ............. ____ .. ______ ....... - --· --·· ---~ .... ··-· 
Table 6 Notes 
~~: _:-. ~~) 
{.J lj ~., 
(1) Source: Monopolies Commission Reports (D61 to D64) 
and Rowley (D60). See D61 Appendix 4 p.ll9 for 
explanation of derivation. Data relates to large 
quoted UK manufacturing companies, and was based on 
Economic trends data originally and DOI Business 
Monistor M3 latterly. 
(2) Historic Cost data derived from DOI Business Monitor 
M3. Replacement Cost data found by adjusting historic 
cost data by conversion factor derived from Monopolies 
Commission data (see NEDO (D53) pp. 81-3 for details). 
Data covers large quoted UK manufacturing companies. 
(3) Source: Trade and Industry (D56 to D58) and Economic 
Trends (D59). Data derived from National Income and 
Expenditure "·Blue Book" and Central Statistical Office, 
and relates to all industrial and commercial companies 
(see D57, p 112 for details of definition). 
(4) Source: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (D54,DSS) 
Data derived from National Income and Expenditure 
"Blue Book" an.d Central Statistical Office, and relates 
to all industrial and commercial cempanies (see D54, 
p.45-6 for details) 
Definitions 
1. Monopolies Commission "Method 4" mean - as defined by 
Rowley (D60, pp. 46,7) Replacement cost basis, but 
excludes adjustment for stock appreciation until post·"l971 
2. Historic Cost Rate of Return: 
(i) NEDO - profits are pre-interest, pre-tax, assets 
are total assets less current liabilities plus short-
term borrowing. 
(ii) Trade and Industry, Bank of England. 
Profits are gross trading profits plus xerit received 
less capital consumption at historic cost. Assets are 
fixed assets (exc. land) at historic cost plus book 
value of stocks. 
3. Replacement cost Rate of Return. 
As for historic cost but depreciation and fixed 
asset valuation based on replacement cost. 
4. Adjusted Replacement Cost Rate of Return. 
As for replacement cost but profit further adjusted 
for stock appreciation. 
-1 
-
- -..T1 
-t-t_J -t++--f-i I f.B,-8-44t~~ ffi ~±±~~f+Et=r=~ ++++---r--L--t--Hl u~ 
1
+ I "-+Ht= 
-t=t+++--\-J +-m 
I 
I 
I 
-
1'-
-
- --~ 11 P. 
- T 
J> 
... 1-:::i 
~ P' \.J 
e 
-
..-
-
. 
<. 
~ ~ 
~ 1 .. ~ 
' 1- , .. 
.. IC 
'1-
1'1-'- ,;: 
' 
' / 
'-
i ll 
I 
II 
I r;; 
""'" ' ! ,.... 
--
·-
-
II' 
~ 1 1 I--, r' 
I~ 
·-· 
i lr-
- ---
- -· 
-
v 1/ I"' 
II-' 
I;-
. I 
' 
. .-
I '-
0 
~ 
, ... 
-<> 
h 
' 1-
J 
-.. 
' 
r 
. 
' 
·-
1--c '/ 
fV 
ti.. I 
I I-' 
~ 1-' 
I ~ 
' 
I<' 
.., 
-
-1\. -
-. 
~ i'c 
··~ .. 
-
c 
-
-
"' , 
<> 
' 
~ 
' 
• I 
rt 0 ~ 
' 
.::r 
"' 
N 
-
-
I 
~.·.: .. . -:. 
~ i.::; ~) 
REFERENCES 
1. S. Aaronovitch .. and M •. c. Sawyer, Mergers, Growth and Concentration 
Oxford ·Economic ·papers Vol. 27 1975 pp .13~_:...155· . 
.......... 
2. L.R. Amey, The"Efficiency·of·Business·Enterprises, Allen and Unwin 1969. 
3. D.F. Arnold and R.J. Huefner, Measuring and Evaluating Replacement Costs:. 
An Application, Jnl. Accounting Research Vol. 15, No. 2, 1977, pp.245-252. 
4·. "'?.A. Bailey, Inflation Accounting: Remedy for a Sandilands Difficulty, 
Times, p.20, 20.1.77. 
5. S.J. Bailey, A-Critique .. of .. U.K. North Sea Oil and Gas Policy, Univ. of 
Strathclyde Dept. Economics, Discussion Paper 76/2. 
6. R.J. Ball, The-Use of Value Added in Measuring Managerial Efficiency, 
Business·Ratios, Summer 1968, pp.5-11. 
7. R. Bates and N. Fraser, Investment·Decisions in the Nationalised Fuel 
Industries, C.U.P. 1974. 
8. W.J. Baumol-and -D.F. Bradford, Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost 
Pricing, ·A.E.R. June 1970. 
9. W.T. Baxter, Accounting Values and Inflation, McGraw-Hill 1974. 
10. , The Sandilands Report, Jnl. Business Finance and Accounting 
Spring 1976, Vol. 3, No. 1. 
11. , The A~countants Safe Haven As Far Away As·Ever, Financial 
Times, p.13, 1.12.76. 
12. , Accountants and Inflation, Lloyds Bank Review, July 1977, 
pp.1-16. 
13. D.M. Beattie, Value Added and Return on Capital as Measures of Managerial 
Efficiency, Jnl. Bus. Finance, Summer 1970. 
14. R.G. Bird\ and A.J. McHugh, Financial Ratios - An Empirical Study, 
Jnl. Business·Finance·and AccountinJ, Vol. 4, No. 1, Spring 1977. 
15. K. Bond, Applying Three Key Tests to Inflation Accounting, Times, p.21, 
24.5.77. 
16. M. Bourn et. al., Price Indices for Current Cost Accounting. Jnl. Business 
Finance·and Accounting Vol. 3 No.5 Autumn 1976. 
17. , Price Indices for Current Cost Accounting: A Rejoinder, 
Jnl. Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 4, No. 1, Spring 1977, 
pp.145-7. 
18. G. Brown and M.B. Johnson, Public Utility Pricing and Output Under Risk, 
A.E.R. March 1969. 
19. 
• 
Public Utility Pricing and Output Under Risk: Reply, A.E.R. 
June 1970. 
20. R.J. Bull, Accounting in Business, 3rd Edn. 1977, Butterworth&. 
21. B. Carlsson, The Measurement of Efficiency in Production: An Application 
to Swedish Manufactur~ng Industries 1968, Swedish Journal of Economics 1972. 
22. R.J. Chambers, Accounting~ 'Evaluation and Economic Behaviour, 
Prentice-Hall 1966. 
23. P. Chantler, The British Gas·Industry- an·Economic Study, M.U.P. 1938. 
24. J. Clayton, Has Sandiland's Been Sabotaged, Times 17.1.77. 
25. A.G. Coenenburg and K. Macharzina, Accounting for Price Changes - an 
Analysis of Current Developments in Germany, Jnl. Business Finance 
and Accounting, Spring 1976, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp.53-68. 
26. M.A. Crew and P.R. Kleindorfer, Reliability and Public Utility Pricing, 
A.E.R. March 1978, pp.31-40. 
27. R.S. Cutler and C.A. Westwick, The Impact of Inflation Accounting on 
the Stock Market, Accountancy, Vol. 83, No.955, March 1973, pp.15-26. 
28. R. Cyert and J.G. March, A Behavioural Theory of the Firm, Prentice-Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1963. 
29. K.W. Dam, The Evolution of North Sea Licensing Policy in Britain and 
Norway, J.L.E. Chicago, October 1974. 
30. P. Dasgupta and G. Heal, The Optimal Depletion of Exhaustible Resources, 
Rev. Econ. Stud. 1974. 
31. O.A. Davis and A.B. Whinston, Welfare and the Theory of Second Best, 
Rev. Econ. Stud. 1965. 
32. Piecemeal Policy in the Theory of Second Best. Rev. Econ. 
Stud. 1967. 
33. E.F. Denison, Why Growth Rates Differ, Brookings Inst. 1967. 
34. P.J. Devine et. al. An Introduction to Industrial Economics, Allen and 
Unwin 1977. 
35. J.L. Eatwell, Growth, Profitability and Size: The Empirical Evidence. 
Appendix A, pp.389-418 in R. Marris and A. Wood (eds.) The Corporate 
Economy, Macmillan 1971. 
36. E.O. Edwards and P.W. Bell, Theory and Measurement of Business Income, 
California University Press, 1961. 
37. D.R. Fairburn, A Howler in the Inflation Accounting Debate, Times, p.19 
30.10.75. 
38. M.J. Farrell, The Measurement of Productive·Efficiency, Journal of 
Royal Statistical Society, Series A (General) Part III 1957. 
39. K. Fleet, The Billion Pound Explosion in Gas, Sunday Times p.61 
31.7.77. 
40. All Gas and Gaiters, Sunday Times, p.45, 7.8.77. 
i-· •. ·~ /.: : '. ; ..) 
41. J. S. Flemmi.ng, Trends in Company Profi tabili t.Y. Bank .of England Quarterly 
Bulletin.Vol. 16 ~o.l 1976 pp. 36-52. 
42. T.D. Flynn,Why we should account for inflation Harvard Business Review 
Sep/Oct. 1977 pp. 145-157. 
43. M. Gibbs, Why Sandiland's is not the full answer Times p. 19, 18.9.75. 
44. , A Better answer to the Problem of Inflation Accounting Times 
23.2. 76. 
45. R.R. Gilchrist, A Measure of Company Efficiency European Business April 
1970, pp. 44-50. 
46. , Company Appraisal and Control by Added Value Analysis 
Cost Accountants Journal Oct. 1970 pp. 573-580. 
47. Godley W. and Cripps R, Profits, Stock Appreciation and the Sandiland's 
Report Times p. 19 1.10.75. 
48. L.A. Gordon, Furthe~ Thoughts on the Accounting Rate of Return vs. The 
Economic Rate of Return Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 
Vol.4. No. 1 Spring 1977. 
49. H.S.E. Gravelle, Public Enterprises under Rate of Return Financial Targets. 
Manchester School of Econ. and· Soc. Stud. March 1976 pp. 1-16. 
50. , Marginal Cost Pricing under Rate of Return Financial Targets, 
Manchester School of Econ. and Soc Stud. Sept. 1977 pp. 236-240. 
51. S.J. Gray, Accounting for Price Changes: A Case Study of A Multinational 
Company. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting Vol 3. No. 1 
Spring 1976, pp.l-14. 
52. S.J. Gray and M.C. Wells, Asset Values and ex post Income. Accounting 
and.Business .Research Summer 1973 pp. 163-7. 
53. A Further Comment on Asset Values and Income 
Measurement, Accounting and Business Research Spring 1975 pp. 91-95. 
54. R.S. Gy,nther, Why use General Purchasing Power~ Accounting and Business 
Research Spring 1974 pp. 141-156. 
55. A.C. Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation American Economic Review 
44(2) 1954 pp. 77-92. 
· 56. J. Hardie, Unrealised Gains Times 13.11.1975. 
57. C. Harlow, Innovation and.Productivity under Nationalisation. published 
by George Allen and Unwin for P.E.P. 1977. 
58. P.D. Henderson, Investment Criteria for public Enterprises{from notes on 
public investment criteria in the U.K. Bull. Oxford Univ. Inst. of Econ 
and Stats. Vol. 27 1965 pp. 55-89)reprinted in (66). 
59. J.R. Hicks Value and Capital Oxford Clarendon Press 1946 Chs. XIV, XV. 
60. H. Hotelli.ng, The Economics of Exhaustible Resources · .. Tournai of Political 
Economy Vol. 39 pp. 137-175. 
61. W.S. Howe, The Inflation Accounting Debate: An Economic Viewpoint 
Moorgate and Wall St. Jnl. Spring 1973. 
62. The Use of Accountancy Data in Measuring Economic Performance. 
Address to A.U.T.A. 1978. 
63. Hyde Committee Inflation Accounting: An Interim Recommendation ICA 1977 
64. I.C.A. Provisional SSAP No.7: Accounting for Changes in the Purchasing 
Power of Money May 1974 I.C.A. 
65. . Exposure Draft E.D.l8: Current Cost Accounting 1976 I.C.A. 
66. P. Jay, A Simple Remedy for the Sandiland's Fallacy Times p. 19 16.10.75. 
67. F.J. Johnson, Marketing Research Used in Tactical Decision Making. 
Conference Papers of Mkt. Research Society 17th Annual Conference 
13-15 Mar. 1974 pp. 7-38. 
68. C. Jones, The Problem of the Profits in State Industries Financial Times 
Dec. 1977. 
69. Nationalised Industries: The Limits to Action. Financial Times 
14.3.78. 
70. J.A. Kay, Inflation Accounting - A Review Article. Economic Journal 
June 1977 pp. 300-311. 
71. C. Kennedy, Inflation Accounting, when profits and potential insolvency 
go hand in hand. Times p. 17 28.10.75. 
72. Cash Flow and Asset Value Times p.l9 5.12.75. 
73. , Sandilands and the Taxation Issue Times p.l9 14.1.76. 
74. , Sandilands: a transparent error Times Feb. 1976 
75. , Inflation Accounting, Profits, Profitability and Share 
Valuation Journal of Business Finance and Accounting Spring 1976. 
Vol. 3 No.1 pp. 137-146. 
76. Comment Jnl. of Business Finance and Accounting Autumn 1976 
Vol 3 No. 3. 
77. , Inflation Accounting: Retrospect and Prospect Cambridge 
Economic Policy Review 1978 pp. 58-64. 
7&M.Laffert~ Accounting Proposals Gain Wide Support Financial Times 
p . 1 1. 12 . 76 . 
79. · ·, Agreement on Hyde Guidelines is expected Today Financi-al Times 
p .1 31. 10. 77. 
80, Lawrance D.M. et.al. Modern .Methods of Valuation .Estates Gazette Ed. 
6, 1975. 
81. G.H. Lawson, Cash Flow Accounting The Accountant 28.10.71. 
82. G.H. Lawson, Inflation Accounting: Another view Times 11.2.76. 
83. , Exposing the Money Gains Fallacy Times 4.3.76. 
84. , Sandilands: Holding Gains, Debt-Financing, Working Capital 
and Current Cost Accounting Jttl. Business Finance and Accounting Spring 
1976 Vol. 3 No.1 pp. 105-114. 
85. , A Reply to Professor Kennedy Jnl. of Business Finance and 
Accounting Vo1.3 No.3. Autumn 1976. 
86. , The Rationale of Cash Flow Accounting, in C.van Dam (ed.) 
Trends in Managerial and Financial Accounting Martinus Nijhoff, Social 
Sciences Division, Leiden/Boston 1978. 
87. , Company Profits: The Grand Illusion Sunday Times p. 61 30.7.78. 
88. T.A. Lee, Income and Value Measurement: Theory and Practice Nelson 1974. 
89. T. A. Lee.-;., Sandi lands and User Comprehension Jnl. of Business Finance 
and Accounting. Spring 1976 Vo1.3 No.1 pp. 85-96. 
90. A. P. Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly . 
Power. Rev. Ec. Stud. June 1943 pp. 157-175. Reprinted in Breit and 
Hochman Readings in'Microeconomics. 
91. Levy-Lambert~ Investment and Pricing Policy in the French Public Sector 
A.E.R. Feb. 1977. 
92. Lex Column, Dr. Morpeth and Mr. Hyde Financial Times 3.11.77. 
93. R.G. Lipsey and K. Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best. Rev. 
Ec. Stud. No.1. 1956. 
94~ · 'I_,M.D~ Lit:tle;··The-Price· .of. Fuel 1953. 
95. S.C. Littlechild, Marginal Cost Pricing with Joint Costs. E.J. June 1970. 
96. C. Lorenz ,:;A European Yardstick for Nationalised Industries Financial 
Times 7.11.77. 
97. , Banning Foul Play in the European Price League. Financial 
Times p.17. 8.11.77. 
98. , The Hidden Items on a Phone Bill. Financial Times 9.11.77. 
99. , Labour productivity: Why Britain may be up to the Germam.Mark. 
Financial Times p.l7 16.11.77. 
100. , How the Post Office toned up its productivity Financial Times 
22.11.77. 
101. B.J. McCormick 1 Review of "Ef:f;iciency Criteria for Nationalised Industries" 
by Alec Nove. E.J. Mar. 1974 pp. 214-215. · 
102. G. Ma_cDonald, Deprival Value: Its Use and Abuse ·Accounting· and ·Business 
Research_Autumn 1977 pp. 263-69. 
103. M.B. McElroy) Capital Gains and Social Income Economic .· IBquiry Vol. XIV 
June 1976 pp. 221-240. 
104. R. Marris and A. Wood (Eds.), The Corporate Economy Macmillan 1971 
105. R.D. Mason,Statistical Techniques in Business and Economics 
Richard D. Irwin Inc. 1974. 
106. G. Meeks,Disappointing Marriages: Gains from Mergers University of Cambridge 
Department of Applied Economics occasional Papers: 51 C.U.P. 1977. 
107. A.J. Merrett, Measuring Trends in Profitability Lloyds Bank Review 
Oct. 1975. pp. 14-26. 
108. and A. Sykes, Sandilands: Considering the Sense and Nonsense 
of Asset Values. Times 20.10.75. 
109. , Merely Metaphysical Lumber Times 18.11.75. 
110. .• Meaningful, not Metaphysical, Accounting 
Arrangements Times Nov.1q75. 
· 111. E.J. Mish~, Second Thoughts on Second Best. Oxford Economic Papers Vol.l4 
No. 3 1962 pp. 205-217. 
112. 0. Morgenstern, On the Accuracy o·f Economic Observations Princeton 1963. 
113. R. Morley,The Rate of Unemployment and the Share of Profit in National 
Income Univ. of Durham W.P. No.l2 Oct. 1977. 
114. D. Morpeth,Accounting Under Inflation Financial Times p. 22 1.12.76. 
115. I. Morriso~Current Cost Accounting Proposals Inappropriate for Financial 
Institutions Times p.l9 27.11.76. 
116. , Inflation Accounting: Seeking a True and Fair View of the 
Banks Times p.23 2.12.76. 
117. R.A. Musgrave, and P.G. Musgrave Public Finance in Theory and Practice 
118. D.R. Myddelton,Untitled Letter Times 20.11.75. 
119. , Why Sandilands is Unacceptable. Jnl. of Business Finance 
and Accounting Spring 1976 Vol. 3 No.1. pp. 97-104. 
120. N.E.D.O. Financial Performance and Inflation 1975. 
121. N.E.D.O. A Study of U.K. Nationalised Industries No. 1976. 
122. J.R. Nelson (ed.), Marginal Cost Pricing in Practice. Prentice-Hall 1964. 
r;: r-.-· =:_, 
Jv d r:J 
123. C. New, Factors in productivity that should not be overlooked Times 
Feb~ 1st 1978. p.19. 
124. G. Newbould,'Management and Merger·Activity Guthstead, Liverpool 1970. 
125. N.H, Nie et.al. Statistical Package for the Social Sciences Manual 
2nd Edn. McGraw-Hill 1975. 
126. D.T. Nguyen and R.A. Whittaker, Inflation, Replacement and Amortisation 
F~ds: A Case Study of U.K. Industries. Jnl. of Business Finance and Ace. 
pp. 43-52. Spring 1976 Vo1.3. No. 1. 
127. C.W. Nobes, C.C.A. -Valuation by Intent? Accounting and Business Research 
Spring 1977 pp. 95-99. 
128. A. No.ve, Efficiency Criteria for Nationalised Industries George Allen 
and Unwin 1973. 
129. M. Panic and R.E. Clos~Profitability of British Manufacturing Industry 
Lloyds Bank Review July 1973 pp. 17-30. 
130. I. Papps, Government and Enterprise I.E.A.· Hobart Paper 61 1975. 
131. ________ , Review of (4) J.E.L. Vol. XIV No. 2 June 1976 pp.504-5. 
132. , Concepts of Income and the Measurement of Firm Performance 
Univ. of Durham Economics Department W.P. No.21 August 1978. 
133, K.V. Peasnall and L.C.L. Skerratt, Price Indices for Current Cost Accounting-
a Reply and some Further Evidence. Jnl. of Business Finance and Accounting. 
Spring 1977 Vo1.4. No.1. pp. 139-144. 
134. J.R. Perrin, Inflation Accounti~g is not economic Valuation. Jou~cal of 
Business Finance and Accounting Spring 1976. Vo1.3 No.1. 
135. , Untitled Letter Times 4.3.76. 
136. N. Pilkington, If Anyone is wrong it is not Sandilands Times Oct. 1975. 
137. G. Polanyi, North Sea Gas and the Future of the Gas Industry N.West Fuel 
Luncheon Club Address April 6th 1966. 
138. _____ ._., What Price North Sea Gas? I.E.A. J{obart paper No.···38. 1968. 
139. and P. Polanyi, The Efficiency of Nationalised Industries 
Moorgate· and Wall St. Jnl. Spring 1972. 
140. P.E.P., Report on the Gas Industry P.E.P. 1939. 
141. B. Popoff, The Informational Value of Replacement Cost Accounting for 
External Company Reports. Accounting and Business Research Winter 1974 
pp. 61-70. 
142. R.W.S. Pryke, Are Nationalised Industries Becoming More Efficient? 
Moorgate and Wall St. Jnl. Spring 1970. 
143. R.W.S. Pryke.:~. Public Enterprise in Practice MacGibbon and Kee 1971 
144. Book Review of (146) E.J. March 1974 pp. 215-217. 
145. , Badly directed and badly managed. Guardian Dec.6th 1976 p.l4. 
146. , Book Review of (118) E.J. Sept 1977 pp. 598-600. 
147. P.W. Reed, The Economics of Public Enterprise Butterworth & Co. 1973 
148. R. Rees, Second Best Rules for Public Enterprise Pricing. Economica 
August 1968. 
149. G.L. Reid et.al. The Nationalised Fuel Industries. 1973. 
150. C. Robinson, A Policy for Fuel I.E.A. Occ. Paper 31. 1969 
151. C. Robinson and J. Morgan, Economic Consequences of Controlling the 
Depletion of North Sea Oil and Gas. Trade Policy Research Centre London 
Guest Paper No.3 1976. 
152. W.A. Robson, The Control of Nationalised Industries National Westminster 
Bank Review No. 1977 pp. 6-16. 
153. Sir D. Rooke, Gas Accounts Soundly Based Sunday Times p. 48 7.8.77. 
154. C. K. Row;L_eY:,•. The Monopolies Commission and Rate of Return on Capital 
. Economic Journal March 1969. 
155. The Monopolies Commission arid Rate of Return on Capital: 
A Reply Economic Journal Sept. 1971. 
156. N. Ruggles,Recent Developments in the Theory of Marginal ·Cost Pricing 
Rev. Ec. Stud. Vol.l7 1949-50 pp. 107-126. 
157. M.F.G. Scott,Sandilands: Holding Gains Times 27.11.75. 
158. L. Shashua andY. Goldschmidt,A Tool for Inflation Adjustment of 
Financial Statements Journal of Business Finance and Accounting Spring 
1976 Vol.3 No.1. pp. 33-47. 
159. W.G. Shepherd, Economic Performance under Public Ownership Yale Univ. 
Press 1965~ 
160. , Alternatives for Public Expenditure. Ch.IX in R.E. Caves 
et.al. Britain's Economic Prospects George Allen and Unwin 1968 .. 
161. et.al. Public Enterprise: Economic Analysis in Theory and 
Practice Lexington Books. 1976. · 
162. M. Sherer and A. Southworth,Accounting for Nationalised Industries in 
B. Carsber·g and T. Hope (eds.) Current Issues in Accounting Philip Allan 
1977. 
163. S. Siegel,Nonparametric Statistics McGraw-Hill 1956. 
l~: r· ~ ~ ~;; 7it 
164. A. Silbertson and D .. Solomons, Monopoly Investigation and the Rate of 
Return on Capital Emp.loyed. Economic Journal Dec. 1952. 
165. J. Sizer~ An Insight. into Management Accounting Pelican 1972. 
166. R.M. Solow, The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics. 
American Economic Review May 1974. 
167. E. Stamp,ED18 and Curren~ Cost Accounting: A Review Article Accounting 
and Business Research Spring 1977.pp. 83-94. 
168. P.E.M. Standish,Implementing Sandilands: Issues for the Steering Group 
Jnl. Business Finance and Accounting Spring 1976 Vol.3 No.1. pp. 147-160. 
169. 0. Stanley,The Case for Reforming Company Taxation p.l9 Times 10.3.76. 
170. F.H. Stephen, On Deriving the Internal Rate of Return from the Accountants' 
Rate of Return Jnl. of Business Finance and Accounting Vol.3. No.2 
Summer 1976. 
171. G.J. Stigler, Production and Distribution Theories Macmillan 1946. 
172. ,and C. Friedland, \Vhat can Regulators Regulate? The Case 
of Electricity Jnl. Law and Economics Oct. 1962. 
173. ! Capital and Rates of Return in Manufacturing Industry. 
N.Y. PUP 1963. 
174. M.T. Sumner, Neutrality of Corporate Taxation or on Not Accounting 
for Inflation Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies (43) 1975. 
175. A. Sutherland, The Monopolies Commission: A Critique of Dr. Rowley 
Economic Journal June 1971. 
176. D. Swann et.al. Competition in British Industry George Allan and Unwin 
1973. 
177. Competition in British Industry - Case Studies 
Loughborough: Loughborough University _1973. 
178. W.D. Targett, Financial Objectives: The Record of British Gas Public. 
Admin. Summer 1977. pp. 171-179. 
179. L. Taylor Harrington, Problems of Using Return on Capital as a Measure 
of Business Success Manchester Statistical Society 8th March 1961. 
180. L. Tivey, The Nationalised Industries Since 1960 George Allen and Unwin 1973. 
181. D. Todd, On the Concept and Measurement of Business Efficiency: A Survey 
H.M. Treasury, London Sept. 1977. 
182. R. Turvey, Marginal Cost Pricing in Practice Economics 1964. 
183. Peak Load Pricing Jnl. Political Economy _Feb. 1968. 
l-' ,.. :--.1 
~ ~] ~J 
184. R. Turvey, (ed.) Public Enterprise Pe_nguin Modern Economics 1968. 
185. Public Utility Pricing and Output Under Risk: Comment A.E.R. 
S~pt. 1970. 
186. , Economic Analysis and Public Enterprises George Allen and Unwin 1971. 
187. , Demand and Supply London 1971. 
188. J. Tzoannos, An Empirical Study of Peak Load Pricing and Investment 
Policies for the Domestic Market of Gas in Great· Britain. Applied Economics 
Vol.9 No.2 ~une 1977 pp. 133-153. 
189. M.A. Utton, On Measuring the Effects of Industrial Mergers Scottish Journal 
of"Political Economy Vol.21 1974 pp. 13-28. 
190. P.T. Wanless, Inflation and the Comparability of Accounts Jnl. Business 
Finance and Accounting Spring 1976 Vol.3 No.1 pp. 69-84. 
191. C.J. Warrell, The Enterprise Value Concept of Asset Valuation Accounting 
and Business Research Summer 1974 pp. 220-226. 
192. .":P.L. Watson, Sandilands and Monetary Liabilities Times 10.3.76. 
193. M.G. Webb, The Economics of Nationalised Industries George Allen and Unwin 1973. 
194. , Pricing Policies for Public Enterprises. Macmillan Studies in 
Economics 1976. 
195. M.C. Weinstein and R.J. Zeckhauser, The Optimal Consumption of Depletable 
Natural Resources. Quarterly Jnl. Economics 1975. 
196. G. Whittington,The Prediction of Profitability and Other Studies of 
Company Behaviour University of Cambridge, Department of Applied Economics 
Occasional Paper:22 C.U.P. 1971. 
197. G. Whittington, Asset Valuation, Income Measurement and Accounting Income 
Accounting and Business Research Spring 1974 pp. 96-102. 
198. , Book Review- Baxter on Inflation Accounting, Accounting 
and Business Research Autumn 1975 pp. 314-317. 
199. , Accounting for Inflation. The Sandilands Report - a Critique, 
The Banker Oct. 1975. pp. 1185-1189. 
200. , Accounting and Economics in B. Carsberg and T. Hope (ed). 
Current Iss~es in Accounting Philip Allan 1977. 
201. G. Whittington, A Critique of Accounting Ratios. Univ. of Glasgow Accounting 
Research Workshop W.P. 3-778. 
202. C. Wilkins,Accountants Support Sandilands, but Leave Banks Position Open 
to Debate. Times 1.12.76. 
203. O.E. Williamson, Peak Load Pricing, from Peak Load Pricing and Optimal 
Capacity under Indivisibility Constraints. A.E.R. Vol. 56 (1966) pp. 81~-27. 
Reprinted in R .. 'Purvey (ed). (184). 
204. O.E. Williamson,Man.agerial Discretion, Organisational Form, and the 
Multi-Division Hypothesis, in R. Marris and P.A. Wood (eds.) 
.The Corporate Economy Macmillan 1971. 
205. G. Wilson, Inflation Accounting as a Defence Against Being Precisely 
Wrong Times p.23 1.12.76. 
206. E.G. Wood, A New Light on Lame Ducks Financial Times May 16th 1972. 
207. , Your Productivity Slip is Showing Financial Times Jan. 23rd. 1973. 
208. , A Better Deal for Productivity. Times Oct. 17th 1973. 
209. How Wages Compare Financial Times 8.2.74. 
210. The Best Yardstick for Performance. Financial Times Sept. 4th 1974. 
211. , Productivity Cannot be Bought. Financial Times_ Oct.22nd 1974. 
212. Manpower Productivity in British Industry. Work Study· and 
Management Services Sept. 1975. 
213. :::---:---:-~='(~ 
Ltd. 1975. 
Comparative Performance of British Industries Graham and Trotman 
214. , Stopping the Spiral - with Pay Linked to Company Income Times 
Nov. lOth 1975. 
215. , Figuring out the Future of the British Steel Industry Times 
Mar. 1st 1976. 
216. 
-----
, Output in the year of the Great Inflation Times 2.5.77. 
217. , A Policy for Pay and Productivity Times 4.5.77. 
218. H. Yoshida, Some Comments on C.P.P. Accounting. Journal of Business Fiance 
Finance and Accounting Vol.3. No. 3. Autumn 1976. 
219. C. Zwagerman, Accounting in the Netherlands Times 3.12.75. 
Unattributed Articles 
220. Definitive Draft Plans Published Financial Times 1.12.76. pp. 11-12. 
221. Hyde Accounting Guidelines Given General Support Financial Times 4.11.77. 
~-· P"" r.-.J ~~.: =_ ·~ 
GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS 
Government·Acts 
Gl Gas Act 1972 
·Command Papers 
G2 The Financial and Economic Objectives of·the Nationalised Industries 
Cmnd 1337 (April 1961.) HMSO. 
G3 Nationalised Industries: A Review of Economic and Financial Objectives 
Cmnd 3437 (1967). HMSO. 
G4 F. Sandilands Inflation Accounting Cmnd 6225 (1975). HMSO. 
G5 Modification to the Price Code: A Consultative Document (1977). 
G6 The Future of Company Reports Cmnd 6888 (1978). 
G7 The Nationalised Industries Cmnd 7131 (1978). 
House of Commons Papers 
G8 Price Commission South of Scotland Electricity Board - Price Increases 
in the Supply.of Electricity H.C. Paper 535 (1978). 
Other HMSO Publications 
G9 Government Statistical Service (C.S.O.) Price Index Numbers for C.C.A. 
HMSO. Annually from 1975. 
c.~: r· ~~) 
~ ;_,~ (.). 
DATA REFERENCES 
I. INFLATION ACCOUNTING ·suRVEY 
1. Public·sector 
Dl BOAC Annual Report and Accounts 1969/70 HC Paper 45 (1969/70). 
D2 B.A. Annual Report and Accounts 1973/'4 .. 
D3 II II II II 1974/5. 
D4 II II II II 1975/6. 
D5 II II II II 1976/7. 
D6 II II II II 1977/8. 
D7 BGC Annual Report and Acc<?unts 1972/3. 
DB II II II II 1973/4. 
D9 II II II II 1974/5. 
DlO II II II II 1975/6. 
Dll II II II II 1976/7. 
Dl2 II II II II 1977/8. 
Dl3 British Rail Annual Report and Accounts 1975. 
Dl4 " " " " " " 1977. 
Dl5 BSC Annual Report and Accounts 1975/6. 
Dl6 " " " " 1976/7. 
Dl7 " " " " 1977/8. 
Dl8 Electricity Council Annual, Reports. and.Accounts 1972/3. 
- -
Dl9 " " " " " " 1973/4. 
D20 " " " " " " 1974/5. 
D21 " " " II " " 1975/6. 
D22 " " " " " " 1976/7 . 
D23 " ... " II II " 1977/8. 
D24 NBC Annual R_eport and Accounts 1974. 
D25 " " " " 1976. 
D26 " " II II 1977. 
.. ~: r· .-, 
(.; :_;; .~-~ 
D27 NCB Annual Report and Accounts 1976/7. 
D28 II II II II 1977/8. 
D29 NFC Annual Report and·Accounts 1972. 
D30 II II " II II 1976. 
D31 II II " II II 1977 .. 
D32 Gen. Post Office Annual Report and Accounts 1947/48 H.C. Paper 22 (1947 /8). 
D33 Post Office Annual Report and Accounts 1975/6. 
D34 II II II II II II 1977/8 
2. Private Sector 
Cement Industry 
D35 Abert haw and Bristol Portland Cement Co. Ltd. Annual Report and Accounts 197E 
D36 II II II II II II II II II II II 197~ 
D37 Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd. II II II II 197E 
D38 II II II II II II II II II 1977 
D39 Ketton Portland Cement Co. Ltd. II II II II 197~ 
D40 Rugby Portland Cement Co. Ltd. II II II II 1976 
D41 II II II II II II II II II 1977 
D42 Tunnel Holdings Ltd. II II II II 1976 
D43 
" 
II II II II II II 1977 
Others 
D44 I.C.I. Annual Report and Accounts 1976. 
D45 II II II II II 1977. 
D46 Shell UK Ltd. Annual Report and Accounts 1976. 
D47 II II II II II II II 1977. 
D48 Shell Transport and Trading Co. Ltd. Annual Report_ and Accounts 1976. 
D49 II II II " II II II II II II 1977-. 
D50 British Petroleum Co. Ltd. Annual Report. and Accounts 1976. 
D51 II II II II II II II II 1977. 
~~-:. 
'0V 
II COMPARISONS OF RATES OF RETURN 
D52 Gas Council Annual:Reports·and Accounts 1949/50 to 1971/72. 
D53 N.E.D.O. Financial Performance·and Inflation 1975 pp. 4,15. 
D54 Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin Mar. 1976 Trends in Company 
Profitability pp.36-52. 
D55 , Quarterly Bulletin June 1977 Supplementary Note 
to the Economic Commentary pp.156-161. 
D56 Trade and Industry, 24th Oct. 1975 pp.244-247 Estimating Companies' 
Rate of Return on Capital Employed. 
D57 , 8th Oct. 1976 pp.ll0-112 Companies' Rate of 
Return on Capital Employed, 1960 to 1975. 
D58 , 16th Sept. 1977 pp.519-22 Companies' Rate of 
Return on Capital Employed 1960 to 1976. 
D59 Economic Trends, Nov.1974 Estimating Companies' Rate of Return 
on Capital Employed. 
D60 C.K. Rowley, The Monopolies Commission and Rate of Rate of Return 
on Capital. Economic Journal Mar. 1969 pp.42-65 at p.48. 
D61 Monopolies Commission Report on Metal Container·s 10.7.1970 
H.C. Paper 6 (1970) H.M.S.O. Appendix 4 p.ll9 et. seq. 
D62 , Report on Flour and Bread 14.7.77 H.C. Paper 412 
(1977) p.89 para. 396. 
D63 , Report on Flat Glass. 
D64 , Report on Frozen Foodstuffs 9.11.76 H.C. Paper 
674 (1976). 
